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Abstract
Members of Congress have been consistently asked to “tone down the rhetoric.”
Implicit in these calls is the assumption that congressional anger has a negative e↵ect
on political participation. To test this claim, this dissertation considers whether
anger increases or decreases voter turnout in the 111th and 112th U.S. House of
Representatives. Although there are a number of ways to measure anger, this study
employs a unique data set of over 7,000 floor speeches, in which the text and audio
are used in order to quantify the degree to which a member of Congress is angry.
Ultimately, I find not only can text and audio data be used for the purpose of
emotional classification, but when this is done, anger is found to be an important
predictor of voter turnout and the margin of victory. In terms of the former, districts
vote more when their representatives are exceptionally angry, whereas the inverse is
true when it comes to the vote margin. Collectively, this suggests that anger may
cause voters to turn out more on Election Day, but generally they do so in order to
vote against anger.
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Chapter 1
“Tone Down the Rhetoric”
1.1 Introduction
Ever since the shooting of Gabrielle Gi↵ords (D-AZ), politicians and pundits alike
have been calling on Congress to “tone down the rhetoric.” Whether it is President
Obama in his 2009 State of the Union Address or Paul Krugman in his oft-cited article
“Climate of Hate,” many seem to argue that extraordinary displays of anger are
somehow detrimental to our democracy (Krugman, 2011). Generally, this argument
centers on not only what we expect from our representatives, but also what we expect
from the political process as a whole. While we all get angry from time to time, we
often times expect our representatives to govern with a more level head, especially
when dealing with the important issues of the day. In this way, we expect our
representatives to somehow stand above the fray. Indeed, children know they should
control their temper, why should we expect anything less from our representatives?
However, to some, not only is ranting and raving on the House floor something
to be expected, but it is a necessary part of representation. For example, when Joe
Wilson (R-NY) yelled “You Lie!” on the House floor, many felt what he said and
how he said it perfectly echoed their own angst and outrage at President Obama
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and the policies he has passed (see Figure 1.1). This is not to say that what Joe
Wilson did was right, but instead to suggest that people around the country have
become increasingly angry, making expressions of congressional anger not simply an
example of an uncontrollable emotional outburst, but an expression of an underlying
emotional tenor which many representatives face on a daily basis from voters inside
and outside of Washington, D.C.
Given that, what are the consequences of congressional anger? While scholars
have spent considerable time talking about the e↵ects of things like political incivility,
no one has considered whether something as simple as losing one’s cool could have
an equal e↵ect on the electorate. When Peter King (R-NY) loses his temper on the
House floor, do his constituents respond positively or negatively? When Anthony
Weiner (D-NY) points and shouts at Republicans, do people in New York reward
or punish him at the polls? Unfortunately, we simply do not know the answers to
these questions, because the majority of research has focused exclusively on political
incivility, which anger is not.
Unlike incivility, anger is anger, regardless of whether representatives are arguing
on the House floor or in their living rooms. However, what is and is not “civil” is
context dependent. For example, if Joe Wilson would have called the president
a liar on Fox News the reaction would have been entirely di↵erent. Similarly,
when Anthony Weiner points and shouts at Republicans during the course of a
congressional debate people are going to hold him to a di↵erent standard than if he
would have done the same thing in his own district (see Figure 1.2). The State of the
Union address, like the House floor, has certain norms that people are expected to
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follow. Joe Wilson violated those norms, making his an example of political incivility.
Unfortunately, while we all know there is a di↵erence between anger and incivility,
scholars have said very little about the causes and consequences of congressional
anger.
However, this is not to say the two concepts are entirely independent. In fact,
often times anger and incivility go hand-in-hand. I am sure many of us have probably
experienced this when arguing with a loved one. Perhaps, you forgot to take out the
trash and your significant other confronts you, reminding you not only that you
forgot to take out the trash this week, but you have forgotten to take the trash out
the last couple of weeks. To this, you respond that you should not have to take out
the trash, because you are constantly picking up after your significant other. From
here, an argument ensues. At first, the exchanges are rather tame, a little yelling, but
nothing much more. Then, slowly, but surely, you begin to get angrier and angrier,
until you reach a boiling point where the next little thing will surely set you o↵.
Up until now, you have had a typical fight, tempers flared, but no real damage was
done. However, this suddenly changes, when you say, without thinking, “sometimes
you can be a real slob!” This causes the gloves to really come o↵. Now, every other
word is an insult, and what was once a healthy argument between two loved ones
has become increasingly bitter and probably something you both will later regret.
Somewhere between raising the tone of your voice and insults we find the argument
moving from anger to incivility. While this transition does not always take place,
often times when we are angry incivility comes naturally since the norms we know
we should follow are quickly thrown out the window when we are in a heated battle.
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However, this is not to say that when people are angry they are also uncivil. Indeed,
there are countless examples of incivility that are unassociated with anger. Perhaps
instead of yelling “sometimes you can be a real slob!” you say something passive
aggressive, where the intent is to insult your loved one, but you do so in a calm
and collected manner. This is why studying anger is not the same thing as studying
incivility, since you can have one without the other. The question becomes which is
more important as an area of study?
While both have their merits, to me, I find anger to be more indicative of the
types of outbursts we typically see on Capitol Hill. Members of Congress, like you
and I, are emotional beings. However, for every Joe Wilson, there are countless others
who express their emotions in a civilized manner. Instead of yelling “You Lie!” at
the president, they raise the tone of their voice when talking about Obamacare on
the House Floor. Instead of waving a finger and yelling “Sit down!,” they become
frustrated when a bill they care about is being obstructed by their opponents. In
these instances, anger is a natural reaction. Representatives are not legislative
automatons. Rather, they are individuals who care passionately about issues and the
people they represent. Sometimes their emotions get the better of them. While the
JoeWilsons of the world are important, this dissertation considers whether something
as simple as anger can have a similar e↵ect on the electorate.
Answering this question is di cult, because anger, unlike incivility, is di cult,
if not impossible to control. When we get into an argument with a loved one, we
probably do not plan on losing our temper. Instead, the circumstances surrounding
the altercation contribute to us losing our cool. Perhaps, we were having a bad
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day? Maybe we did not get enough sleep the night before? Who knows? What is
important, is that we sometimes give anger a free pass, meaning when we see displays
of anger, especially from people we have known for a long time, we often times just
chalk those outbursts up to individuals simply letting their emotions get the better
of them. Joe Wilson said this much immediately following his outburst. Specifically,
he said:
This evening I let my emotions get the best of me when listening to the
President’s remarks regarding the coverage of illegal immigrants in the
health care bill. While I disagree with the President’s statement, my
comments were inappropriate and regrettable. I extend sincere apologies
to the President for this lack of civility (Hulse, 2009).
Perhaps this is why many in Joe Wilson’s district responded so favorably to
his outburst. Not only was there an outpouring of support from his constituents,
but shortly after he yelled “You Lie!” he received millions and millions of campaign
contributions (Harnby, 2009). This suggests people did not pull away from the
democratic process immediately following his outburst, but instead became more
engaged. This is why it is not entirely surprising that Joe Wilson was re-elected in
the 2010 Congressional elections. Even though people speak out against incivility,
they also speak in favor of anger, meaning when Joe Wilson yelled “You Lie” people
were disappointed where he expressed his anger, but they were not opposed to him
being angry.
In many ways, Americans may actually want their representatives to be more, not
less angry. This is because Americans themselves have become increasingly angry
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at a variety of things ranging from Obamacare to someone cutting you o↵ in tra c.
For example, shortly after tempers flared during the 2010 Florida primary former
Governor Charlie Crist said, “This past week or 10 days in Florida it has been a
very angry tone, and regrettably, amazingly negative. My hope is, as a Floridian, as
an American, we can get away from that negative tone” (Weeks, 2012). To which,
Linton Weeks of National Public Radio said:
Good luck. We are in an angry, angry time. On the right, the Tea Party
stages protests. On the left, the Occupy movement occupies. The Arizona
governor wags an angry finger in the president’s face. Candidates snarl
at one another. Voters yell at candidates. Everybody is angry about
something, even if it’s just about the anger of everybody else (Weeks,
2012).
This emotional tenor partially explains why many people responded positively to
Joe Wilson’s outburst, but this is not to say that people did not hold Joe Wilson
responsible for his actions. Indeed, while Americans may be angry, they are not
necessarily uncivil, and in fact respond negatively to displays of incivility. For
example, in a 2010 poll conducted by Daniel Shea at Allegheny College 95 percent
of Americans agreed that political civility was necessary for a healthy democracy.
Similarly, in a 2012 poll conducted by Weber Shandwick, 65 percent of Americans
say that lack of civility is a major problem, with nearly 50 percent of those same
respondents saying they were withdrawing from the basic tenets of democracy -
government and politics - because of incivility.
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Collectively, this leads to a very interesting puzzle. While Americans seem to
be troubled by displays of incivility, they are not necessarily troubled by displays
of anger. Given that, when we ask whether displays of congressional anger have
a positive or negative e↵ect on the electorate, it is di cult to answer given what
we already know. On the one hand, perhaps Americans see temper tantrums on
the House floor as being detrimental to the political process, while on the other
hand, Americans may see these same displays of emotion as a reflection of their own
internal angst and outrage, meaning more, not less, anger is what they want from
their representatives.
Unfortunately, answering these types of questions is extraordinarily di cult since
members of Congress, like justices of the Supreme Court and presidents of the United
States, are unlikely to answer questions regarding how they feel on any given day.
Indeed, it is di cult enough to get a straight answer from politicians about their
positions on a given issue, let alone get politicians to answer questions about whether
they are angry. Consequently, in order to answer even a basic question like, “who
is the most angry member of Congress?” one must develop a new way to determine
who is and who is not “angry.” Fortunately, while members of Congress are unlikely
to answer surveys, they are likely to appear on television, especially since the advent
of CSPAN where every minute of every floor debate is not only broadcast live, but
is available online well after the fact. Using the text and audio of these speeches
I will show not only can one determine who is and who is not “angry,” but when
one does one can derive substantively meaningful insights regarding other facets of
congressional behavior.
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However, before we dive into the details of emotional classification, we need to
understand the causes and consequences of “anger.” While many of us think we know
anger when we see it, there is considerable debate over what constitutes “anger.” To
some, “anger” has a very specific definition, meaning you are either angry or your
not. However, to others, “anger” represents one point in a multidimensional space
where emotions are organized using some overarching properties. Even though most
political scientists see anger as constituting the former, most in psychology have
moved to the latter simply because “anger” has turned out to be more complicated
than originally thought. In this dissertation, I adhere to the latter for both theoretical
and methodological reasons. When we interpret “anger” using predetermined
definitions it constricts our ability to discuss more subtle variations in one’s “anger”
which in politics are not only important, but I argue essential to understanding how
anger functions on a day-to-day basis. Indeed, for every outburst of anger there are
literally hundreds, if not thousands, of other less extreme types of emotional displays
which are far more common. The question becomes what are the consequences of
these lesser forms of anger? In the next chapter, I will begin to provide an answer.
Unfortunately, Chapter 3 shows it is di cult to answer these types of questions
using our existing methodological approach. Whether it is asking someone whether
President Obama makes them “angry” or Republicans makes them “happy,”
embedded within our measurement of anger is an assumed definition which may
or may not be grounded in theory. Even when these questions are converted into
multiple point scales we are still missing considerable variance. This is why the
methodological approach I present here is not only useful for those studying political
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elites, but I argue it is useful for any scholar of emotion in politics. Given that, I will
spend considerable time discussing the intricacies of text and audio analysis, but I
want to be clear that this is only one way to operationalize “anger.” Indeed, there
are lots of ways one can operationalize a multidimensional model, some of which are
more accessible than others. In this way, text and audio analysis should be seen as
a means and not an end. One should view the approach used here as one way to
push scholars towards a model of “anger,” which I argue is more useful, and perhaps,
better than the way we have defined “anger” in the past.
To validate the measure introduced in this study, Chapter 4 will answer some
basic, yet fundamentally important questions, like, who is the angriest member
of Congress? What groups are angrier than others? When speaking, what topics
increase the level of anger? These questions are not only important for determining
whether anger can be e↵ectively classified using the approach introduced in this
study, but they also help lay the foundation for studying anger on Capitol Hill.
Many people have various assumptions about who is and who is not “angry,” but it
is unclear whether these assumptions are empirically grounded. Is Joe Wilson one of
the angriest members of Congress? Are members of the Tea Party angrier than other
groups? Even though we may have some insights into the answers to these types of
questions, to date, we simply do not know. In this way, this chapter will help us
begin to understand the characteristics of congressional anger, while simultaneously
demonstrating the utility of text and audio data.
When this is done, we can begin to understand the consequences of anger in a
new light. For example, while we have all learned from a very early age that we
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should control our temper, it is unclear how voters respond when they see displays
of congressional anger. Do they withdraw from the political process? Or do they
become more engaged? Similarly, do they punish a member of Congress for being
too angry? Or do they reward him? Here, each of these questions are intricately
related to how we define “anger.” While many will think of Joe Wilson when we
ask about anger, I will demonstrate that Joe Wilson is the exception, not the rule,
meaning more mundane forms of anger may have di↵erent e↵ects than previously
thought. Incivility and anger are two di↵erent things. While people may generally
be opposed to incivility, we do not know whether people will be opposed to “anger.”
As will be seen in Chapters 5 and 6, voters respond di↵erently to anger and incivility,
suggesting anger is not only interesting, but worthy of study in and of itself.
However, these results are only the tip of the iceberg. Indeed, while this study
focuses exclusively on the e↵ects of anger on political participation, one could imagine
that the e↵ect of anger on political elites may be distinctly di↵erent from the e↵ect
of anger on the mass public. Are angry members of Congress more or less successful
in the legislature? Do they pass more bills? Are they more central in
sponsorship-cosponsorship networks? Even though this dissertation will not answer
these questions, it will use these questions as a way to discuss directions for future
research. In political science, we often focus on how members of Congress can a↵ect
voters, but what about other members of Congress? I think this latter question is
of equal import and can be addressed using the theoretically and methodological
approach outlined in this study. Given that, the last chapter will begin to provide a
framework for asking these and other types of questions which may be of interest to
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legislative scholars as a whole.
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Chapter 2
Anger on Capitol Hill
2.1 Introduction
Anger and politics go hand-in-hand. Whether it is Joe Wilson yelling or Preston
Brooks beating Charles Sumner with a cane, members of Congress have often gotten
angry. Unfortunately, to date, we know little about the causes and consequences
of congressional anger. Are certain members of Congress more angry than others?
What e↵ects do outbursts of anger have on the American public? While political
scientists have spent considerable time studying anger at the mass-level, few have
considered whether these studies can be applied to political elites. I argue in Chapter
3 this is partially due to a lack of readily available data, but I also think it is due to
how we conceptualize “anger.” This chapter will explore this latter point and show
how a re-definition of anger can help us to begin to understand anger on Capitol
Hill, and in doing so, expand our understanding of emotion and politics as a whole.
For the purposes of this chapter, I think it is useful to begin with an example.
Imagine you are driving home after a long day at work. The whole time you are
thinking about your favorite chair and what you are going to watch on television
once you get home. Around you horns are honking, people are yelling, but the
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thought of a relaxing evening is so strong the sounds of these annoyances become
surprisingly muted. You pull into your driveway. Open the door. And just as you
are about to plop down in your favorite chair your loved one asks you why you did
not take out the trash. Any other time this inquiry would not cause you to get
angry, but something about the way it was said and the thought of your favorite
chair triggered something inside of you, and an argument ensues.
At first, the argument is rather tame, but slowly and surely the argument escalates.
Your loved one begins to talk about other times you have forgotten to take out the
trash, some of which seemed like they had been years, if not decades, before. This
causes you to make some accusations of your own. Maybe they had forgotten how
they had dinged up your car last year. Or maybe they had forgotten to put the
toilet seat down or clean up their make-up. Eventually, your growing anger causes
you to recall nearly ever instance of anger you have felt towards your loved one since
you started dating. Then, with your heart pounding and your skin sweating, these
accusations turn into insults and what was once a typical argument has turned into
something much worse. Something which will undoubtedly have future repercussions
on your relationship and your ability to enjoy your favorite chair in peace.
Even though politics is undoubtedly di↵erent the crux of the theory advanced in
this dissertation can be found in this fictional scenario. Whether it is on Fox News
or CSPAN, congressional anger, like a loved one yelling at you, can be jarring and
disconcerting. In some instances it is your own representative who gets out of line
and in other instances it is someone like Peter King pointing a finger at Democrats on
the House floor. Either way, going into the encounter you have certain expectations
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regarding how Congress should behave and outbursts of anger break you from this
routine. Unlike an argument with a loved one, there is typically no interaction
between a representative and a constituent, but the arguments constituents observe
between representatives can have similar e↵ects. When a loved one gets angry, this
either confirms what you already know about the person or introduces a new trait.
Your own proclivity for anger influences how you react in both situations. If you are
typically a fiery person, perhaps these types of altercations are just what the doctor
ordered, whereas if you are less emotional maybe these same exchanges cause you
to withdraw all together. The relationship between constituents and their members
of Congress is similar. For constituents who are angry, outbursts of anger may be
desirable, where the inverse is true for those who are not.
However, before we dive too deeply into the consequences of congressional anger,
we need to get a better understanding of what is and is not “anger.” This fictional
exchange is useful in this regard. For example, when you began to argue with your
loved one, when did you move from being “upset” to being truly “angry”? Was
it when you started making accusations? Or was it when insults began flying left
and right? Those adhering to the discrete perspective would argue that certain
criteria can be used to make these distinctions. Maybe we want to say “anger”
encompasses accusations, but not insults. Maybe being “upset” implies your heart
rate has increases, but your palms do not sweat. Even though these examples are far
from how most di↵erentiate between di↵erent types of “anger”, discrete definitions
of anger are grounded in similar choices. However, instead of classifying anger post
hoc, many scholars argue the di↵erence between “anger” and other emotions such
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as “fear” lies in the neurological origins of anger which, in the case of the former,
cause one to approach the source of one’s anger, whereas in the latter avoidance is
the more typical response.
The dimensional perspective, on the other hand, does not argue that “anger” has
certain criteria that makes it di↵erent from being “upset” or “fearful,” but, instead
“anger” and other emotions each represent one point in a common multidimensional
space which describes all the emotions one feels on a daily basis, both big and small.
While these dimensions are also grounded in how the brain responds to emotional
stimuli, scholars advocating this approach are less likely to di↵erentiate between
specific emotional states. For example, both “anger” and “fear” may constitute
distinct points on a common multidimensional space, but they are not necessarily
conceptually di↵erent. Instead, these words are used simply as a way to talk about
the underlying dimensions, which ultimately are what constitute one’s emotional
relationship with the external world. In this way, we can say “anger” and “fear” are
di↵erent, but both are among the many ways we can describe the multidimensional
space in which we live.
2.2 A↵ective Intelligence
Marcus, Neuman, and MacKuen (2000) are perhaps the most well-known proponents
of this latter perspective. To them, emotion is organized around two dimensions,
enthusiasm and anxiety, where the former refers to the degree to which an emotional
stimulus is consistent with one’s actions, thoughts, and routines, and the latter refers
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to the degree to which an emotional stimulus is considered novel or threatening.
Each of these trigger di↵erent underlying systems and a↵ect behavior accordingly.
Enthusiasm, they argue, results when a stimulus signals one’s goals are being met,
thus reinforcing habitual behavior and attitudes (dispositional system). Anxiety,
on the other hand, is triggered when danger lies ahead. This causes the individual
to pay extra attention to the external environment which results in an increased
reliance on new information and a decrease in the use of previous patterns of behavior
(surveillance system).
For example, when you came home you were expecting to do what you always
do. Sit down in your favorite chair and turn on the television. This habitual pattern
of behavior was interrupted when your loved one scolded you for not taking out the
trash. At this point, you begin to pay more attention to what your loved one is saying
and how it makes you feel. Perhaps, up until today, your loved one typically does
not get angry about chores, or maybe they never raise their voice. This makes the
present argument extraordinary and consequently you become more anxious. From
this point, you will do anything in order to become less anxious. While the rational
move would be to try to defuse the situation, your anxiety a↵ects your ability to think
clearly, and more importantly, your anxiety causes you to recall other instances when
your loved one has made you anxious, which just happened to be that time your car
was scratched. This makes you all the more anxious, and you know the rest of the
story.
Here, one’s “anxiety” is triggered by changes to one’s external environment.
While we can certainly say things like anger and fear are encompassed within this
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dimension, Marcus, Neuman, and MacKuen (2000) are not interested in these specific
emotions, but are instead interested in the dimension as a whole. To them, as
opposed to scholars advocating the discrete emotional perspective, “anger” is just
a di↵erent manifestation of the underlying surveillance system, meaning a person’s
anger does not a↵ect behavior, but instead this anger is a reflection of how changes
in the surveillance system can cause the person take one action instead of another.
Even though this seems like a subtle di↵erence, it fundamentally changed the way
we study emotion. Questions like “Does President Obama make you angry?” were
no longer used as a direct measures of a specific emotional state, but, instead, were
used as a one of the many ways to measure the anxiety dimension.
With this change in measurement also came a change in theoretical focus. Prior
to Marcus, Neuman, and MacKuen (2000)’s work many in political science saw
cognition and emotion as being diametrically opposed (e.g., Arkes, 1993; Callan,
1997; Holmes, 1995), with emotions clouding our ability to make otherwise sound
judgments. Even in our fictional argument, I fall prey to this line of thought,
suggesting that your anger caused you to refuse to de-escalate an argument which
was clearly getting out of hand. However, emotion does not always work in this
fashion. Suppose the habitual behavior was not sitting in a chair, but instead it
was robbing a bank? And, instead of your loved one scolding you for not taking out
the trash, they pleading with you to end your life of crime, something which they
have never done before. In this instance, breaking your routine would be desirable,
meaning your emotion actually would help you make a better choice than you would
have otherwise. Even though Marcus, Neuman, and MacKuen (2000) were not the
19
first political scientists to make this type of argument (e.g., Lodge, McGraw, and
Stroh, 1989; Lodge and Taber, 2000), their book A↵ective Intelligence and
Political Judgment was fundamentally important to bringing this argument to the
forefront.
2.3 The Valence-Arousal Model
With that said, Marcus, Neuman, and MacKuen (2000)’s dimensions are not the
only dimensions we can use in order to define what is and is not “anger.” Indeed,
many dimensional models have been created in the past, some of which are more
popular than others (Marcus, 2000; Scherer, 2000). Of these, the valence-arousal
model is perhaps the most well known Russell (1980). Here, an emotion’s “valence”
refers to whether the emotion is generally positive or negative, whereas an emotion’s
“arousal” or activation refers to the degree to which someone is emotionally activated.
Collectively, these two dimensions are used to describe one’s core a↵ect, which
(Russell, 2003) equates to one’s body temperature. Even though your body
temperature is always present and you can note it whenever you want, sometimes
extreme changes become so noticeable that you are forced to deal with them.
Regardless, these changes exist prior to words such as “hot” or “cold” and prior to
you determining the cause of these changes. Emotions work in a similar way. While
we all know when we are angry, there are many subtle changes in our underlying
emotional state which occur prior to us becoming “angry.” Russell (2003) argues
these, like “anger,” have an important e↵ect on our behavior by changing the way
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we process new and existing information.
In the fictional argument, you can find this component of the valence-arousal
model even before you get out of the car. Up until this point, we have discussed how
yelling at a loved one is perhaps not the best way to relax, but what about everything
in your day that happened prior to the argument? Do these have any e↵ect on how
yelling influences you emotionally? While I think both Russell and Marcus, Neuman,
and MacKuen (2000) would argue that these prior experiences do have an a↵ect, the
valence-arousal model emphasizes them a little more. Here, having a bad day at work
is not just something that receives an a↵ective tag in memory, but is something that
places you in a certain emotional state which changes the way you react to new
emotional stimuli. This is not to say that having a good day would prevent you
from yelling when scolded about taking out the trash, but having a good day would
make yelling somewhat less likely. To Marcus, Neuman, and MacKuen (2000) these
lesser types of emotions are of little importance, which is why these authors focus on
“enthusiasm” and “anxiety” which are simply a subset of the “valence” and “arousal”
dimensions.
To understand this point, one must first understand the origins of the enthusiasm
and anxiety dimensions: Watson and Tellegen (1985)’s positive and negative a↵ect,
respectively. In Appendix B of A↵ective Intelligence Marcus, Neuman, and MacKuen
(2000) are very clear on this point:
In psychology it has been common practice to label these two dimensions
of emotion as “positive” and “negative.” As we make clear in our exposition
of the dual model of emotional response in chapter 3, we prefer to use
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the terms enthusiasm instead of positive, and anxiety instead of negative.
In the present discussion of Watson’s work, however, we carry over his
terminology. In Tables B1-B3, two sets of labels are provided: the
conventional psychological terms, positive and negative, and in parentheses
the corresponding terms we have proposed, enthusiasm and anxiety. We
think the latter pair of terms more precisely identifies the emotional
content of the reactions associated with each factor (emphasis in original;
153).
Here, positive and negative a↵ect can be thought of as an activated positive
and negative emotional state (Barrett and Russell, 1999; Watson et al., 1999; Yik,
Russell, and Barrett, 1999). This is why many, including Watson and Tellegen
themselves, refer to these two dimensions as positive and negative activation. For
example, Tellegen, Watson, and Clark (1999) explain the original Watson and Tellegen
(1985) dimensions in this way:
Watson and Tellegen’s (1985) model was developed on the basis of previously
published factor analytic investigations. Rotation to simple structure
of the two major factors recovered from each of these self-report a↵ect
studies have consistently yielded two dimensions of valences emotional
activation or engagement, which were labeled Positive A↵ect and Negative
A↵ect and have the characteristic shown in Figure 1. To avoid terminological
ambiguity, we have renamed the two factors Positive Activation and
Negative Activation, respectively, and use the abbreviations PA and NA
in reference to these new labels only (297-298).
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This relationship is shown in the first panel of Figure 2.1, where the thin solid lines
represent the valence-arousal dimensions and the dashed lines represent the original
specification of the Watson and Tellegen (1985) framework, leaving the thick solid
lines to represent the Tellegen, Watson, and Clark (1999) re-specification of positive
and negative a↵ect. As you can see, it is apparent that positive and negative a↵ect
explain fewer types of emotional expressions, as compared to the valence and arousal
dimensions. Consequently, Marcus, Neuman, and MacKuen (2000)’s model explains
a small subset of all the types of emotions that people experience in their daily
lives (see second panel of Figure 2.1). “Anxiety” and “enthusiasm” can only take
us so far since A↵ective Intelligence gives us little ability to discuss or measure
these lesser types of emotional expressions. In fact, both Watson and Tellegen and
Marcus et al. argue these lesser types of emotional expressions are theoretically
uninteresting. In the case of the former, Watson et al. (1999) argue, “although
the concept of Arousal/Activation makes excellent sense when applied to short-term
a↵ect (especially ratings of current, momentary mood), its relevance to long-term
individual di↵erences in emotionality is less apparent” (829). In the case of the
latter, Marcus, Neuman, and MacKuen (2000) argue, “If the dispositional system
only adjusted our moods, making us feel more excited when things are going well
or making us feel gloomy or depressed if plans are going awry, then the role of
emotionality would be interesting but not very important, at least with respect to
behavior” (48).
However, in political science, these lesser types of emotional expressions are
fundamentally important to our understanding of emotion and politics. Indeed,
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for every Rush Limbaugh or Keith Olberman, there are lots of people who do
not get all that emotional when it comes to politics. For example, in a 2010 poll
conducted by the Pew Research Center, nearly 56 percent of Americans indicated
they were “frustrated,” with the federal government, whereas only 21 percent of
Americans indicated they were “angry” (Pew Research Center, 2010). Similarly, from
1980-2008 the American National Election Studies (ANES) has asked questions like
“Has Barack Obama - because of the kind of person he is, or because of something
he has done - made you feel angry?” On average, a majority of respondents tends
to answer “no” to these questions (61.94%), with George W. Bush in 2004 (45.89%)
being the only exception to this rule. To me, this suggests emotions like “frustration”
are not only important, but essential to understanding how the majority of Americans
think about emotion and politics. Unfortunately, Marcus, Neuman, and MacKuen
(2000) give us little ability to discuss or measure these lesser types of emotions, since
the anxiety-enthusiasm model was created to capture only activated positive and
negative emotional states.
A similar story can be told in Congress. While we all can recall outbursts of
anger like Joe Wilson yelling “You Lie!” or Anthony Weiner pointing a finger at
Republicans, these episodes are the exceptions, not the rule. For example, Jamieson
and Falk (2001) found that on average in the 99th to 106th Congresses one can find 40
insult words per 1,000 pages of the Congressional Record, with the greatest number
of insults being found in the first session of the 104th Congress where the number
of insults increased to a measly 79 per 1,000 pages of the Congressional Record.
Similarly, pejoratives, which deride another member of Congress’ remarks, are also
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used sparingly. In this instance, the first session of the 104th Congress once again
comes out on top with a little over 70 pejoratives per 1,000 pages of the Congressional
Record, which is, again, extraordinarily low. This suggests that congressional anger
is not as prevalent as one might think, which is not to say that anger does not exist.
Rather, it is merely to suggest, when it comes to politics, not only are these lesser
types of emotions important, but they are the main way people emotionally relate to
their political world. Indeed, whether it is members of Congress or American voters,
people are much more likely to get “upset,” than to get “angry.”
To bring this back to our fictional argument, how many times have you gotten
into an argument like this? Some of us probably have, but I would say that for the
most part these types of arguments are rare. Instead, the majority of arguments we
have with our loved ones are not very exciting. For example, instead of scolding us
for not taking out the trash, maybe our loved one simply asks us, but does so in such
a way as to signal annoyance. Similarly, instead of hurling accusations or insults,
maybe we respond to this request by sighing and reluctantly agreeing. While these
types of interactions are not the most exciting, they are what we typically encounter
on a daily basis, whether it is in our home or on Capitol Hill. Even though Marcus,
Neuman, and MacKuen (2000) acknowledge the existence of these types of emotions,
the A↵ective Intelligence model gives us little ability to describe or study them. Even
though the valence-arousal model is by no means perfect, it can help us achieve this
end.
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2.4 Appraisal Theory
With that said, one can not deny the importance of A↵ective Intelligence. For many,
the Marcus, Neuman, and MacKuen (2000) model served as a way to study the e↵ect
of emotion on a variety of political behaviors such as voting (Redlawsk, Civettini,
and Lau, 2007), political appraisals (Cassino and Lodge, 2007; Just, Crigler, and
Belt, 2007), and political advertising (Brader, 2005, 2006). For others, the Marcus,
Neuman, and MacKuen (2000) model served as a way to explore the causes and
consequences of emotion more fully. For example, Nicholas Valentino and others
(Valentino et al., 2008; Valentino, Gregorowicz, and Groenendyk, 2009; Valentino
et al., 2011) began to disentangle Marcus, Neuman, and MacKuen (2000)’s anxiety
dimension into individual emotional states, such as anger, fear, and anxiety. Here,
borrowing from discrete emotional models, Valentino et al. (2011) argue “anger arises
when threats are attributable to a particular source and the individual feels that she
has control over the situation, while anxiety is triggered when an individual is less
certain about the cause and does not feel in control” (159). In this way, “anger”
and “anxiety” can both arise when one encounters a threat, but “anger” only occurs
when there is an identifiable cause which is within an individual’s control.
This is the reason why our fictitious argument leads to anger and not anxiety.
When you come home and get yelled at the source of your angst is easily identified,
and, depending on your relationship with your loved one, under your control. You
know there are things that you can do to address the emotion you are feeling.
Conversely, if you were to come home and your favorite chair spontaneously combusts,
the emotion you would feel would be closer to anxiety since it is unclear why your
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favorite chair burst into flames. While in this somewhat silly example the di↵erence
between the two is somewhat negligible since in either case your day has gotten
exponentially worse, in politics this distinction is fundamental to understanding why
anger is important in and of itself.
For example, Huddy, Feldman, and Cassese (2007), similar to Valentino, argues
“anxiety is best characterized by heightened vigilance, increased sensitivity to threat,
and behavioral avoidance. In contrast, anger is associated with superficial and
possibly rapid decision-making, a lowered sensitivity to risk, and an orientation
towards action” (209). Using this as a starting point these authors ask a series of
questions regarding how voters emotionally respond to a variety of prompts relating
to the Iraq War (i.e., Saddam Hussein, terrorism, etc.). Ultimately, they find that
anger leads to a reduced perception of the risk of war and an increase support for
intervention, whereas the inverse is true for anxiety. In this way, those who felt
anxious about the war in Iraq were less likely to act, whereas individuals who were
angry wanted action, regardless of the costs.
To Valentino and Huddy, Feldman, and Cassese (2007), what is important is
whether one can identify a cause for the change in one’s emotional state, something
known in the psychology literature as cognitive appraisal theory (for review see
Scherer, 1999). In essence, this theory states that our emotions are a result of how
we evaluate (appraise) changes to our external environment. For example, when you
come home and get yelled at for not taking out the trash, you become upset because
you do not like to be yelled at. This leads you to identify the source of your angst,
which, in this case, is your loved one. Consequently, you become angry because
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you feel your loved one should not be yelling at you for something that you see as
being somewhat trivial. While anxiety arises from a similar evaluation it is distinctly
di↵erent since no responsibility can ultimately be assigned. Here, when you come
home and your chair explodes you become equally upset, but, this time, it is unclear
what caused the chair to spontaneously combust. Could it happen again? Are the
other chairs safe? All of these thoughts rush through your head producing anxiety.
In support for the Iraq War one finds a similar story. Those who were angry
towards people like Saddam Hussein or George W. Bush were angry because they felt
as though these individuals made war more likely, which ultimately put them at risk.
Conversely, those who felt anxious towards these same people were anxious because
they felt as though the causes and consequences of war were beyond everyone’s
control including those in power, such as Saddam Hussein and George W. Bush.
Similarly, those who are angry towards these same people tend to underestimate the
consequences of war, this is because their anger fosters an attitude where one must
act regardless of the costs. Conversely, those who were anxious towards Saddam
Hussein and George W. Bush tend to focus more on the consequences of action,
meaning instead of viewing war as a necessary evil, these individuals tended to view
war as an unnecessary end which would do little or nothing to prevent violence in
the future.
Notice that Huddy, Feldman, and Cassese (2007) and Valentino’s insights originate
in A↵ective Intelligence, but are di↵erent in several ways. Most notably, these
authors are much more willing to di↵erentiate between specific emotional states,
whereas Marcus, Neuman, and MacKuen (2000) are much less willing to do so. This
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is not to say that Marcus, Neuman, and MacKuen (2000) believe that “anger” is
synonymous with “anxiety,” but, instead to suggest that Marcus, Neuman, and
MacKuen (2000), like Russell, see the definitions of emotions to be more fluid,
meaning we can certainly di↵erentiate between “anger” and “anxiety,” but we can
also find di↵erences within these broader categories. For example, instead of someone
being “angry” towards the political process as whole one can be “upset” or
“frustrated.” Similarly, instead of being “anxious” about the potential for war,
someone can be “nervous” or “uneasy.” Either way, while Russell argues we can
certainly find di↵erences between broad emotional categories, Russell also contends
within these categories meaningful di↵erences can also be found.
2.5 Congressional Anger
The question becomes how does this help us understand the consequences of
congressional anger? First, it is abundantly clear that anger has an e↵ect on political
behavior which is fundamentally di↵erent from other types of negative emotions.
This is because one’s anger is directed towards an object. Consequently, when one is
exposed to congressional anger one can become angry because one thinks yelling and
screaming destroys the democratic process by making policy making more di cult.
Many argue this makes political participation less likely because individuals are
more reluctant to participate in a system where bickering has become the norm. In
the context of negative advertising Stephen Ansolabehere and Shanto Iyengar argue
that attack ads have an adverse e↵ect on political participation for similar reasons.
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Specifically, in their book Going Negative, these authors find in both experimental
and aggregate results that voters tended to respond negatively to attack advertising,
where in the former vote intention dropped by 5%, whereas in the latter aggregate
turnout in the 1992 Senate election decreased by 4%. Ultimately, Ansolabehere
and Iyengar (1997) attribute these negative e↵ects to attack advertising significantly
weakening voter confidence in institutions and elected o cials, creating
“disillusionment and distrust among the public” (147). Indeed, “attack
advertisements resonate with the popular beliefs that government fails, that elected
o cials are out of touch and quite corrupt, and that voting is a hollow act. The end
result: lower turnout and lower trust in government, regardless of which party rules”
(147-148).1
Congressional anger is no di↵erent. When members of Congress yell and scream at
one another they give voters the impression the political system is broken. Ultimately,
this decreases political participation because voters are less likely to participate in
a system where, regardless of an election’s outcome, little to nothing will get done.
Moreover, even before the shooting of Gabrielle Gi↵ords, voters have consistently
expressed their desire for members of Congress to “tone down the rhetoric.” However,
despite these calls, congressional anger has increased, not decreased. What does
1Many have called into question whether attack advertising has a negative e↵ect on the
electorate. For example, John Geer in a series of articles, which culminated in his book In Defense
of Negativity, argues that negative advertising actually increases political participation. Later,
Kenneth Goldstein and Paul Freedman with a series of coauthors (Freedman and Goldstein, 1999;
Goldstein and Freedman, 2002; Goldstein and Ridout, 2004; Freedman, Franx, and Goldstein, 2004)
found the same result using aggregate-level data. Moreover, others, including Jackson, Mondak,
and Huckfeldt (2009) have also questioned many of the intricacies of Ansolabehere and Iyengar’s
(1997) argument, such as whether negative advertising has a negative e↵ect on e cacy. Ultimately,
this work suggests that it is far from clear whether negative advertising demobilizes the electorate,
with the majority of the evidence showing the inverse to be true.
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this say about the average voters ability to make a di↵erence politically? If voters
cannot even get members of Congress to speak to one another in a more cordial
fashion, what are the chances voters will be able to get members of Congress to pass
policies they desperately need? This feeling becomes more pronounced in the case
of congressional anger where both Republicans and Democrats agree that we need
to “lower the temperature” on Capitol Hill. In this way, yelling and screaming not
only sends a strong signal that the political process is fundamentally flawed, but it
also underlines a voters inability to change the system in such a way as to rectify the
problems making politics extraordinarily di cult. Both of these processes combine
to make participation less likely.
Even though this line of reasoning resonates with many, Valentino and Huddy
would argue these concerns are somewhat misplaced. Specifically, we all know
political participation is extraordinarily di cult. Whether it is voting or volunteering,
one must have the resources and motivation to act politically. Anger helps facilitate
both. In terms of the former, anger makes one more likely to spend resources. For
example, arguing with a loved one about taking out the trash comes with considerable
costs. Indeed, whether it is missing your favorite television show because you are
engaged in what seems like World War III or simply the amount of energy it takes
to yell and scream for an extended period of time, getting into an argument with
a loved one is not easy. Fortunately (or unfortunately), anger helps you overcome
these obstacles by leading you to ignore the consequences of your actions. If you have
ever been involved in a heated argument with a loved one you probably know what
I mean. While the argument is happening it seems like the only thing that matters
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is winning the argument. You do not think about what you are saying or how you
are saying it, rather you are thinking about not taking the trash out this one time.
Or maybe you are thinking about how it is just wrong for the other person to yell
at you about such a trivial matter, especially when you have had such a long day at
work. Either way, your focus is not on what you are losing by arguing. Instead, you
are focusing on what you can potentially gain, even if those gains are unlikely.
In terms of the latter, anger can give one the motivation to act when, otherwise,
action would be unlikely. For example, maybe you would never in a million years
insult your loved one, but your anger causes you to do so anyway. This is because
your anger a↵ects how you process new and existing information. Perhaps you would
never insult your loved one because of all the other person has done for you in the
past. While generally this may be true, when you are angry you are unable to
remember these instances. Instead, you focus on all the other times your loved on
has made you angry. When this happens, insults become more likely since you see
your loved one as being an angry individual who should be reprimanded. Similarly,
maybe you would never insult your loved one because you are just not that type of
person. Even though your anger does not change who you are fundamentally, it does
cause you to focus more on the parts of your personality that are more consistent with
your anger. Perhaps you become more aggressive. Or maybe you become meaner.
Either way, your anger causes you to behave di↵erently, making you, in many ways,
a di↵erent person. Not only does this make you more likely to expend resources in
order to win an argument, but it also makes you more motivated to act, even if that
action is something that you generally find undesirable, like hurling insults towards
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someone you love.
2.5.1 Opponents
When it comes to voting, congressional anger also can be mobilizing. Here, people
feel as though members of Congress are becoming increasingly angry. For example,
in a USA Today/Gallup Poll released on February 9, 2009 23% of Americans think
“. . . ‘the overall tone and level of civility’ in Washington between Republicans and
Democrats. . . ” has gotten worse since President Obama took o ce (Saad, 2009, 1),
with the majority of Americans seeing “members of Congress themselves, rather
than a broken political system, as the problem. . . ” (Pew Research Center, 2010, 6).
Consequently, voters have become increasingly angry. Indeed, in a poll released by
the Pew Research Center on August 15, 2011 “[t]he share of Americans who describe
themselves as angry with the federal government has nearly doubled since March,
from 14% to 26%, while those who say they are basically content has fallen by half,
from 22% to 11%” (Pew Research Center, 2011, 30). When put together, these results
suggest that Americans have become fed up with the level of anger on Capitol Hill.
However, instead of withdrawing from the process, many Americans have become
more engaged. They do so not because they themselves are angry, rather they do so
in order to demonstrate their opposition to a pattern of behavior they see as being
detrimental to the democratic process. In this way, they are more likely to vote in
order to “throw the bums out.”
For example, shortly after Joe Wilson yelled “You lie!”, his Democratic opponent,
Rob Miller, amassed over a million dollars in campaign contributions, far surpassing
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the mere $390,000 of contributions he received in the 2008 election cycle (Kane,
2009). While it is unclear whether this short-term surge in campaign contributions
contributed to an increase in political participation, we know that voter turnout
in the 2010 election was higher in South Carolina than it was in the last midterm
election held in 2006. Specifically, in 2010, 37.6 percent of the voting population
showed up at the polls which is nearly identical to the national average of 37.8
percent. Conversely, in 2006, only 33.1 percent of the voting age population turned
out which is slightly less than 4 percentage points below the national average (37.2
percent).
Undoubtedly, it is di cult to determine whether this increased turnout is due to
changing opinion towards Joe Wilson, but when one looks at the percentage of the
vote he received one finds evidence consistent with this claim. Here, the percentage
of people who voted for Joe Wilson decreased by 9.1 percent in 2010 as compared
to 2006 where the inverse is true for people voting against him where the percentage
increases from 37.3 to 43.8 percent in 2006 and 2010, respectively. These trends
are particularly interesting given how Republican representatives generally faired in
those elections. As many know, Republicans regained the House in 2010, and not
surprisingly they received more of the vote in 2010 (49.9 percent) as compared to
2006 (43.3 percent). While far from definitive, these results suggest that Joe Wilson’s
comments may have had a positive e↵ect on political participation, even if it was
only to increase the participation of those who wanted to vote Joe Wilson out of
o ce.
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2.5.2 Supporters
With that said, not everyone reacted negatively to Joe Wilson’s outburst. Indeed,
not only was he re-elected, but he also received millions and millions of campaign
donations a few days after he yelled “You Lie!,” far surpassing the number of campaign
contributions his opponent received (Harnby, 2009). This is not entirely surprising
since Americans have become increasingly angry at a variety of things ranging from
Obamacare to politics as a whole. Indeed, “Democrats are angry that Republicans
have thwarted e↵orts to spend more on social programs and increase taxes on higher
income Americans,” while “Republicans are angry that Democrats won’t cut spending,
except growth in planned spending, which is not the same as spending cuts” (Shapiro,
2012, 1-2). Regardless, Joe Wilson’s anger probably resonated with some voters,
making those voters more likely to turnout on election day.
Even though not entirely the same, Uslaner (2000) makes a similar argument
regarding political incivility. To him, the incivility on Capitol Hill is merely a
reflection of the growing incivility we find across the United States. Specifically,
Uslaner (2000) explains his argument in this way:
The nasty mood in Congress reflects growing hostility in the country.
Since the 1970s, American society has become far more contentious than
it used to be. Witness the explosion in litigation rates, the frequency
of air rage and road rage, the popularity of “shock jocks” on the radio,
and the way talk show guests attach each other on television. Stores
now advertise polite service as if it were something reserved for special
occasions. Congress isn’t insulated from the public. Instead it is first and
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foremost a representative institution. Wilson was right: the members of
Congress take their cues from the public. As the public has become less
civil, so has the Congress (42).
Consequently, it should not be too surprising that angry members of Congress
may actually increase political participation. Many voters are angry and these voters
want a representative who reflects their anger. Again, we can see some of this in
our fictional argument. Often times when we are in a bad mood we want others to
be in a similar state. Undoubtedly, this is selfish, but if you have had a bad day
at work, sometimes the last thing you want to encounter is someone explaining how
good their day was. This is because their good day highlights the extent to which
your day was bad. In this way, people who have had a bad day at work want to
commiserate with others who found their day equally unsatisfying. Coal miners do
not want to discuss the darkness of a mine with lifeguards who spend their day in
the sun. This is not to say these conversations cannot be productive, but instead to
suggest often times one’s emotions are considered to be more genuine if one has a
similar frame of reference.
In politics we see this relationship all the time. While any politician can talk
about people losing their jobs, the best politicians are those who can make people feel
as though they truly understand how it feels to be out of work. In this way, members
of Congress sometimes do not merely represent their constituents substantive
interests, but also their emotions as well. For example, it is one thing for a Republican
member of Congress to vote against Obamacare and quite another to give an
impassioned speech on the House floor about how Obamacare is ruining America.
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Similarly, it is one thing for a Democrat to vote against a decrease in government
spending for education and quite another for a Democrat to yell in a town hall
meeting about how the government spends too little on educating our children. In
each instance, the substance may be the same, but the level of emotion is di↵erent.
While many voters may want their representative to ignore how they feel and only
focus on what is best for the district, others want their representative to be emotional,
especially when it comes to issues they care about.
In this way, emotions help make political rhetoric more believable, meaning when
representatives say they will do things to help the district their anger makes them
more credible. Ultimately, this is because people know what it feels like to be angry.
When we get angry our heart rate increases, our palms sweat, and often times we
run out of breath. This all is extremely costly, meaning when we express anger we
demonstrate a greater commitment to our positions. Similarly, we also know that
anger comes with negative consequences, whether it is damaging our relationship
with a loved one or locking us into an argument which makes us miss our favorite
television show. All of this combines to make anger something most of us want to
avoid. Given that, when members of Congress display anger they demonstrate to
their constituents the extent to which they care about a given position. For those
citizens who support the position this anger increases the likelihood they will vote for
a candidate, whereas the inverse is true for those who oppose the position. Either
way, congressional anger is likely to increase political participation for supporters
and opponents, alike.
I am sure many people have never gotten into a yelling match with a loved one
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over taking out the trash. Most probably avoid these confrontations all together.
However, this avoidance means when one encounters this type of argument the
argument becomes incredibly salient. “Why is Joe yelling at me about the trash?”
“He has not done this in the past. Why is he yelling at me now?” “All I asked him
to do is take out the trash. This is unlike him.” In these instances, a loved one’s
anger can easily motivate people to act positively or negatively simply because it is
so unusual. “Wow! I cannot believe he yelled at me. He never yells at me. I am going
to show him.” In other instances, perhaps a loved one’s anger is desired. “Wow! I
cannot believe he is not angry? Did he hear what I had to say about my job? This is
unbelievable.” Regardless, when a loved one gets angry one is more likely to become
more, not less, motivated to act. In politics, it is no di↵erent.
However, in politics, like relationships, we know that not all “anger” is created
equally. Yelling and screaming is not the same as sighing and walking away. A
member of Congress cutting o↵ a question in an interview is not the same thing as
a member of Congress pounding on the podium while giving a fiery speech on the
House floor. Similarly, pounding on a podium is not the same thing as yelling “You
lie!” There is a fundamental di↵erence between being “upset” and “angry.” Just like
their is a meaningful di↵erence between being “angry” and being “anxious.” While
scholars have spent considerable time exploring the latter, this dissertation shifts our
focus to the former. Not only is this move helpful in furthering our understanding
how the main classes of emotions di↵er, but it is also fundamentally important to
understanding how lesser emotions a↵ect political behavior.
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2.5.3 Independents
Such a shift is needed because the majority of Americans are not passionate about
politics. Whether it is specific socioeconomic groups such as racial and ethnic
minorities (Leighley and Vedlitz, 1999) and the poor (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady,
1995) or specific types of people such as those are less open to new experiences
(Mondak, 2010) we know that some people are less likely to participate as compared
to others. The question becomes how does congressional anger a↵ect these
individuals? Does it make them more or less likely to participate? Unlike supporters
and opponents, to mobilize or demobilize these individuals we cannot simply stoke
their internal political fire. Instead, we need to start a fire in the first place.
Fortunately, displays of congressional anger can help achieve this end.
To understand this argument, let’s return to our fictional argument, but instead
of focusing on our fictions couple, let’s imagine they have a fictitious teenage son.
To the son, the only thing that matters is hanging out with his friends and playing
video games. Generally, when his parents get home from work he could care less.
This is because the typical conversation is extraordinarily boring. Did you have a
good day at work? Or did you have a bad day at work? Who cares. However, this
time, something seems to be up. They seem to be arguing about something. “Did
one of them just yell? What are they arguing about that is making them so angry?
They never yell and scream, this must be important. Oh, Dad forgot to take out the
trash.”
Here, the anger expressed by the fictitious couple can generate interest in what
would otherwise be an uneventful conversation. In politics, congressional anger works
39
in a similar way. Regardless of what one thinks about Joe Wilson’s outburst, one
cannot deny that Joe Wilson made politics a little more interesting, even if it was
for a short period of time. Indeed, in a USA Today/Gallup poll conducted a few
days after President Obama’s State of the Union Address 52 percent of respondents
said they were following the news about Joe Wilson’s outburst somewhat or very
closely (Newport, 2009), which is essentially the same percentage of people who
reported following the IRS (54 percent) and Benghazi (53 percent) scandals somewhat
or very closely in May of 2013 (Newport, 2013). While it is unclear whether this
increased interest contributed to an increase in political participation, we know from
the political behavior literature that interest is an important predictor of voter
turnout (e.g., Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, 1995).
John Geer and others make a similar argument regarding political advertising
(Brooks and Geer, 2007; Geer, 2008; Finkel and Geer, 1998). Specifically, Finkel and
Geer (1998) argue that negative advertising can increase political participation in
three ways. First, negative advertising contains an incredible amount of relevant
policy information, meaning the more negative advertising one views, the more
informed one becomes making participation more likely (see Neuman, 1986). Second,
people tend to focus more on negative information, meaning not only does negative
advertising contain more information, but that information is more likely to be
recalled when deciding between candidates. This makes voting more likely since some
di↵erentiation is necessary to make one’s vote meaningful. Indeed, if both candidates
look the same, then voting becomes irrelevant because either candidate ultimately
would bring the same thing to the table. By highlighting relevant di↵erences between
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candidates, negative advertising can be useful in this regard. Finally, borrowing
from Marcus et al., negative advertising is also more likely to generate an emotional
response, which increases the degree to which voters care about a given election and
increases their enthusiasm for their preferred candidate. Consequently, referencing
Ansolabehere et al. (1994), Finkel and Geer (1998) argue:
For all these reasons, we believed that negative advertising may be just
as likely to stimulate turnout as to depress it. The causal process process
suggested by Ansolabehere et al. (1994), that negative advertising decreases
e cacy which decreases turnout, may be o↵set by alternative processes
whereby negative advertising spurs turnout by increasing political knowledge
and concern about the election’s outcome. More plausibly, negative and
positive advertising may lead to di↵erential e↵ects on di↵erent voters,
resulting in a weak net e↵ect of advertising tone on individual participation
(578).
Although somewhat di↵erent, this is precisely the argument advanced in this
study. When members of Congress get angry they a↵ect political participation in
two ways. First, supporters and opponents become more mobilized because, in
the case of the former, their representative is striking a responsive chord which
calls them into action, whereas in the case of the latter, this same representative is
demonstrating what is wrong with politics and consequently citizens must mobilize
to remove their representative from o ce. Second, for those who are uninterested in
politics, emotional outbursts on the House floor make politics more interesting, which
ultimately makes these individuals focus more on what is being said. This increases
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the chances they become concerned with the outcome of the election, making voting
more likely. These two factors combine to o↵set the negative e↵ect of congressional
anger. While people are tired of members of Congress yelling at one another, they
are not to a point of withdrawing from politics all together. Instead, most are
more likely to engage in the political process in order to “throw the bums out.”
Undoubtedly, some have become so fed up with the way things are going they have
concluded enough is enough, but, similar to negative advertising, these individuals
are the exception, not the rule.
However, this is not to say there is nothing new we can learn about displays of
congressional anger. While we have learned a great deal about how negative ads can
a↵ect political participation, congressional anger is fundamentally di↵erent. Here,
unlike negative advertising, anger is often times out a representative’s control. For
example, prior to the State of the Union Address, I doubt Joe Wilson planned to yell
“You Lie!.” Instead, his emotions just got the better of him, which is precisely what
he said to reporters the very next day. Specifically, Wilson said, “It was spontaneous.
It was when he stated, as he did, about not covering illegal aliens, when I know he
had those two amendments, and I say that respectfully” (Harnby and Walsh, 2009).
While many were still outraged by Joe Wilson’s remarks, the spontaneity of his
actions most likely changed how they were interpreted by many.
Imagine if Joe Wilson used a television ad to claim that President Obama lied.
Would voters respond in the same way? I argue they would not. Part of the
reason hinges on the ubiquity of the word “liar” in political advertising. Indeed,
it seems as though every ad accuses every other ad of bending the truth in some way.
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Whether it is Mitt Romney accusing President Obama about not “telling the truth”
about Bain Capitol (Murray, 2012) or President Obama chastising John McCain
for running “dishonest smears,” accusing people of lying and negative advertising
often go hand-in-hand (Parker, 2008). Given that, if Joe Wilson were to yell “You
Lie!” in a political ad, I doubt it would have gotten the same level of attention.
Consequently, voters would most likely be less a↵ected, since saying things like
“You Lie!” in campaign advertisements is par for the course. With that said, when
members of Congress run negative ads they are held responsible for what they say.
For example, President Obama received considerable flack for a political
advertisement featuring Joe Soptic even though Obama had little or nothing to do
with the ad. In an advertisement sponsored by President Obama’s Super-PAC Joe
Soptic suggested that his wife died because Bain Capital closed the steel plant he was
working at. Specifically, in the ad, Soptic says, “When Mitt Romney and Bain closed
the plant, I lost my health care, and my family lost their health care. And a short
time after that, my wife became ill. . . she passed away in 22 days” (Stanage, 2012).
However, it turns out that many of these claims were false. Not only did Soptic’s wife
actually die several years after his steel plant closed, but she lost her health insurance
years before due to cuts at her own job which had nothing to do with Mitt Romney
or Bain Capital. Even though this advertisement did not cost President Obama the
election, he was held responsible, despite his best e↵orts to distance himself from the
ad. This is understandable since an advertisement is far from spontaneous. Instead,
an ad is entirely planned, meaning when a campaign decides to go negative it must
write, film, and air advertisements which reflect this choice. Unlike an emotional
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outburst, a campaign cannot accidentally decide to go negative, meaning voters are
likely to evaluate the two acts di↵erently. While campaigns can easily choose to be
less negative, can a member of Congress choose to be less angry? Consequently, do
voters hold representatives as responsible for displays of anger as they do for displays
of negativity in their ads? We do not know.
Our fictional argument can help us better understand the implications of this
logic. Although your actions during a heated argument with a loved one are generally
out of your control, imagine if you had a similar argument with your loved one over
the course of several lengthy emails. Even though we all know that often times
emails are not the most well-thought out prose, we also know that it takes more
e↵ort to type something than it does to say it, even if the di↵erence is slight. This
added e↵ort means that people may be held more responsible for the words they
type in an email as compared to the words they yell during an argument, especially
if the email is lengthy. Drawing a parallel between these di↵erent types of exchanges
and the di↵erence between negative advertising and congressional anger is relatively
straightforward. However, unlike emails, negative ads require a lot more conscious
e↵ort in comparison to an argument with a loved one regarding the trash. Thus,
Finkel and Geer’s (1998) insights may be correct regarding negative advertising, but
it is unclear whether we will find the same results when it comes to congressional
anger.
A similar argument can be made regarding political incivility. Here, some may
argue that political science has already studied outbursts like Joe Wilson’s, meaning
there is little to learn by shifting our focus to more mundane forms of congressional
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anger. For example, Mutz and Reeves (2005) demonstrate that displays of
congressional incivility have a negative e↵ect on things like political trust. Specifically,
they argue, using a series of experiments, that televised political conflict violated
norms of everyday discourse, which rea rms the “viewers’ sense that politicians
cannot be counted on to obey the same norms for social behavior by which ordinary
citizens abide” (2). This a↵ects one’s trust in government because trust is to assume
that an individual will observe the same rules as everyone else. In this way, when
viewers observe incivility on television they are likely to react in the same way as if
they viewed incivility in real life. Those being uncivil violate an important norm of
behavior, which means they are likely to violate other norms, such as reciprocity, in
the future, making trust more di cult.
In this way, when Joe Wilson yelled “You Lie!” during President Obama’s State of
the Union Address, many reacted negatively not because of what he said, but because
of where he said it. Specifically, many made a distinction between disrespecting the
president and disrespecting the o ce as a whole (Dowd, 2009; Martin, 2009). In our
democracy, the president represents both the leader of government and the head of
state, meaning President Obama does not just represent his policies and positions,
but he also represents the nation as a whole. This is why when Joe Wilson yelled
“You Lie!” he not only attacked President Obama, but he also attacked the o ce
itself. There is a time and place for those types of accusations, and the State of the
Union is not one of them.
One can make a similar argument for the recent altercation between President
Obama and Arizona governor Jan Brewer. In this incident, Governor Brewer
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continually interrupted President Obama and pointed a finger at him while he
confronted her with some inconsistencies he had found in her recently released book
Scorpions for Breakfast, in which he claimed she had misrepresented a meeting they
had in 2010. While Brewer is not the first governor to have a heated argument
with a sitting president, she was one of the first to seemingly scold the president in
front of television cameras. This is where she crossed the line. Whenever we have a
conversation with someone else there are certain rules of behavior we all are expected
to follow. When we violate these rules by pointing our finger or by calling someone
a “liar,” we not only demonstrate disrespect towards the individuals, but we also
show disrespect for the rules themselves. This is magnified when the person we are
arguing with is the President of the United States. Regardless of your opinion of
Barack Obama, he is still the president, and consequently demands some respect.
In this way, when Joe Wilson yelled “You Lie!” and Jan Brewer pointed her finger,
they crossed the line between being simply angry to being uncivil. Consequently,
one would expect their actions to have a greater e↵ect on voters, which is what Mutz
and Reeves (2005) have shown.
In the context of Congress, the question becomes, what e↵ect does anger have
on political participation? If Joe Wilson gets angry about Obamacare on the House
floor, does this have a positive or negative e↵ect on participation in his district?
To date, we do not know. This is unfortunate since there are literally hundreds, if
not thousands, of angry expressions which take place on Capitol Hill that we know
little, to nothing, about. Do these instances of congressional anger have an e↵ect
on political behavior? Until we know the answer to this question, we cannot begin
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to understand the causes and consequences of emotional outbursts, since the bulk
of what we know is about instances of incivility, not anger. This dissertation argues
not only does anger have an important e↵ect, but the e↵ect is di↵erent from the
e↵ect we see when we encounter incivility. This is because incivility, unlike anger,
revolves around the violation of norms, which most agree are necessary for society to
progress. Things like respecting the o ce of the Presidency fall into this category.
Consequently, regardless of whether someone is a Republican or Democrat, most will
agree that incivility has no place in politics.
Anger, on the other hand, generally does not violate any social norm. Instead,
anger is often times seen as a natural reaction to certain circumstances. Undoubtedly,
many probably thought that President Obama was bending the truth when talking
about Obamacare, but it is unacceptable to express that anger by yelling “You
Lie!” Similarly, many probably would get angry if someone was claiming they had
misrepresented them in a book, but when the person we are getting angry at is the
President their is a time and place to express that anger. This is why when Joe
Wilson yelled during the State of the Union Address he was not reprimanded for
what he said, only where he said it (Rowland, 2009). Indeed, the House Rules of
Decorum say nothing about raising the tone of one’s voice. Specifically, when it comes
to “unparliamentary speech,” the House Rules Committee states “A Member should
avoid impugning the motives of another Member, the Senate or the President, using
o↵ensive language or uttering words that are otherwise deemed unparliamentary”
(Dreier et al., 2014). This means that a representative is more than welcome to
express anger on the House floor, just as long that anger is civil.
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Undoubtedly, when people are angry incivility is more likely, but they are not one
in the same. The House Rules of Decorum emphasize this point. According to the
House, a member’s words can be taken down if they are deemed “unparliamentary,”
but nowhere in this rule is the emotional state of the representative considered.
Indeed, calling someone a “liar” is uncalled for whether the accusation is made in an
angry tirade or mundane recitation of facts. Similarly, a member of Congress cannot
use vulgar words, even if those vulgar words are said in an otherwise happy speech.
In this way, civility, unlike anger, hinges on the established rules of discourse, which
can be formally outlined, such as the House Rules of Decorum, or implicitly assumed.
Either way, the line between what is “civil” and “uncivil” is fundamentally di↵erent
from the line between “angry” and “happy.” Given that, in some instances incivility
and anger may be similar, but they are fundamentally distinct concepts, the latter
of which is currently understudied.
While somewhat di↵erent, the same argument can be applied to negative
advertising. We have spent considerable time understanding how negative
advertisements a↵ect political behavior, but negative ads are only one of the many
ways that members of Congress can express anger. Indeed, whether it is news
interviews or floor speeches, there are lots of ways that voters become aware of
their representative’s proclivity towards anger. For example, members of Congress
like Peter King express anger all the time on news programs, but they may not
necessarily express anger on the House floor. Similarly, while Joe Wilson is infamous
for one outburst of anger, it is unclear whether he is typically an angry person. In
this way, this study is not interested in a singular outburst of anger, which to date has
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been the focal point of the majority of research, but instead this project is interested
in whether anger in general can have a positive or negative e↵ect on things like voter
turnout.
2.6 Conclusion
Members of Congress, like you and I, are emotional beings. Sometimes they wear
their hearts on their sleeves. The question becomes, what e↵ect does this have on
political participation? Do voters become more or less mobilized when they encounter
displays of congressional anger? This chapter provides reasons to believe either could
be true. In Chapter 5, these arguments are formalized into testable hypotheses, but,
for now, all we can say is that congressional anger matters in ways that are di↵erent
from either negative advertising or political incivility. With that said, how do we
know when a member of Congress is angry?
While there are a variety of ways to quantify anger, one of the benefits of
the valence-arousal model is that it can be operationalized using data other than
self-reports, which are di cult to use when one is studying congress. For the purposes
of this study, I operationalize valence and arousal using the text and audio from House
floor speeches, respectively. Given that the latter has never been used to classify
emotional expressions, a good portion of the next chapter will be used to discuss what
we can learn from audio data. Even though this discussion will be more technical,
it will provide the reader with a solid foundation for using audio data in their own
research. In doing so, I will also answer more basic, yet theoretically important
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questions, like, which member of Congress is the most angry? Are Democrats angrier
than Republicans? Are men angrier than women? Each of these questions is not only
useful for validation of the measures introduced in this dissertation, but it is also
helpful in addressing some alternative hypotheses which others have o↵ered. These
questions will be considered in Chapter 4.
50
2.7 Figures and Tables
Figure 2.1: Two-Dimensional Perspectives of Emotion (modified from Yik et al.
1999, 601)
Note: This figure compares Marcus, Neuman, and MacKuen’s dimensional model to Russell’s, using
the Watson and Tellegen model to help explain the di↵erence. In both panels of the figure the
solid line represents the Marcus, Neuman, and MacKuen specification. The dashed line represents
Russell’s specification. Although the dotted line is not shown, it is present under each solid line,
suggesting the Marcus, Neuman, and MacKuen model explains fewer emotions.
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Chapter 3
Measuring Anger
3.1 Introduction
When getting into an argument with a loved one regarding the trash, it is easy to say
when we are angry versus when we are upset. However, if one were to observe this
altercation, how would we know when a person has become “angry”? The easiest
answer is to simply ask them. However, even here, there are some limitations, since
what we define as being “angry” may be di↵erent from how others define anger.
Perhaps what we see as an angry argument, others see as being simply a display of
frustration. In this way, even if we could ask the arguing couple how they felt, it is
unclear whether their answers will give us valid responses. The problem becomes even
more pronounced when dealing with members of Congress, because representatives
are unlikely to answer these types of questions in the first place. This dissertation
introduces text and audio data as a way to address this latter problem.
Even though the majority of this chapter will be used to explain the intricacies of
text and audio analysis, this approach is only one of the many ways one can measure
“anger” (for review see, Mauss and Robinson, 2009). Indeed, scholars have used a
variety of methods in order to quantify the degree to which someone is angry. These
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range from functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) (e.g. Greene et al., 2001;
Westen et al., 2006) and Event-Related Potentials (e.g. Ashley, Vuilleumier, and
Swick, 2004; Carretie´ et al., 2001) to variations on the lesion method (e.g. Adolphs
et al., 2000; Phillips et al., 2003). While each of these approaches has been used
extensively in other fields, for the most part political scientists tend to rely on
self-reports when it comes to measuring anger (e.g. MacKuen and Marcus, 1994;
Mutz and Reeves, 2005; Smith et al., 2011; Williams et al., 2001; van Dooren, de
Vries, and Janssen, 2012). To me, this is entirely understandable because self-reports
are by far the easiest to use, especially within the parameters of survey research.
For example, imagine you wanted to study our fictional argument. To use an
fMRI you would have to rent costly equipment, then convince a couple to subject
themselves to brain scans, which are not the most pleasant experience. All while
creating an experimental treatment which entices the subjects to feel the emotions
you are interested in studying, meaning to study the emotional dynamics of a heated
argument you would have to create a situation in which the couple would fight.
Even though there are certainly many benefits to taking this approach, many will
find the costs prohibitive and external validity limited. On the other hand, while
self-reports may not allow you to see the intricacies of the the human brain, they
are much less invasive and can be used by any scholar, making them much more
accessible. Given that, while many political scientists would like to use things like
fMRIs and ERPs to study emotion, these measures are simply beyond the means
of many. Marcus, Neuman, and MacKuen (2000) advance a similar argument in
Appendix B of A↵ective Intelligence:
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The array of methods available to neuroscientists to study the brain is
not as yet generally suitable for political science research. As a result,
political scientists interested in emotional response will have to rely largely
on self-report surveys and experiments. The core data of political science
is self-reported recollections of what people think, what they do, and how
they feel (152).
However, this is problematic because many scholars have questioned the ability
of self-reports to adequately capture “emotion” (i.e., Robinson and Clore, 2002).
Specifically, in order for self-reports to be valid an individual has to be willing and
able to recall past emotions. In terms of the former, individuals with high social
desirability bias may be reluctant to report negative emotional states (i.e., Paulhus
and Reid, 1991), such as anger (i.e., Welte and Russell, 1993). For example, men
and women di↵er in terms of the emotions that they are willing to express, with
women being more likely to report “happiness,” “sadness,” “fear,” and a general
level of “emotionality,” and men being more likely to report “anger” (Birnbaum
and Chemelski, 1984; Birnbaum, Nosanchuk, and Croll, 1980; Brody, 2006). This is
because men and women have been socialized to exhibit di↵erent emotional traits,
with men being expected to display fewer emotions as compared to women, and
generally to display more aggression. Ultimately, this implies an emotional self-report
will be biased in one way or another, depending on whether you are using the
self-report to assess the emotional state of a male or female respondent.
Unfortunately, the problems do not end here, since even if an individual was
willing to report their emotional state they must also be able to do so accurately.
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For example, to measure a respondent’s anger towards President Obama, the 2008
American National Elections Study asks, “Has Barack Obama - because of the kind
of person he is or because of something he has done, ever made you feel angry?”
In order for this question to accurately capture voter anger the respondents have
to recall all the instances when President Obama made them angry. Not only is
this process fraught with errors, but things like party identification are likely to bias
the search one way or another. Given that, even if a subject were willing to report
their anger towards President Obama, their report will undoubtedly be inaccurate
simply because of the nature of the questions we ask. Other methods, such as fMRIs
and ERPs, may not be cost e↵ective, but they are less likely to su↵er from similar
problems because, unlike self-reports, these methods do not introduce cognition into
the equation. When this is done, errors and bias become more likely.
To some, the solution is to write better questions. Although there are ways to
improve the way we ask respondents about their emotions, ultimately, their answers
align with their own definition of what is and is not “anger.” Indeed, to some
respondents a couple arguing over taking out the trash is an example of two people
being “angry,” while to others they are simply “upset” or “frustrated.” This implies
even the best questions regarding emotion bring certain definitional assumptions
to the table which may vary from respondent-to-respondent. More importantly,
these di↵erent definitions may not be consistent with the ways researchers define
“anger.” To researchers, anger may have very specific characteristics, which help
researchers di↵erentiate anger from other similar emotional states, such as being
upset or frustrated. If respondents do not see anger in the same way, then either
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their answers will be exceptionally noisy or researchers may be given the impressions
respondents are angry, when in reality they are not. FMRs and ERPs measure anger
objectively, meaning regardless of the respondent, the definition of anger will be the
same.
These factors combine to place scholars in a di cult position. Either they
use self-reports which may be biased, or they use things like fMRIs and ERPs
which may not be biased but are extraordinarily expensive and di cult to use.
Unfortunately, scholars of congressional, judicial, and presidential politics are often
not even given this choice, because members of Congress, justices of the Supreme
Court, and presidents of the United States are unlikely to answer questions regarding
how they feel. Here, self-reports, like fMRIs and ERPs are di cult, if not impossible,
to use, meaning if one is interested in studying the e↵ects of congressional anger, a
new measurement strategy has to be created. Even though text and audio analysis
should not be treated as a panacea, I argue it can be used to achieve this end. This is
because unlike scholars in computer science (see Schuller et al., 2011), psychology (see
Scherer, 2003), and communication (see Metts and Planalp, 2002), in political science
we are inundated with text and audio data. Indeed, whether it is the House Video
Archives, CSPAN Video Library, Project Oyez, or the American Presidency Project,
scholars of legislative, judicial, and presidential politics have a wealth of text and
audio data at their finger tips. Unfortunately, to date, no one has shown how this
data can be used to study emotional expression, among other things. This project
plans on doing just that.
However, using text and audio data is easier said than done. In terms of the
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former, while political scientists have used text data for a variety of purposes, such
as topic (Grimmer, 2010; Quinn et al., 2010) and ideological (Laver, Benoit, and
Garry, 2003; Slapin and Proksch, 2008) classification, no one has used text data to
study emotion. In terms of the latter, political scientists recently have begun to
explore how things like vocal pitch a↵ect voting behavior, but no one has used audio
data in order to understand emotional expression. In this way, this dissertation is
wading into uncharted waters, which is why this chapter is by far the most technical.
3.2 Text as Data
This dissertation argues that words matter. Indeed, whether it is members of
Congress debating legislation or a newspaper discussing the importance of Obamacare,
the words we use and how we use them underline what politics means to many on a
day-to-day basis. Specifically, Grimmer and Stewart (2012) argue:
Language is the medium for politics and conflict. Candidates debate and
state policy during a campaign. Once elected, representatives write and
debate legislation. After laws are passed, bureaucrats solicit comments
before they issue regulations. Nations regularly negotiate and then sign
peace treaties, with language that signals the motivations and relative
power of the countries involved. News reports document the day-to-day
a↵airs of international relations that provide a detailed picture of conflict
and cooperation. Individual candidates and political parties articulate
their views through party platforms and manifestos. Terrorist groups
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even reveal their preferences and goals through recruiting materials, magazines,
and public statements (267).
In each of these examples, politics is defined by the words we use. Indeed, “those
examples, and many others throughout political science, show that to understand
what politics is about we need to know what political actors are saying and writing”
(Grimmer and Stewart, 2012, 267). Unfortunately, while many agree that words
matter, the amount of text makes using words to understand politics extraordinarily
di cult. For example, while it is easy to transcribe and study a single altercation
between two loved ones regarding taking out the trash, it would be much more
di cult to transcribe and study every altercation two loved ones have over the course
of a year. Similarly, while it is easy to study something like the Gettysburg Address, it
is much more di cult to study every speech President Lincoln gave during the course
of his political career. Given that, many scholars have turned to computerized text
analysis in order to make these larger studies more manageable
Although there are a variety of ways that computers can be used to study
text, this dissertation uses text to determine whether a speaker is generally in a
positive or negative emotional state. Here, various “psychological studies reveal that
the user’s emotional state significantly a↵ects his or her phrasing” (Osherenko and
Andre, 2007, 232). Of these studies, several have shown that measures of word
use provide “a meaningful indicator of emotion that may be used as an alternative
or complement to self-reports of emotion” (Kahn et al., 2007, 281). One recent
extension of this work is James W. Pennebaker’s Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count
(LIWC) dictionary (for review see Tausczik and Pennebaker, 2010). This dictionary
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attempts to quantify various underlying psychological states by looking for hundreds
of words and their extensions across a wide variety of texts, such as “emails, speeches,
poems or transcribed daily speech” (What is LIWC?, 2007). Several scholars have
found relationships between LIWC word counts and the expression of various things
such as honesty (Newman et al., 2003), dominance (Sexton and Helmreich, 2000),
cognitive mechanisms (Graesser et al., 2004; Pennebaker, Slatcher, and Chung, 2005),
personality traits (Mehl, Gosling, and Pennebaker, 2006; Pennebaker and King,
1999), and emotional states (Alpers et al., 2005; Bantum and Owen, 2009; Kahn
et al., 2007).
Of the eighty one measures calculated by the LIWC, the “negative emotion”
measure which consists of 500 words (and their extensions) has proven to be the most
useful. Here, words such as “bitter,” “disgust,” “enrage,” and “hate,” are considered
to be indicative of an underlying negative emotional state. While this measure has
not been used in political science, it has been used by a variety of scholars in other
fields in order to study the causes and consequences of emotion (Alpers et al., 2005;
Bantum and Owen, 2009; Kahn et al., 2007). For example, Alpers et al. (2005) found
the “negative emotion” category outperformed all other LIWC categories (Figure 2),
leading these authors to conclude the category “. . .might be satisfactory in tracking
changes in expression of negative emotions in on-line groups” (372). Given that, the
“negative emotion” category seemed like a logical place to begin.
To understand how this measure works, lets return to our fictional argument.
Here, imagine the altercation consisted of the following exchange. First, your loved
one said, “I can’t believe you did not take out the trash!” To which, you responded,
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“Stop yelling at me! I really hate it when you yell and scream about these minor
things. It really makes you look bad. You scratched my car last week, and you did not
hear me yelling at you! I can’t take this any more!” The question becomes, who is in a
more “negative emotional state”? The LIWC would say you are, simply because you
used more negative as opposed to positive emotional words. Here, words like “yell”
and “bad,” are viewed as being “negative,” meaning the more you use the words
the more negative you are. Specifically, when your loved one confronted you about
not taking out the trash 4.5 percent of her statement was “negative.” Conversely,
when you responded by reminding her about your car, 7 percent of your words were
considered to be “negative.” Given that, if one were to analyze the text of this limited
altercation using the LIWC, one would conclude you were more negative than your
loved one.
From this small example, one can easily see the benefits and limitations of text
analysis. First, quantifying emotion is relatively straightforward. If we have a
collection of text, we can quantify the degree to which an individual is in a positive
or negative emotional state by simply counting the relevant words that were used.
Given that, members of Congress, justices of the Supreme Court, and presidents
of the United States can all be studied using this approach. Indeed, Weinstein’s
Postivie A↵ective Dictionary has been used by a variety of presidential scholars
to understand the extent to which things like television interviews can be used to
understand a president’s underlying emotional state. Even though these types of
applications have advanced our knowledge considerably, text analysis comes with
it own limitations (for review see Grimmer and Stewart, 2012). Specifically, often
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times context is di cult to infer using these types of word counts. For example, the
sentences, “I really hate it when you yell and scream about these minor things!” and
“You know I hate it when you yell and scream. Thanks for refraining!” are scored
exactly the same since the word “hate” is the key word when determining whether the
sentence is indicative of a negative emotional state. Thus, when using the “negative
emotion” category, often times one has to use other variables in conjunction with
the LIWC measure in order to infer whether a speaker is angry.
For example, Bohanek, Fivush, andWalker (2005) asked 44 undergraduate women
to write for 40 minutes about personal events in their lives which varied along two
dimensions, valence and intensity. This yielded 4 narratives per respondent, for
a total of 176 narratives. After this was done, these authors used the “negative
emotion words” category of the LIWC to determine the percentage of negative words,
among other things. Generally, they found “the negative narratives contained more
negative emotion than the positive narratives” (Bohanek, Fivush, and Walker, 2005,
58), suggesting the “negative emotion words” category of the LIWC is useful for
quantifying emotional valance.
Unfortunately, the Bohanek, Fivush, and Walker (2005) results also show that
the “negative emotion words” category of the LIWC is unable to quantify emotional
intensity. Specifically, data in the Bohanek, Fivush, and Walker (2005) study show
that undergraduate women actually use more negative words when describing
“moderate” events (2.06) than when describing “intense” events in their lives (1.85).
Moreover, when one conducts a simple two-sample t-test using these results (assuming
unequal samples and variance), one finds that the “negative emotion words” category
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is a significant predictor of whether a speech is “positive” or “negative” (t = 10.59,
df = 140.41, p ⇡ 0), whereas the inverse is true when predicting whether a speech
is “intense” or “moderate” (t =  1.07, df = 173.89, p ⇡ 0.23). Given that, in order
to determine whether a speaker is emotionally activated one has to use something
other than the LIWC “negative emotion” category. For this study, I use audio data
to achieve this end.
3.3 Audio as Data
Specifically, the mean fundamental frequency has been shown to be consistently
associated with emotional activation (for review see Calvo and D’Mello, 2010; Owren
and Bachorowski, 2007; Russell, Bachorowski, and Fernandez-Dols, 2003; Zeng et al.,
2009). While political scientists have recently begun to notice the importance of vocal
pitch (Anderson and Klofstad, 2012; Klofstad, Anderson, and Peters, 2012; Tigue
et al., 2012), no one, to date, has used it for the purpose of emotional classification.
This is unfortunate, since psychologists (for review see Scherer, 2003), computer
scientists (for review see Schuller et al., 2011), and communication scholars (for
review see Planalp, 1999) have long noted the relationship between vocal pitch and
emotional activation. Specifically, in their review of emotional measurements Mauss
and Robinson (2009) put it this way:
The assessment of vocal characteristics appears to be especially useful
in understanding levels of emotional arousal, with higher levels of pitch
and amplitude associated with higher levels of arousal (Table 1). By
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contrast, attempts to link emotional valence or discrete emotions to
vocal characteristics have been met with mixed success at best, although
more sophisticated methods may be capable of doing so in the future.
Thus, we conclude that vocal characteristics are primarily reflective of
the dimension of emotional arousal (225-226).
Generally, vocal pitch corresponds (with some qualifications) with the
fundamental frequency (F0). While many of us know that when one moves from
left to right on a piano’s keys the pitch of the keys increases, few know that one’s
vocal cords work in a similar fashion when one is emotional. To understand this
relationship, we need to have a clearer understanding of the fundamental frequency,
which Titze (2000) defines using this equation:
F0 =
1
2L
s
 
⇢
(3.1)
where L is the vocal fold length,   is the longitudinal stress on the vocal folds, and
⇢ is the vocal fold tissue density. Here, “. . . voice pitch is inversely proportional to
vocal fold length and directly proportional to the square root of tension on the vocal
folds” (Puts, Gaulin, and Verdolini, 2006, 284). Thus, “[l]onger vocal folds with less
tension on them lead to lower voice pitch” (Puts, Gaulin, and Verdolini, 2006, 284).
This relationship is why men typically talk with lower pitch than women. Specifically,
male vocal folds are generally between 17.5 and 25mm long, whereas female vocal
folds are typically between 12.5 and 17.5mm long, making the denominator for the
first part of Equation 3.1 smaller for women, increasing their F0 (Titze, 2000).
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For the most part, individual variations in vocal fold length (L) and density
(⇢) are determined by genetics (e.g. Przybyla, Horii, and Crawford, 1992; Debruyne
et al., 2002). For example, vocal fold length is positively correlated with size (both
height and weight), which is one of the reasons why a boy’s voice drops once he hits
puberty (Fitch and Giedd, 1999). Conversely, variations in longitudinal stress ( )
are almost entirely determined by the speaker. For example, “[e]motional activation
raises F0 by increasing tension on the focal fold mucosa ( , in Eq. (1)), mainly
via contraction of the circothyroid muscles and consequent lengthening of the vocal
folds” (Puts, Gaulin, and Verdolini, 2006, 285).
Here, imagine your vocal cords are similar to the strings on an acoustic guitar.
The tighter the strings, the higher the pitch. However, in order for those strings to
produce a higher pitch something must cause the strings to vibrate. On a guitar,
that something is your fingers strumming the strings. In your vocal tract, the
“strumming” occurs by increasing and decreasing your air flow, meaning the more air
that flows through your vocal cords, the more your vocal cords will vibrate. When
we are angry, this increased air flow naturally occurs as our heart rate increases and
our breath consequently shortens (for review see Kreibig, 2010). However, this only
explains why your voice naturally changes as you become more angry. It does not
explain why your pitch subsequently increases.
Again, thinking of a guitar is useful in this regard. When we play a guitar we
willingly strum the string we want in order to produce the desired note. However,
sometimes our finger slips and we accidentally hit a string that is slightly higher or
lower than the one we would expect. In many ways, this is what happens to your
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vocal cords when you are emotionally activated. While you may not want to raise
the tone of your voice, when you are emotional often times you lose some control of
your vocal inflection causing you to vocalize your words in unintended ways. Even
though, on its face, it seems as though a decrease in vocal pitch is equally likely, in
reality the inverse is true. This is because when you are emotional your increased
heart rate naturally causes your muscles to tighten, which consequently tightens your
vocal cords, increasing your pitch. Thus, not only does emotional activation cause
your voice to change in unexpected ways, but this change tends to be an increase in
vocal pitch.
Unfortunately, when we are in a heated argument with a loved one often times we
do not recognize these physiological changes. Indeed, when one gets into an argument
with a loved one about taking out the trash it seems like all of a sudden we are yelling
and screaming. While some of us may recognize that the tone of the argument has
changed, often times the argument seems to become more vocal as time progresses,
even if neither party intends for it to do so. This is because arguments naturally
change our physiology, causing our vocal pitch to change, whether we like it or not.
Indeed, when we are in a heated argument, our skin sweats, our heart rate increases,
and our breath shortens. It is only natural to imagine that our vocal pitch changes as
well. Given that, while one can certainly say when one is “angry,” often times these
physiological changes occur below our conscious awareness, meaning sometimes we
are angry even before we know that we are “angry.”
Remarkably, Darwin noted this relationship in Chapter 3 of The Expression
of Emotions in Man and Animals. Specifically, Darwin (1872) argued:
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Involuntary and purposeless contractions of the muscles of the chest
and glottis, excited in the above manner, may have first given rise to
the emission of vocal sounds. But the voice is now largely used by
many animals for various purposes; and habit seems to have played an
important part in its employment under other circumstances. Naturalists
have remarked, I believe with truth, that social animals, from habitually
using their vocal organs as a means of intercommunication, use them
on other occasions much more freely than other animals. But there
are marked exceptions to this rule, for instance, with the rabbit. The
principle, also, of association, which is so widely extended in its power,
has likewise played its part. Hence it follows that the voice, from having
been habitually employed as a serviceable aid under certain conditions,
inducing pleasure, pain, rage, etc., is commonly used whenever the same
sensations or emotions are excited, under quite di↵erent conditions, or in
a lesser degree.
In this way, one’s vocal pitch is a direct reflection of how one’s body changes when
one is emotionally activated. From both a methodological and theoretical framework
this is useful. In terms of the former, while definitions of “anger” di↵er from one
respondent to another, vocal pitch is objectively defined, meaning an increase in
pitch from a low C to a high C will be the same regardless of respondent. Moreover,
while things like social desirability bias may cause some respondents to be reluctant
to report negative emotions, one has little to no control of one’s vocal pitch, making
it potentially more useful for scholars. Specifically, citing Go↵man (1959) Fenno
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(1977) argues:
Go↵man is particularly interested in the second kind of expression -
“the more theatrical and contextual kind” - because he believes that the
performer is more likely to be judged by others according to the nonverbal
than the verbal elements of his presentation of self. Those who must do
the judging, Go↵man says, will think that the verbal expressions are more
controllable and manipulable by the performer; an they will, therefore,
read his nonverbal “signs” as a check, on the reliability of his verbal
“signs” (898).
Here, many use nonverbal “signs” to determine the veracity of verbal claims
because the former are extraordinarily more di cult to control making them a more
reliable indicator of an individual’s underlying emotional state. Thus, if we are
interested in congressional anger, then focusing on something like vocal pitch is
not only useful, but essential to understanding emotional expressions on Capitol
Hill. Indeed, things like vocal pitch are more likely to show variation, making them
particularly interesting in this regard.
3.4 Analyzing Audio
Measuring vocal pitch brings its own challenges (for review see Hess, 2007). To
understand the di culties, we must have a understanding of what constitutes “sound.”
Here, Aristotle was perhaps the first to answer this question. Specifically, Aristotle
(2004) argued in his book On the Soul :
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What has the power of producing sound is what has the power of setting
in movement a single mass of air which is continuous from the impinging
body up to the organ of hearing. The organ of hearing is physically united
with air, and because it is in air, the air inside is moved concurrently with
the air outside. Hence animals do not hear with all parts of their bodies,
nor do all parts admit of the entrance of air; for even the part which
can be moved and can sound has not air everywhere in it. Air in itself
is, owing to its friability, quite soundless; only when its dissipation is
prevented is its movement sound (Book II, Part 8).
Here, Aristotle is fundamentally correct. Sound is produced by the movement of
air, which begins at the sound’s source and ends at the “organ of hearing.” Although
the “organ of hearing” does not necessarily move concurrently with the movement
of the sound source, the “organ of hearing” mimics the source’s movement in a very
real way. Thus, when we say we hear a “sound” we do not really hear the sound
itself. Instead, what we hear is the translation of that sound by our chosen “organ
of hearing,” which can be anything from a digital recorder to the ear itself.
Remarkably, this is essentially how scientists think of sound today. Here, any
sound wave can be defined using two components, its amplitude and frequency. This
is shown in Figure 3.1. In this example, a pressure di↵erential emitting from a given
source causes a displacement which creates sounds in a given receiver. For example,
imagine your loved one yells at you from across the room. In this instance, the person
pushes air through the vocal cords causing the vocal cords to vibrate. This, in turn,
causes the air to exit the vocal tract in a way that is similar to the vibrations of the
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vocal cords themselves. These waves of air then enter your ear canal and moves your
ear drum in a similar fashion. A sound’s amplitude is simply the peaks and valleys of
these movements, with higher amplitudes producing greater movements. A sound’s
frequency is simply the speed of these movements, measured in Hertz. In this way,
a sound’s frequency is related to the number of oscillations a sound wave completes
over a given period of (T ), whereas a sound’s amplitude is related to the maximum
and minimum of the sound wave over the course of the sound’s life.
Even though speech scientists have advanced our understanding of sound
considerably over the last 50 years, these basic properties of sound were originally
outlined by Galileo nearly 400 years earlier. Specifically, in his book The Assayer,
Galileo argued:
Sounds are made and heard by us when the air - without any special
property of “sonority” or “transonority” - is ru✏ed by a rapid tremor into
very minute waves and moves certain cartilages of a tympanum in our
ear. External means capable of thus ru✏ing the air are very numerous,
but for the most part they may be reduced to the trembling of some body
which pushes the air and disturbs it. Waves are propagated very rapidly
in this way, and high tones are produced by frequent waves and low tones
by sparse ones (Galilei, 1957, 276).
Here, both Aristotle and Galileo are making two arguments. First, the frequency
of a sound is determined by the number of waves the sound produces. For example,
one of the reasons why the first string of a guitar plays a higher note as compared to
the sixth string is due to the size of the first string relative to the sixth. Specifically,
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the first string of an acoustic guitar ranges from around 0.010 to 0.016 inches in
diameter, whereas the sixth string ranges from around 0.047 to 0.059 inches in
diameter. Thus, when you apply the same amount of energy to a guitar’s first
and sixth strings the former will move faster as compared to the latter, ultimately
producing a higher pitch. Second, the sound itself is created by the displacement
of air. For example, when one strums a guitar string the movement of the string
pushes air away from the surface of the string. This creates a very small area of
high pressure followed by a very small area of low pressure, resulting in a pressure
di↵erential. This phenomenon can be understood by waving one’s hand in the air.
As you wave your hand in the air you should feel the pressure building on the palm
of your hand, making the air on the front heavier than the air on the back. In both
instances, these minute pressure di↵erentials eventually reach your ear producing a
similar e↵ect in your ear drum, ultimately producing sound.
Unfortunately, every day sounds are not as simple as Figure 3.1. Instead, “real
sounds are never characterized by a single frequency f , but by an energy distribution
across di↵erent frequencies” (Camastra and Vinciarelli, 2008, 18). This implies the
sounds we hear in our daily lives are actually the sum of several frequencies and
amplitudes. To demonstrate this e↵ect listen to your voice while you speak aloud.
Here, when one speaks not only does one hear the sound exiting one’s mouth, but
one also hears the sound reverberating up through one’s skull, meaning the voice you
hear aloud is a function of two processes. Thus, it is not surprising that many find
their recorded voice sounds “funny.” Indeed, your recorded voice does not possess
the latter of these two processes, meaning it should sound di↵erent from your voice
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when you speak aloud.
Figure 3.2 shows one way to think of these types of complex sounds. Here, we see
a very general representation of a “source-filter” model, in which a source produces
an initial sound wave (x(t)) which is distorted by a filter (z(t)) producing the sound
we ultimately hear (y(t)). As you can see, not only is y(t) a linear function of x(t)
and z(t), but x(t) and z(t) are independent, meaning one can change the properties
of the filter without altering the properties of the source. These two assumptions
are important to audio analysis because in combination they suggest that any signal
can be decomposed into an underlying source and filter.1
In this way, the source-filter model is particularly useful for analyzing human
speech. Specifically, the source-filter model suggests that any speech wave can
be characterized as a Fourier series. Here, Fourier’s theorem “. . . says that any
periodic function can be written as the sum of infinitely many sine and cosine
terms whose angular frequencies are !, 2!, 3!, and so on. The lowest of these
frequencies (i.e., !) is the fundamental frequency, and its higher multiples are known
as harmonics.” (Maor, 2008, 205). While harmonics are not necessarily important for
the study of emotion, they are essential to speech analysis since they are the reason
why some vocal tracts will produce di↵erent pitch output using the same fundamental
frequency, meaning a fundamental frequency of 100 Hz will sound distinct coming
from one person’s vocal tract as compared to another. Similarly, when one changes
1The logic here is similar to the logic underlying simple ordinary least squares (OLS). Specifically,
in the context of OLS, the source would be the independent variable (x) and the filter would be the
coe cients ( 0 and  1). In the context of OLS, the source-filter model assumes y is a linear function
of x and one can change the equation one uses to model the relationship between y and x without
altering x. Given that, the two assumptions of the source-filter model seem rather innocuous.
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the shape of one’s mouth, one’s vocal tract changes, meaning the harmonic structure
of the letter “a” will be distinctly di↵erent from the harmonic structure of the letter
“b.” In this way, you manipulate your vocal tract to emphasize some aspects of the
fundamental frequency and deemphasize others. The former are called “formants.”
Thus, Fourier’s theorem suggests speech can be decomposed into the fundamental
frequency and its formants. To give you a sense of this process, consider Figure 3.3.
Here, we begin with a square wave, which simply returns 1 when the underlying
function is above 0 and returns -1 when the underlying function is below 0. In this
instance, the underlying function is the sine wave shown in Figure 3.1, which has
a frequency of 8Hz, meaning in one second the sound wave repeats itself 8 times.
Fourier’s theorem argues we should be able to write the square wave as a series of
sine and cosine functions. To begin, let’s start with the original underlying sine wave,
this is shown in Figure 3.3 (see the panel labeled ff). To this let’s add the third
harmonic (see the panel labeled ff3). As you can see, the resulting wave is squarer
than the underlying sine wave (see the panel labeled ff+ff3). Now, let’s add the
fifth harmonic (see panel labeled ff5). As you can see, the resulting wave (see the
panel labeled ff+ff3+ff5) is now squarer than the wave shown in the panel labeled
ff+ff3. If we were to continue this process to infinity, we would ultimately recover
the original square wave. In essence, this is Fourier decomposition.
Now, imagine a speech wave is simply a complex version of a square wave. In this
context, the underlying sine wave is the fundamental frequency and the formants are
the odd harmonics. Although the Fourier decomposition of a square wave and speech
wave are similar, the former can be achieved via a simple closed-form solution while
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doing the same for the latter is extremely di cult. This is because one’s vocal tract
consists of several parts which emphasize some frequencies while de-emphasizing
others. For example, as a sound wave exits your vocal cords part of the sound
wave is able to move out of your esophagus, whereas other parts of the sound wave
hits the top of your esophagus and reflects back down towards your vocal cords.
These reflections then collide with the sound wave itself, creating an extraordinarily
complicated formant pattern. Even though more complex models can be developed
in order to facilitate Fourier decomposition, often times an algorithm must be used
to find the Fourier series. Although there are several algorithms which achieve this
end, most scholars use a Fast Fourier Transformation (FFT).
To give you a sense of the FFT, consider Figure 3.4. Here, I have applied the
FFT to the wave shown in the ff+ff3+ff5 panel in Figure 3.3. Given the nature
of Figure 3.3, the Fourier series should consist of three sine waves, with frequencies
of 8Hz, 24Hz, and 40Hz. This is precisely what is found in Figure 3.4. Notice,
the largest peak corresponds with the fundamental frequency (8 Hz), while each
subsequent peak corresponds with the first two formants, found at 24Hz (F1) and
40Hz (F2).
Moreover, the height of each peak is the directly related to the amplitude of the
corresponding sine wave. For example, the amplitude of the underlying sine wave is
1, while the amplitude of the sine wave corresponding to F1 and F2 is 0.33 and 0.2,
respectively.2 While the FFT produces amplitudes remarkably similar to the real
2It is important to note that the amplitude of a formant will always be lower than the amplitude
of the fundamental frequency. This follows from the definition of amplitude, which essentially
equates amplitude with the signal’s energy. Given that, since formants are created by the original
sound wave colliding with the walls of the vocal tract, then it should be no surprise the amplitudes
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amplitude (i.e., 0.3326 in the case of F2), they are still slightly di↵erent. This is due
to the nature of the algorithm. With that said, the FFT is extremely useful because
it allows one to easily decompose a complex periodic signal, like a speech wave, into
a Fourier series.
Once this information is obtained, we can reconstruct the source-filter model.
Specifically, in the case of the FFT, the signal is modeled in terms of a combination of
complex exponentials, where the first iteration consists of the fundamental frequency
and the subsequent iterations consist of the formants. In this way, the FFT is a
source-filter model, where the “source” is the initial signal and the “filter” is how
that signal is changed over time. In the context of Figure 3.4 the “source” of the
signal is represented by the first spike, whereas the “filter” is represented in the
second and third spikes.
When using real-world data, obtaining these parameters is extraordinarily di cult.
Specifically, “speech is a non-stationary process; the momentary position of the
vocal tract may change abruptly at any time,” which ultimately can lead to wide
variations in the temporal structure of the signal (Hess, 2007, 184). For example,
people can speak faster, slower, or not at all at any given moment, which makes
pitch determination particularly di cult. Similarly, “[t]he excitation signal itself is
not always regular. Even under normal conditions, i.e., when the voice is neither
hoarse nor pathologic, the glottal waveform exhibits occasional irregularities” (Hess,
2007, 184). This is why “[f]or a number of reasons, the task of pitch determination
must be counted among the most di cult problems in speech analysis” (Hess, 2007,
are smaller, since those collisions transfer some of the original sound’s energy to the walls of the
vocal tract.
74
184). Consequently, hundreds of pitch determination algorithms (PDAs) have been
developed (for review see Hess, 2007). One such algorithm, proposed by Boersma
(1993), utilizes the autocorrelation function (ACF).
Here, for a stationary time signal, the ACF can be defined in the lag-domain using
the underlying fundamental frequency. Unfortunately, the majority of speech signals
are not stationary, meaning the signal’s statistical properties change over time. Given
that, one must calculate the short-term autocorrelation which is simply the ACF of a
segment of the original speech signal centered around a particular point in time. This
returns the local fundamental frequency (F0(t)). Here, the periodicity assumption
is more tenable. Specifically, countless studies have shown that the glottis tends to
open and close in a quasi-periodic fashion (see Titze, 2000), meaning for the most
part, if one chooses the appropriate windowing approach, then an accurate estimate
of the fundamental frequency can be obtained. Thus, the next step is to divide a
continuous speech signal into pieces defined by a given window. An example of this
windowing process is shown in the first panel of Figure 3.5.
Here, we start with a 24ms segment of simple sinusoid with a fundamental
frequency of 140Hz and one “formant” at 280Hz. This function is shown here:
x(t) = (1 + 0.3 sin 2⇡140t) sin 2⇡280t (3.2)
While the segment shown in the first panel of Figure 3.5 is similar to x(t), it has been
slightly modified. Specifically, to be consistent with Boersma (1993) I subtracted the
segment’s mean (µx) and multiplied the segment by a Hanning window (Oppenheim
and Schafer, 1989, 447-448) centered around t. This results in the following function:
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a(t) = (x(tmid   1
2
T + t)  µx)w(t) (3.3)
Here, a(t) returns zero when t falls outside of the time interval [0, T ] and w(t) is
defined as:
w(t) =
1
2
  1
2
cos
2⇡t
T
(3.4)
Ultimately, w(t) is shown in the second panel of Figure 3.5 and a(t) is shown in
third panel. Next, I applied a normalized version of the ACF to a(t). Specifically, I
divided the ACF of a(t) by the square of a(t). This function is plotted in the fourth
panel of Figure 3.5 and defined here:
ra(⌧) =
R T ⌧
0 a(t)a(t+ ⌧)dtR T
0 a
2(t)dt
(3.5)
Unfortunately, one can see that the global maximum (other than 0) corresponds
with the formant (see spike at 3.57ms), whereas one would like the global maximum
(other than 0) to correspond with the fundamental frequency (see vertical dashed line
at 7.14ms). This is a common problem with PDAs which use the ACF. Specifically,
Hess (1992) argues the autocorrelation method is “rather sensitive to strong formants”
(cited by Boersma, 1993, 99). While there are many ways to deal with this problem,
Boersma (1993) simply divides ra(⌧) by the normalized autocorrelation of w(t), which
has the following closed-form solution:
rw(⌧) =
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(3.6)
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This function is shown in the fifth panel of Figure 3.5. Ultimately, this suggests
that in order to estimate rx(⌧) we simply divide ra(⌧) by rw(⌧), which is shown here:
rx(⌧) ⇡ ra(⌧)
rw(⌧)
(3.7)
As you can see in the sixth panel of Figure 3.5, this function returns a global
maximum (other than 0) corresponding with the fundamental frequency (see vertical
dashed line at 7.14ms). Thus, the foundation of the Boersma (1993) algorithm
is the division of the normalized autocorrelation of the windowed segment by the
normalized autocorrelation of the windowing function itself.
With that said, it is important to note the relationship between the ACF and the
FFT. According to the discrete correlation theorem, the discrete correlation of two
real functions g and h is equivalent to the complex conjugate of Gk and Hk which
are the Discrete Fourier Transformation (DFT) of g and h (Seung, 2002). This is
shown here:
Corr(g, h), GkH⇤k (3.8)
, where the asterisk denotes the complex conjugation of Hk. Since the FFT is an
estimate of the DFT, we can compute the correlation between g and h by first
applying the FFT to g and h and then multiplying one FFT by the complex conjugate
of the other. Once this is done, one can recover the correlation between g and h by
applying the inverse FFT to the resulting product. Here, the inverse FFT converts
a signal in the frequency domain to a signal in the time domain. Unfortunately,
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this results in a complex vector. However, since both g and h are real vectors the
resulting vector’s imaginary parts are all zero, making conversion to the real domain
relatively easy. Once this is done, one will have a real vector in which each value is
the correlation between g and h at di↵erent lags.3
From this point it should be apparent how one could use the FFT to obtain
the autocorrelation of x(t). Specifically, the autocorrelation of a signal is simply
the correlation of the signal with itself, meaning if we replace both g and h with
x(t) we can use the same process to obtain the autocorrelation of x(t) using the
FFT. Ultimately, this is how most software calculates the autocorrelation of a signal.
Indeed, this is how the autocorrelation was estimated in Figure 3.5. Although to
some this relationship may seem rather technical, to us this relationship is important
because it shows the FFT is the foundation of the autocorrelation method. Thus,
if one believes that a speech wave can be best represented by a source-filter model,
then the autocorrelation method seems to be a natural extension.
3.5 Using Praat
While there are many ways one could implement the Boersma (1993) algorithm, Praat
is by far the most popular. Indeed, a recent Google Scholar search showed Praat had
been cited 6,549 times4, which is substantially more than it’s next closest competitors
3Also, similar to convolution, when using this algorithm one must take into account end e↵ects,
which occur at the beginning and end of a signal when there are not enough points to execute the
algorithm. Given that, Seung (2002) suggests adding zeros to both ends of the signal equal to the
number of lags one is interested in. Thus, if one was interested in the first five lags, then one would
add five zeros to both ends of the signal of interest.
4This search can be found here http://scholar.google.com/scholar?cites=
8104635033638065008&as_sdt=40000005&sciodt=0,22&hl=en (Accessed July 19, 2014).
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SoundScope and WinPitch, which yielded only 453 and 429 citations, respectively.5
Specifically, Praat has been used by scholars to extract pitch from a variety of audio
sources, ranging from monkeys (e.g., Harris et al., 2006; Slocombe and Zu¨berbuhler,
2007) to televised sporting events (e.g., Audrit et al., 2012; Trouvain, 2011). Thus,
when deciding what software to use Praat seems like an obvious choice.
However, using Praat is not as straightforward as it seems. Specifically, three
parameters must be specified (see Weenink, 2012, 22-23). First, one has to set
the “pitch range,” which is simply the “pitch floor” and “pitch ceiling,” where the
former refers to the lowest frequency Praat will consider as a possible candidate
for the signal’s fundamental frequency, while the latter is the same in terms of the
highest frequency (Weenink, 2012, 98). While both the pitch floor and pitch ceiling
are important, the former is more important than the latter because the former is
also used to define the “window length,” which is simply the length of the speech
segment to be analyzed. By default, Praat derives the window length by dividing
three seconds (or 3000ms) by the pitch floor, meaning if one were to set the pitch
floor to 50Hz the resulting window length would be 60ms.
Second, one has to set the “time step” which determines the amount of overlap
between successive speech segments. This is shown in Figure 3.6. Here, in order
to analyze a speech signal Praat has to “cut up the sound into small segments and
analyse each interval separately and pretend it has constant characteristics” (Weenink,
2012, 21). This follows directly from the ACF which requires a signal to be periodic.6
5For a complete list of audio analysis software see http://liceu.uab.es/~joaquim/phonetics/
fon_anal_acus/herram_anal_acus.html (Accessed on July 19, 2014)
6Again, Fourier decomposition (see Section 3.4) makes a similar assumption. However, given
Equation 3.8 this should not be too surprising.
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Figure 3.6 shows why the window length and time step are essential to using the
Boersma (1993) algorithm. Here, in order for the Boersma (1993) algorithm to work
one has to define a segment in such a way as to capture the properties of the speech
signal, while ensuring the segment itself is periodic. This is di cult, to say the least.
Not only do people speak at di↵erent rates, but often times they do not speak at all,
meaning the audio from human speech is more di cult to work with than the audio
from other sources. Thus, for the most part, Praat users should “choose a time step
smaller than half the window length,” meaning if one’s window length is 60ms, then
one’s time step should be 30ms (Weenink, 2012, 22).
Finally, one has to select an appropriate “window shape.” This function determines
how the segment will be extracted from the speech signal. This follows directly
from Equation 3.3. Here, the speech segment is centered around a midpoint (tmid),
meaning the segment’s properties will be di↵erent in the middle as compared to the
tails. Generally, one can think of the windowing function as fading the sound in
and out, making transitions between speech segments relatively seamless. While one
could use any number of windowing functions (Hanning, Bartlett, Guassian, etc.) to
achieve this end, the Boersma (1993) algorithm utilizes a Hanning window, which
happens to be the Praat default.7
While there are certainly other Praat settings one could change, these are the
three settings one has to note. Unfortunately, scholars tend not to report these
settings when using Praat. Specifically, I randomly sampled 50 studies from the
Google Scholar search mentioned above and found only 15.25 percent reported their
7However, it is important to note that Boersma (1993) suggested using a Guassian window could
achieve similar results
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pitch range, time step, and window shape.8 Indeed, in none of the studies dealing
with vocal pitch and voting behavior was any of these Praat parameters reported
(Anderson and Klofstad, 2012; Klofstad, Anderson, and Peters, 2012; Tigue et al.,
2012).
Of these, the failure to report one’s pitch range is particularly troubling. At this
point it should be apparent why the pitch range is essential to properly estimating
the fundamental frequency. Indeed, if one makes the pitch floor too high, then the
resulting window length may make the speech segments non-periodic, causing the
FFT (and ACF) to return inaccurate results. Similarly, if one makes the pitch floor
too low, then the Boersma (1993) algorithm will not capture the dynamics of the
speech signal, making the pitch profile incomplete. This is why the Praat user guide
says the pitch range is “the most important setting for pitch analysis” (Praat, 2012,
Section 4.2). Thus, when I found so few studies reported this setting I was concerned
to say the least.
3.6 Conclusion
At this point, you may be wondering what are the best practices when it comes
to audio analysis? First, have a clear understanding of what you are trying to do.
Even though software has been developed in order to extract various measures from
audio data, this software makes several assumptions about the nature of speech.
8Here, Google Scholar returns 100 pages of results, from which I randomly sampled 10. Once
these pages were selected I went through every citation on every page and determined whether they
extracted pitch values from a given audio sample. This yielded 50 studies, from which I determined
whether they had reported the window length, pitch floor, and window shape.
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For example, if you are using Praat, then you are implicitly assuming that speech
is represented by a source-filter model. Although this makes sense when studying
something like emotion, because you are arguing that one’s internal emotional state
a↵ects one’s vocalization, in other applications perhaps this type of model is less
appropriate. Indeed, if we view changes in one’s vocal cords as being dependent on
changes in one’s vocal tract, then, the source-filter model may be inappropriate.
Second, when dealing with vocal pitch, some measures are more reliable as
compared to others. For example, summary statistics, such as the mean and median
are generally going to be more consistent since they are less dependent on
appropriately defining the windowing process. Although measures such as the pitch
maximum and minimum are certainly interesting, they are more di cult to measure
since they can potentially lie on the window boundaries making them more sensitive
to misspecification. Above I show how misspecifying the pitch range can lead to
irregularities, but a similar argument can be made for choosing to use a Hanning
over a Bartlett window, and vice versa. This latter point is problematic, since the
common use of vocal pitch in political science is to manipulate audio samples by
a specified amount which means these studies are particularly susceptible to these
types of problems.
Finally, validate, validate, validate. Audio analysis is extraordinarily di cult
because results can vary somewhat depending on the way the parameters are
extracted. Thus, the only way to ensure consistency is to include validation exercises
whenever audio data are employed. In this way, this study echoes the fourth principle
of text analysis outlined by Grimmer and Stewart (2012). Specifically, these authors
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argue:
Automated text analysis methods can substantially reduce the cots and
time of analyzing massive collections of political text. When applied to
any one problem, however, the output of the models maybe misleading or
simply wrong. Therefore, it is incumbent upon the researcher to validate
their use of automated text analysis (275).
I could not agree more. “More than a century after Darwin’s pioneering e↵orts,
this research domain may be ripe for another thrust in addressing the fundamental
issues concerning the externalization and social communication of emotion” (Banse
and Scherer, 1996, 635). Political science is well positioned to lead this next step.
Not only do we have a wealth of text and audio data at our finger tips, but the
importance of anger at both the mass and elite-level is at an all time high. However,
in doing so, political scientists are entering uncharted waters. This is why we must
pay extra attention to the audio measures we use. We must make sure not only that
we are using them in an appropriate manner, but also that they are returning reliable
results. Given that, the next chapter will demonstrate the validity of using text and
audio data to quantify congressional anger. Ultimately, I show not only that text
and audio data return valid results, but also that this analysis can be used to gain
insights into some basic questions which underline the causes and consequences of
congressional anger.
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3.7 Figures and Tables
Figure 3.1: What is “Sound”?
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Note: This figure shows how sound waves are defined using two components: amplitude (A) and
frequency. In terms of the latter, a Hertz is related to the number of oscillations a sound wave
completes over a given period of time (T). This sound wave completes one oscillation (see bold
line). In addition to showing how sounds are defined, this figure also shows how sounds (see solid
line) are created from pressure di↵erentials (see dashed line). In this way, a speaker’s vocal cords
creates sounds by altering the air pressure which are then perceived by similar movements in a
receiver’s ear drum.
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Figure 3.2: An Example of a “Source-Filter” Model
Note: This figure shows a simple example of a source-filter model. Here, a sound wave (x) is altered
by a filter (z) which ultimately produces what is heard by a received (y). If one thinks of x(t) and
z(t) as the vocal cords and tract, respectively, then z(t) is what we perceive as human speech.
Notice, in this model the process is assumed to be linear, meaning one can add any number of
filters. This is why you sound di↵erent when you hear a recording of your voice. In this example,
there are two filters. One for your vocal tract and one for your skull, etc. When you hear a recording
the latter filter is removed.
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Figure 3.3: Decomposing a Sound Wave
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Note: This figure shows a simple square wave can be recovered by adding a series of formants to
the fundamental frequency. Here, the sound wave found in Figure 3.1 can be seen in panel ↵. The
square wave (see panel Square) was creates using this function. Specifically, when the sound wave
exceeded zero, the square wave returns a 1. When the sound wave falls below zero the square wave
returns a -1. From this point, both panels ↵3 and ↵5 are the third and fifth formants, respectively,
which are then sequentially added to the fundamental frequency. The result of this process is the
panel found in the bottom right (see ↵+↵3+↵5). Notice how this panel looks more square than
panel ↵. This is essentially the basis of signal decomposition. The square wave was recovered using
the fundamental frequency and formants. If sound is produced using a source-filter model, then
this type of decomposition can theoretically be done using any sound wave.
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Figure 3.4: The Fast Fourier Transformation
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Note: This figure shows how the fundamental frequency and formants can be obtained from a
sound wave using a Fast Fourier Transformation (FFT). Specifically, this figure shows an FFT
being applied to the signal found in the bottom right panel of Figure 3.3. Given what we know
about the signal, one should expect to find a fundamental frequency of 8Hz and two formants, one
at 24Hz and another at 40Hz. This is because the “square” in the top panel of Figure 3.3 repeats
itself 8 times, hence 8 Hz. Similarly, since we know the third and fifth formants were added, then
we know the square should repeat itself 24 and 40 times, respectively. As you can see, the FFT
returns peaks at 8, 24, and 40Hz, with the first being the global maximum (1) and the last being
the global minimum (0.20). If you were to take each of these values, you would find the relative
amplitude of the fundamental frequency and each formant. This suggests that if the source-filter
model is correct, then the fundamental frequency and formants can be obtained using a FFT.
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Figure 3.5: The Boersma (1993) Algorithm
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Note: This figure shows how the Boersma (1993) algorithm can be applied to obtain the fundamental
frequency from a sound wave. Here, the top left panel shows a 24ms sinusoid with a fundamental
frequency of 140Hz and one formant at 280Hz. Moving from left to right on the top row, the
second panel shows a Hanning window, which ranges from 0 to 1 over the course of the signal. The
third panel subtracts the mean from the signal found in the top left panel. Moving to the bottom
row, the left panel applies a normalized autocorrelation function (ACF) to the signal found in the
top right panel. Specifically, the ACF of the signal is divided by the ACF of the squared signal.
Unfortunately, in this panel, the global maximum (other than 0) corresponds with the formant
(see spike at 3.57ms), whereas one would like the global maximum (other than 0) to correspond
with the fundamental frequency (see vertical dashed line at 7.14ms). To correct for this, Boersma
(1993) divides the signal in the first panel by the normalized Hanning window which can be found
in the second panel on the bottom row. When this is done, the result (see third panel) finds
the global maximum at the fundamental frequency. In this way, the foundation of the Boersman
(1993) algorithm is the division of the normalized autocorrelation of the windowed segment by the
normalized autocorrelation of the windowing function itself. In essence, this is the approach used
by Praat
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Figure 3.6: Extracting Pitch (borrowed from Weenink 2012, 22)
Note: This figure shows how the fundamental frequency is extracted using Praat. There are two
things to notice. First, in order for the Boersma (1993) algorithm to work the signal must be
stationary, meaning one has to select an appropriate window length. If the window length is too
long (i.e., the length of the entire signal), then the stationarity assumption is violated. However, if
the window length is too short, then the overall dynamics of the sound wave can be missed. In Praat
the window length is determined using the time step, which is why it is important to properly specify
the time step. Second, within each window the Boersma (1993) algorithm is applied to recover the
local fundamental frequencies (see green, blue, and red waves). Thus, the “fundamental frequency”
returned by Praat is actually the average of the local maxima found in the bottom right panel of
Figure 3.5.
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Chapter 4
Who is the Angriest Member of
Congress?
4.1 Introduction
The previous chapter argues that anger can be e↵ectively measured using text and
audio data. However, it is one thing to say that negative words in conjunction with
vocal pitch can be used to classify anger, and another thing to provide evidence
consistent with this claim. Indeed, at the end of Chapter 3, I implore the reader
to validate, validate, validate. Given that, this chapter will demonstrate not only
can text and audio data be used to e↵ectively measure anger, but when this is done,
meaningful results are obtained. In this way, not only is this chapter a means by
which to validate the measurement approach used throughout this study, but it is
also an important exploration in the characteristics of congressional anger.
However, achieving this goal is easier said than done since no scholar has attempted
to study anger on Capitol Hill systematically. Given that, before we validate the
measure used throughout this study, perhaps we should take a step back and ask
ourselves, what would an ideal measure of anger look like if one were interest
understanding how anger a↵ected things like political participation? Here, there are
three things of considerable import:
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1. The measure must be behavioral.
2. The measure must contain both verbal and non-verbal components.
3. The measure must be continuous.
4.1.1 Behavioral Measure
Generally, there are three ways to measure emotion: (1) overt acts or functional
behavioral sequences; (2) emotional language; (3) physiological reactions. Although
there are potentially many ways to measure emotion on Capitol Hill, floor speeches
are particularly useful because they contain this behavioral component. For example,
when representatives speak angrily about Obamacare on the House floor, they
undoubtedly feel upset towards the bill, but they also express that frustration in
front of their colleagues, and, perhaps the nation as a whole. For some, this may
be a strategic choice in order to bring attention to themselves and their speeches.
For others, this may just be their emotions getting the better of them. Either way,
studying emotion in this context is important to understanding congressional anger,
especially when it comes to things like political participation. In this study, I am
not interested in understanding whether Joe Wilson is di cult to get along with.
Similarly, although interesting, I do not really care whether Peter King yells and
screams at his colleagues behind closed doors. Instead, I am interested in how angry
representatives a↵ect behavior in their districts. In this way, while asking members
of Congress how they feel on any given day would be interesting, this is not what
this dissertation wants to do. Rather, this study is interested in how emotions a↵ect
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voters, meaning not only are behavioral measures useful, but they are also essential
to answering the underlying research question.
With that said, floor speeches are far from perfect. Often times they are given
in front of a handful of people and most voters are probably not sitting around
watching CSPAN. However, this study assumes that members of Congress who give
more emotional speeches are more likely to expression emotion in a similar way
when they are in their districts. This follows directly from behavioral measures of
emotion, which assume that people’s actions reflect their internal emotional state.
For example, if you were to observe an individual fleeing from a bear you would
likely conclude the individual was afraid. Similarly, if your co-workers seem more
depressed then they typically do, then you may conclude that they are having a
bad day. In terms of this dissertation, this is precisely the types of emotions we are
interested in. Indeed, behind the scenes, Joe Wilson may be an extraordinarily nice
guy, but this is not the image he chooses to display to voters. Just like John Dingell
may genuinely be a happy person, but, for whatever reason, he chooses to be the
ultimate curmudgeon when debating on the House Floor. Although understanding
why members of Congress choose to display emotion in this way is certainly a topic
of interest, for this study, I am primarily interested in the e↵ects of these displays
on the electorate as a whole. Specifically, when Joe Wilson yells “You Lie!” does
this increase or decrease voter turnout? To answer this question, we must focus our
e↵orts on how Joe Wilson expresses emotion, which make floor speeches particularly
useful.
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4.1.2 Verbal and Non-Verbal Components
Although obtaining a behavioral measure of emotion is important, the measure
must also contain both verbal and non-verbal components. Not only is it di cult
to understand emotional expression with one and not the other, but often times
non-verbal expressions are more indicative of an individuals underlying emotional
state. For example, when JoeWilson yelled “You Lie! his words gave many indications
that he was angry. However, other times people may not come out and say something
makes them angry. Instead, their non-verbal cues are what help observers infer
their underlying emotional state. Even though on Capitol Hill both types of cues
are important, when it comes to understanding the e↵ect of emotion on voters,
non-verbal cues, especially vocal pitch, are of perhaps greater import, especially
when there is some motivation to deceive.
For example, Ekman et al. (1991) argues that “when motivation is high” and the
stakes are high, “most people will monitor and inhibit most of the behavior they are
capable of controlling” (134). Things like “verbal content, speech rate and fluency,
most body movements, and the large easy-to-see facial expressions,” are all more
susceptible to deliberate control, as compared to “voice pitch” which Ekman et al.
(1991) argues is beyond the control of the individual (134). This is particularly
true in “deceptions which involve emotion,” meaning voters may place more weight
on non-verbal displays of emotion, especially changes in pitch, when determining
the truth and falsity of “any arguments or claims” speakers may advocate (Ekman
et al., 1991, 133). Hence, one’s vocal pitch may actually be a more reliable indicator
of one’s underlying emotional state, making it particularly useful when it comes to
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understanding the consequences of congressional anger.
Given that, while we could certainly ask a member of Congress how they feel at
any given moment, arguably, their answers may be totally irrelevant when it comes
to voters. How many times do politicians claim to be truthful? Patriotic? Religious?
Voters are constantly bombarded with these types of claims, making it particularly
di cult to put any weight into what politicians are saying. For voters who echo
this sentiment, the proof is in the pudding, meaning it is not what members of
congress say, but the way they say it which matters the most. Indeed, Rick Perry
found this out the hard way during the debates before the Republican primary.
Even though Rick Perry said many things that ultimately hurt him, lots of the
press coverage was over how he acted when under pressure. To many he seemed
“awkward, “uncomfortable, and genuinely “nervous (Burns, 2011; Halloran, 2011;
Levs, 2012). It is these non-verbal behaviors that were driving many of the opinions
following debates, even though his words certainly did not help. Looking at both
in combination is the only way to get a full sense of whether a politician, including
Rick Perry, genuinely expresses anger.
4.1.3 Continuous Measure
Finally, in order to adequately operationalize the valence-arousal model the measure
must be continuos and contain a physiological component. Here, members of Congress
are not simply “angry or “happy, rather they can possess a variety of emotional states,
many of which we can identify as “anger. For example, a member of Congress could
be upset with a piece of legislation. Similarly, a representative could be frustrated
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with another colleagues speech. In either situation, there are di↵erent variations of
anger which occur on Capitol Hill, many of which can a↵ect voting behavior. Indeed,
some voters may be “upset with congress, but are not necessarily “angry. Similarly,
others may be “frustrated as opposed to “ticked o↵. Collectively, this means that our
measure of anger must be able to capture these various gradations. Unfortunately,
this is impossible to do using things like psychological biographies since implied
within this type of approach is an assumed knowledge of where “frustration ends
and “anger begins. A continuous measure on the other hand makes no similar
assumptions. Instead, it simply says something is more or less “angry based one
whatever components are used to form the ultimate measure.
Moreover, the arousal component of the valence-arousal model is physiological
in nature. Here, one’s emotional valence can cause one to be either in a generally
positive or negative emotional state, but one’s level of activation is entirely determined
by how one reacts to an emotional stimulus. For example, when people are angry,
their heart rate increases and their skin sweats. This same reaction occurs when
someone is happy, since both are activated emotional states. The main di↵erence
between the two is the valence, where the former is more negative than the latter.
Notice that the valence-arousal model equates activation with these physiological
reactions. Although there are many ways to measure emotional arousal, often times
scholars must use things other than self reports which contain a conscious component
that is the antithesis of emotional activation. Indeed, we do not consciously increase
our heart rate when we are aroused. Similarly, we do not willingly increase our
vocal pitch. In both instances, our body naturally reacts in particular way given
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whatever stimuli we encounter. In this way, not only does our ideal measure contain
a physiological component, but that component must also be continuous.
Fortunately, the measure used throughout this dissertation meets all of these
criteria, meaning if one believes that a proper measure of anger should be continuous,
containing both verbal and non-verbal behaviors, then using text and audio data is
not only useful but fundamentally important to understanding what is and is not
“anger” on Capitol Hill. To validate this measure, I will show that text and audio
data can be used to reasonably capture what most think of when then think of
congressional anger. Undoubtedly, this is, to some extent, subjective, meaning what
seems reasonable to one may be unreasonable to another. Given that, I will present
multiple pieces of evidence that demonstrate how text and audio data can be used to
di↵erentiate between those who are angry and those who are not. For example, are
the most “angry” members of Congress the ones we typically think of when we think
of congressional anger? Similarly, do groups we typically think of as being angry
use more negative words and speak at a higher vocal pitch? If the approach used
in this study is unable to adequately answer these types of questions, then perhaps
one cannot reasonably use text and audio data to classify elite emotion. Whereas, if
the inverse is found to be true, then it means one may be able to use text and audio
data to achieve this end. Ultimately, I find evidence of the latter. This serves as the
impetus for the upcoming empirical chapters where I use this approach to predict a
variety of political behaviors, including voter turnout.
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4.2 How Many Speeches Do We Really Need?
Before we demonstrate the utility of this study’s measure, we should get a better
understanding of the data collected for this dissertation. To date, the majority of
work in political science that has considered the fundamental frequency has focused
on only a handful of speeches. Here, one or two speeches are taken from a couple of
politicians, then the audio is used in experiments to predict things like vote choice.
While this is certainly useful, no study to date has considered audio from a large
speech corpus in order to understand the e↵ect of the fundamental frequency on
political behavior. Even though in political science we typically think bigger is
better, in this dissertation I took a step back and actually considered whether using
more speeches would add anything to our understanding of congressional anger.
Generally, for a large speech corpus to be useful the speeches need to be indicative
of actual congressional behavior. While a study focusing on YouTube videos would
be interesting, many are not actually indicative of the types of behaviors members
of Congress participate in on a daily basis. Floor speeches, on the other hand, are
a key aspect of congressional behavior, making them not only interesting for those
studying Congress, but also an important reflection of a representative’s emotional
state. Undoubtedly, giving a speech is not the same thing as talking about your
feelings, but when members of Congress express emotion on the House floor they
demonstrate their emotional disposition within the legislature, which is particularly
useful if one is interested in how those displays emotion a↵ect behavior on and o↵
Capitol Hill.
Another benefit of floor speeches is that they are comparable across representatives.
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Some members of Congress are covered extensively in the media, whereas others
rarely make appearances. For representatives who are interviewed on Fox News or
CNN there are hours and hours of video that one can use in order to assess their
emotional state. However, for others who do not receive as much coverage finding
high quality text and audio is extraordinarily di cult. Fortunately, every member of
Congress appears on CSPAN at one time or another, meaning not only can one obtain
similar text and audio for every member of Congress, but one can obtain several
instances of emotional expression, both of which are necessary if one is interested
in classifying who is and who is not “angry.” Other sources could potentially gain
similar insights, but floor speeches are the only text and audio source which possess
all of these desirable properties.
Once I decided to focus my e↵orts on floor speeches, data collection was relatively
easy. Specifically, for this study, I obtained text and audio data from the CSPAN
Video Library1 and the House Video Archives,2 respectively. Even though there are
over 2,830 days of House floor proceedings included in the CSPAN Video Library, I
decided to only use floor speeches delivered between January 13, 2009 and October
13, 2011, since, at the time, these were the only dates also available in the House
Video Archives. Combining these two data sets was necessary, since the former
contains a great deal of information about the speaker, while the latter contains
closed-captioning information time-stamped to the hundredth of a second, which
makes splitting the audio file into individual speeches easier and more precise.
Fortunately, both websites use the same closed-captioning information which I used
1http://www.c-spanvideo.org/videoLibrary/
2http://houselive.gov/
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as a bridge to merge the two data sets. When this was done, I found that 109 members
of the 111th House were omitted. For these members, I manually recorded the
text and audio from 5 randomly selected speeches from the CSPAN Video Library’s
website. Ultimately, this resulted in 7,453 floor speeches, including both the original
and supplemental data.
Using this dataset, I operationalized “anger” using the valence-arousal model,
where the text of floor speeches was used to quantify the former and the audio was
used to capture the latter. This is shown in Figure 4.1. As the number of negative
words increases the speaker is more likely to display a more negative emotional
state, whereas speaking with a higher vocal pitch is more indicative of emotional
activation. For this study, each of these variables was first converted to standard
deviations above and below their respective means, for both the 111th and 112th
Congresses. This was done in order to ensure each variable contributed to the final
measure of anger equally. Once this was done, each variable was then re-scaled to
range between the minimum (0) and maximum (1) for each Congress. Both vocal
pitch and “negative words” are gender specific, meaning for male representatives a
0 implies they were the minimum for men in that particular Congress. For example,
if Peter King were the angriest male representative in the 112th Congress, then he
would receive a 1, whereas the same can be said for Jane Harman (D-CA) if she
were the angriest female representative in the 111th Congress. This type of scaling
was necessary because women naturally speak at a higher pitch than men. While
there is generally no di↵erence between men and women when it comes to the use of
negative emotional words, the associated text variable was scaled in a similar way in
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order to maintain consistency.
The question becomes, how can we be sure that text and audio data can be used
to classify anger? While Chapter 3 outlines the logic behind this approach, there is
no empirical demonstration. To rectify this situation, this chapter will answer three
questions: Who is the angriest member of Congress? Who are the angriest groups?
What are the angriest topics? Answering these questions will not only help us gain
some insights into the characteristics of congressional anger, but it will also help
us determine whether vocal pitch and “negative words” can be used for emotional
classification. Indeed, when we think of anger on Capitol Hill certain members of
Congress almost always come to mind. Given that, if I find that some members of
Congress who most observers think are angry are actually found to be “happy,” then
it would suggest maybe I am not measuring what I say I am measuring.
For example, ever since yelling “You Lie!” Joe Wilson and anger often times go
hand-in-hand, meaning if I find that Joe Wilson is among the least angry members
of Congress, then it would call into question whether text and audio data can be
used to classify a speaker’s emotional state. A similar argument could be made for
the Tea Party, who most consider to be one of the angriest groups in American
politics. If I find the Tea Party is one of the “happiest” according to the measure
used throughout this study, then it would suggest “anger” can not be operationalized
using the number of negative words in combination with vocal pitch. Collectively, if
I find that my measure provides reasonable answers to these three questions, then it
suggests that it can be used to quantify congressional anger.
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4.3 Who is the Most Angry Member of
Congress?
Who is the angriest member of Congress? To answer this question, I used the average
weighted rank of each representative’s anger in the 111th and 112th U.S. House of
Representatives, where the weights are proportional to the number of speeches. For
example, if in the 111th House Peter King’s pitch score is .80 and his negative words
score is .50, then his level of anger would be coded as the product of these two
values; .80 ⇥ .50 = .40. Now, imagine if he gave 1 speech and Joe Wilson gave 2
speeches and had a level of anger of .80. If we were to consider each representative’s
anger in isolation, then Joe Wilson would be the most angry and Peter King would
be the least angry, receiving a rank of 1 and 2, respectively. However, we should
take into account the number of speeches given, since Representative Wilson not
only was more angry, but also gave twice as many speeches, meaning the measure
of his anger is more precise than the measure of Representative King’s anger. To
account for this disparity, one can simply repeat each representative’s anger for the
number of speeches and then create a new rank using the inverted rankings and each
representative’s midpoint. In this instance, the resulting vector would be [.80, .80, .40]
with the following ranks [3, 2, 1], making Representative Wilson’s final rank 2.5 and
Representative’s King’s final rank 1. Here, higher numbers mean you are more angry,
so when the anger is unweighted Joe Wilson is twice as angry as Peter King, whereas
when anger is weighted he is two and half times as angry. The di↵erence between the
two is attributed to the di↵erences in the number of speeches. These weighted ranks
101
can be created in R using the Hmisc package. Because I am interested in using the
average across Congresses, I only ranked representatives who were in both Houses
(n = 341). The results are shown in Table 4.1.
As you can see, the most angry member of Congress is Representative John
Dingell (D-MI) and the least angry member of Congress is Representative Judy Chu
(D-CA). Even though some of the representatives on the list may not be the first
people you think of when you think of Congressional anger, others on the list, such
as John Dingell, Peter King, Ron Paul (R-TX), Tom McClintock (R-CA), and Joe
Wilson, often times come to mind when one thinks of anger on Capitol Hill. For
example, John Dingell in a 2011 interview with Roll Call described himself as being
“really angry” with the way Congress has changed over the years, going as far as
to say, he would “probably want to go and vomit” if a younger version of himself
served in the current House of Representatives (Strong, 2011). While this does not
necessarily mean he is always angry, I think it is telling that Dingell’s 2010 biography
in the Almanac of American Politics is the only to include the phrases “We will kill
the closest snake first” and “I don’t know when the hell it will come.” Similarly,
Peter King, “the tough-talking, self-described ‘blue-collar Republican’ has found
himself increasingly isolated” on the House floor due to his willingness to get into
verbal battles with Republicans and Democrats (Nocera, 2013). One such incident
involving Anthony Weiner almost led to blows and eventually culminated in a heated
exchange on Fox News which led host Bill Hemmer to say, “Gentlemen, this may be
why Congress has an 11 percent approval rating by the American public” (Amira,
2010).
102
Then there are Ron Paul and Tom McClintock, both of whom are no strangers
to anger. While Ron Paul may not necessarily be one of the angriest individuals,
his supporters are certainly one of the angriest groups. These individuals, known as
Ronulans and Paulists, are consistently in the headlines for their raucous behavior.
For example, during the 2011 primary season, several got into a fight in Iowa during
a Ron Paul rally (Steinmetz, 2011). Similarly, during the 2012 Republican National
Convention, Ronulans stormed the hallways yelling and screaming about the new
party rules which impeded their ability to gain delegates for future conventions. This
fervor culminated in Paulists openly booing John Boehner (R-OH) on the convention
floor. Perhaps this is why Time magazine said, “If Mitt Romney is vanilla, Ron Paul
is coconut - voters seem to either love him or hate him” (Steinmetz, 2011).
Ironically, Ron Paul is one of the biggest supporters of Tom McClintock. In
2008, Ron Paul sent an email to all of his supporters urging them to donate money
to McClintock’s House campaign. Specifically, Paul said “Tom McClintock is one of
the most promising warriors in the fight against big government we have seen in a long
time, and the special interests and big bankers know it” (Malcolm, 2008). This fight
against big government lead McClintock to become so “angry at Governor Arnold
Schwarzenegger’s lack of fiscal conservatism that he boycotted the governor’s speech
at the State GOP convention” in 2007 (Richman, 2007). While being a fighter and
“warrior” does not necessarily make you angry, you do not find this type of language
being used to describe the least angry members of Congress. For example, in a profile
for the Ventura County Democratic Party, Representative Elton Gallegly (R-CA) is
described as a “nice guy.” Specifically, he is described in this way:
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From what I’ve heard from people who know him personally, Elton Gallegly
is a nice guy. He’s friendly, personable, and kind. One man I talked
to told me how his daughter and son-in-law, on their honeymoon in
Cancun, were marooned in a tropical hurricane, unable to return home
until Gallegly intervened with the Mexican authorities and had the young
couple air lifted out of the stricken area. Needless to say, the family was
grateful (Ventura County Democrat, 2008).
Undoubtedly, this is only one constituent’s opinion, but we see similar sentiments
expressed about Representative Pat Tiberi (R-OH), who is the second least angry
member of Congress. Specifically, in a letter to the editor of the Northwest Columbus
News, C. Douglas Moody writes this about Representative Tiberi:
Managing Editor Joe Meyer’s Jan. 23 observations about Congressman
Pat Tiberi (R-Columbus) certainly rang true for me. Washington, D.C.,
can be a pretty rough place, one that often attracts hard-nosed folks or
ones with good-sized egos. But in the case of Rep. Tiberi, you really do
get what you see: a really nice guy (Moody, 2002).
Finding similar statements about any of the angriest members of Congress is di cult,
to say the least. For example, perhaps the only article which associates Peter
King with the word “nice” is titled, “Peter King: No More Mr. Nice Guy on
China” (Kopan, 2013). Similarly, the only reference to John Dingell’s niceties is
prefaced with “To many outside observers, Dingell was a fearsome force - he could be
tough as nails, and sometimes overly tough, when he wielded a gavel and conducted
an investigation, and he has a temper” (Orstein, 2014).
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However, it is one thing to say anecdotally that some members of the top-ten are
notoriously angry, and another thing to actually provide evidence consistent with
this claim. Given that, I asked two groups of experts whom they thought were the
most angry members of Congress. The first group was 161 Congressional scholars3
who answered an online survey which essentially asked, “Which current member of
Congress do you consider to be the first, second, and third most angry?” This same
question was also answered by 89 political journalists.4 In total, 66 members of
Congress were ranked as being either the first, second, or third angriest member of
Congress. The counts in the “Expert Ranks” column are the number of scholars
who considered the representative to be exceptionally angry. As you can see, four
members of the top-ten angriest members of Congress were considered to be one of
the most angry representatives by the experts survey, whereas only one member of the
top-ten least angry members of Congress was considered to be exceptionally angry.
When the number of ranks are compared using a simple t-test, one finds that there
are more in the list of the most angry members of Congress (36) as compared to the
least angry members of Congress (1), but this di↵erence not statistically significant
(t = 1.73, df = 18, p = 0.101).
3Congressional “scholars” were defined as anyone who participated in a relevant panel from
2010-2012 in the Legislative Studies and Legislative Institutions sections of the annual meeting for
the American Political Science Association and Midwest Political Science Association, respectively.
Relevant panels included topics such as “Polarization in Congress,” whereas irrelevant panels
included topics such as “Legislative Politics in Latin America.” This yielded 105 panels and 467
email addresses, of which 161 responded, yielding a response rate of around 34 percent.
4“Political” journalists were defined as anyone who covered state or local politics for a newspaper
ranking in the top-100 in terms of circulation. While including journalists who covered national
politics would be useful, this list was already compiled for other purposes, and one would think beat
reporters may have a better since of local, and perhaps lesser known, representatives, making this
list particularly useful for the task at hand. This yielded 638 email address, of which 89 responded,
yielding a response rate of around 14 percent
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Although these results are by no means convincing, they are consistent with the
members of Congress who the Almanac of American Politics see as being particularly
angry. Here, I did a simple word count using some words the LIWC associates with
“anger.” While this category has proven to be less reliable than the “negative emotion
words” category (i.e., Alpers et al., 2005; Kahn et al., 2007), for this study I am
merely using this approach to see if one can find additional evidence suggesting text
and audio data can be used to reasonably di↵erentiate between those who are angry
and those who are not. Given that, for each member I used the average number
of angry words in their 2010 and 2012 biographies. To be consistent, I scaled this
variable to range from the minimum (0) to the maximum (1). These results are
presented in the second to last column in Table 4.1.
As you can see, the top-ten angriest members of Congress are seen, on average,
as being angrier by the Almanac of American Politics (0.40) than their less angry
counterparts (0.21). Not only is this di↵erence statistically significant at the 0.05-level
(t = 2.66, df = 18, p  .05), but it is rather sizable with the angriest members of
Congress being nearly twice as “angry.”5 However, simply comparing the two top-ten
5I also conducted similar tests using lead paragraphs of the New York Times. Here, I used
the New York Times Articles API to find articles where the member of Congress was flagged as a
subject of the article. For the 111th Congress I restricted the search to 2009 and 2010, whereas for
the 112th Congress 2011 and 2012 were used. Then, I found the degree to which the lead paragraph
was “angry,” using LIWC’s “anger” category. To be consistent with the number of floor speeches,
I only considered members of Congress who had 5 or more total articles. Unfortunately, this only
returned 37 members of Congress. However, even with this small number of representatives, I found
a strong positive correlation between the measure of anger used for this study and the measure of
anger derived from the New York Times (corr = 0.33, t = 2.10, df = 35, p  .05). As before,
when one compares the average level of anger in the New York Times for those who are ranked
by the experts (0.54) as angry and those who are not (0.54), one finds no significant di↵erence
between the two (t =  0.01, df = 35, p > .05). Similarly, one finds no significant correlation
between “Almanac Anger” and anger derived from the lead paragraphs of the New York Times
(corr =  0.02, t =  0.09, df = 35, p > .05). Each of these tests were weighted using the number
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lists does not provide a definitive test of whether, in general, members of Congress
who use more negative words while simultaneously speaking with a higher vocal
pitch are seen as being “angry” by both experts and the Almanac of American
Politics. Given that, Table 4.2 attempts to predict each of these using the definition
of “anger” used for the purpose of this study. When this is done using a weighted
negative binomial regression, where the weights are equal to the number of speeches,
one finds that text and audio can be used to accurately predict who is and who is
not angry, regardless of whether one uses the experts or the Almanac of American
Politics.
Specifically, anger is a statistically significant (p  .05) predictor of both the
“Expert Ranks” and “Almanac Anger.” This is the case even when one controls
for party identification, ideology, seniority, race, and gender. To be clear, for these
models, “Almanac Anger” is simply the number of angry words that appear in each
representative’s biography. While anger is also statistically significant (p  .05)
when one uses a weighted beta regression to model the variable outlined in Table 4.1
(  = 3.15, se = 0.29, z = 11.01), I used a count variable so the models could be easily
compared. When this is done, one finds that anger seems to be a greater predictor of
“Expert Ranks.” Not only is the pseudo-R2 higher for this model, but the coe cient
is quite a bit larger. Interestingly enough, “Almanac Anger” is not a statistically
significant predictor (p > .05) when it is included as a predictor of “Expert Ranks”
instead of the anger variable used in this study (  = 0.14, se = 0.28, z = 0.49). This
suggests that one can use text and audio data to di↵erentiate between those who
of speeches.
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are angry and those who are not, but one cannot use a simple word count from the
Almanac of American Politics to achieve a similar end.
4.4 Which Are the Angriest Groups?
While it seems as though one can use text and audio data to determine who are
the most and least angry members of Congress, what about groups? Can one use
the number of negative words and vocal pitch to determine which are the angriest
groups? Here, an answer is not readily apparent since the individuals who were
found to be exceptionally angry did not have any noticeable similarities. Indeed, of
the ten individuals flagged as being the most “angry,” we found five Democrats and
five Republicans. Similarly, we found one woman and nine men, which is slightly less
than the average number of women in the 111th and 112th House (18.20 percent).
Collectively, these initial results suggest determining the characteristics of angry
groups is going to be more di cult than originally thought.
However, this is not to say we do not have some initial impressions. For example,
many think the Tea Party and anger are nearly synonymous. J.M. Berstein, a
Professor of Philosophy at the New School for Social Research, nicely captures this
sentiment in a New York Times op-ed titled “The Very Angry Tea Party” (Bernstein,
2010). Here, Berstein argues, citing Zeleny (2010), that the Tea Party’s anger is one
of the reasons why it has been so influential. Specifically, Berstein says:
The seething anger that seems to be an indigenous aspect of the Tea Party
movement arises, I think, at the very place where politics and metaphysics
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meet, where metaphysical sentiment becomes political belief. More than
their political ideas, it is the anger of Tea Party members that is already
reshaping our political landscape. As Je↵ Zeleny reported last Monday
in The Times, the vast majority of House Democrats are now avoiding
holding town-hall-style forums – just as you might sidestep an enraged,
jilted lover on a subway platform – out of fear of confronting the incubus
of Tea Party rage that routed last summer’s meetings. This fear-driven
avoidance is, Zeleny stated, bringing the time-honored tradition of the
political meeting to the brink of extinction.
While many Tea Party members may disagree with Berstein’s assessment, this
type of depiction can also be found in polling data. For example, in a 2013 survey
conducted by the Pew Research Center researchers found that 26 percent of
respondents were angry at the federal government, which is the highest reported
level of anger since Pew began asking the question in 1997. Of these, conservative
Republicans were the most angry with 41 percent reporting being angry. Even though
four out of ten is an exceptional level of group anger, the Tea Party was by far the
angriest of the angry. Here, 50 percent of Republicans and Republican leaners who
agree with the Tea Party say they are angry at the federal government. Collectively,
these results demonstrate that when thinking of angry groups the Tea Party will be
one of the first to come to mind.
However, another pattern is also found in the Pew data: the importance of
minority party status. Specifically, before the Democrats took control of the House
in November 2006, Pew found that 44 percent of liberal Democrats reported being
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angry at the federal government. A similar trend is found in September of 2010,
two months before the Republicans took the House in the midterm elections. Here,
the most angry group was conservative Republicans, with 36 percent reporting they
were angry at the federal government. More recently, this pattern has not held
up, with conservative Republicans maintaining their dominance of anger, despite
being in the majority. Pew introduces the Tea Party as one explanation for this
phenomenon. While generally those in the majority should be less angry, the Tea
Party has fundamentally changed this dynamic since they are, for the most part,
synonymous with anger.
For us, what do these patterns say about our ability to measure anger using text
and audio data? Similar to Joe Wilson and Peter King, if we were find that the Tea
Party was one of the least angry groups, then it would call into question the degree
to which we are truly measuring anger. Conversely, if the Tea Party was found to
be the most angry, then it would further corroborate that we are indeed measuring
what we say we are measuring. However, achieving this end is easier said than done,
since within this group their will be more and less angry members, meaning even
in the Tea Party there will be members who are above or below what one would
consider to be “angry.” Given that, while we expect to see the Tea Party as being
one of the most angry groups, one could easily think of scenarios where this is not
the case. This scenario becomes even more likely when you think of those in the
minority party, which has a more diverse membership than the Tea Party. Thus,
while it is easy to say that we should see Joe Wilson and Peter King as being some
of the angriest members of Congress, saying something similar in terms of groups is
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considerably more di cult.
Given that we have very few expectations about which groups should and should
not be angry, I decided to consider a wide variety of groups, ranging from demographic
groups, such as men and women, to regional groups, such as members of Congress
from the south. Specifically, in terms of the former, in addition to men and women,
I looked at Caucasians, African-Americans, Latinos, and Asian-Americans. For
African-Americans, I used members of the Congressional Black Caucus. Similarly,
for Latinos and Asians, I used the roles of the Congressional Hispanic Caucus (CHC)
and the Congressional Asian Pacific American Caucus (CAPA). As for regional
di↵erences, I used the 2000 Census designations to determine whether a member
of Congress resided in either the Midwest, Northeast, South, or West. While
demographics and region may certainly matter, I also considered whether groupings
based on age, ideology, and partisanship were of equal if not greater import. For age,
“Senior” representatives where members of Congress who served in congress more
than the average member of Congress, which in this dataset was ten years. Conversely
“Junior” members of Congress served less than the mean. Both partisanship and
ideology were relatively straight forward. In terms of the latter, I used DW-Nominate
to di↵erentiate between “Liberals” and “Conservatives,” with “Liberals” being
defined as those who have DW-Nominate scores less than -.30, whereas
“Conservatives” have scores greater than .30. For party, “Democrats” and
“Republicans” were obvious choices, but I also included members of the “Progressive
Caucus” as a counterpart to the “Tea Party.” The thought being that maybe
extremism is what is driving the anger of the Tea Party instead of the Tea Party itself.
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Finally, congressional leaders may also reflect anger di↵erently than the rank-and-file.
Here, “Leaders” were defined as members of Congress who served as either Speaker
of the House, Majority Party Leader, Minority Party Leader, Majority Party Whip,
or Minority Party Whip. The “Followers” are considered all of those who did not
serve in any of these positions. The results of this analysis are presented in Table 4.3.
Here, we find that many of these expectations are supported. Specifically, we find
that conservatives, Republicans, and members of the Tea Party are all among the
angriest groups. Conversely, liberals, Democrats, and members of the Progressive
Caucus are all among the least angry groups. Unfortunately, the di↵erence between
the most and least angry groups are negligible, with the former returning a level
of anger that is, on average, 0.01 higher than the latter. While this di↵erence
is statistically significant at the .05-level (t = 2.61, df = 18, p  .05), it is not
particularly meaningful. Part of the reason for these subtle di↵erences is the nature
of group membership. As groups grow larger, they incorporate more and more
members, each of which have their own proclivity towards anger. Even in a group
like the Tea Party you find stark di↵erences between members. For example, while
Joe Wilson is certainly considered to be one of the angriest Tea Party members,
other Tea Party members may not be as angry. In this way, within any group one
should expect some regression towards zero.
A similar story is found when one considers the expert ranks. Here, I took
the mean number of experts that ranked each group member as being one of the
three most angry members of Congress. For example, imagine that there are only
four members of the Tea Party: Joe Wilson, Tom Graves (R-GA), Cynthia Lummis
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(R-WY), and TomMcClintock. If this were the case, then the “Expert Ranks” for the
Tea Party would be 5, because only Joe Wilson (19) and Tom McClintock (1) were
ranked by any experts. Even though the variable is di↵erent, I did the exact same
thing for “Almanac Anger,” meaning if Cynthia Lummis and Tom Graves had levels
of “Almanac Anger” of 0.25 and 0.50, respectively, then the “Almanac Anger” for
the Tea Party would be 0.33. These results are presented in the last two columns of
Table 4.3. As you can see, while experts tend to rank the most angry groups higher
(0.75) than their less angry counterparts (0.68), there is no significant di↵erence
between the two (t = 0.26, df = 18, p = 0.80). The same is true for “Almanac
Anger,” where the most angry groups have an average level of anger according to
the Almanac of American Politics of 0.338 which is nearly identical to the average
level of “Almanac Anger” for the least angry groups (0.335). Again, this di↵erence
is not statistically significant (t = 0.16, df = 18, p = 0.88).
Noticeably lacking from the discussion is members of the minority party.
Unfortunately, considering this question is di cult given the previous approach, since
all the previous tables include averages across both the 111th and 112th Congresses,
meaning if Joe Wilson’s anger was .80 for the 111th Congress and .20 for the 112th
Congress, then the level of anger considered in the previous tables would be .50. With
minority party status you cannot do this type of calculation because Republicans
were in the minority in the 111th Congress and in the majority in the 112th Congress.
In order to gain some traction on this question, I constructed three models, each of
which use gender, race, region, ideology, seniority, party identification, minority party
status, and whether or not an individual is a leader to predict each representative’s
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level of “anger.” The first model defines “anger” using text and audio data, the second
model defines anger using the Almanac of American Politics, and the final model
defines anger using the expert ranks. Given that the level of text and audio anger
ranges from 0 to 1, I rescaled the expert ranks variable to range from the minimum
(0) to maximum (1). This was done to make all three models easier to compare. Even
though I used a count variable for “Almanac Anger” in Table 4.2, in this analysis
“Almanac Anger” is unchanged, meaning it too ranges from its minimum (0) to its
maximum (1). These results are presented in Table 4.4. Consequently, each model
is a weighted beta regression where the weights are proportional to the number of
speeches.
Although this table reports the results from three di↵erent models, there are only
two things to note. First, the number of observations is twice as large as the number
of observations reported in Table 4.2. This is because each member of Congress
is included in the analysis twice. Even though this makes these models somewhat
di↵erent than the one previously reported, it is the only way to consider the e↵ect
of minority party status. When this is done, one finds that minority party status is
a statistically significant predictor of anger, regardless of whether you define anger
using text and audio data, expert ranks, or the Almanac of American Politics. This
suggests that members of the minority party are generally more angry than those in
the majority.
Second, nine of the twelve independent variables used in this analysis are
consistently in the same direction (see highlighted rows). Of these, six are statistically
significant across all three models (Asian, Black, DW-Nominate, Republican, Tea
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Party, and Minority Party), meaning fifty percent of the independent variables
operate the same regardless of whether you define anger using the Almanac of
American Politics, expert ranks, or a measure derived from text and audio data.
Although I will not go as far as to say that some groups are angrier than others
given the minuscule di↵erences outlined in Table 4.3, at least these models show that
the relationship between group variables at the individual-level are consistent across
the various definitions of anger. Indeed, even when one predicts the raw number
of expert ranks similar to Table 4.2, one finds that the same nine variables are in
the same direction as the other models (Asian, Black, Latino, South, DW-Nominate,
Republican, Tea Party, Minority Party, and Seniority) and that five of these variables
are statistically significant at the .05-level. Again, this suggests there are some
individual-level traits that seem to predict anger, many of which are indicative of
group membership. Unfortunately, when these are aggregated up to the group-level,
these di↵erences are washed away.
4.5 What Are the Angriest Topics?
The question becomes, what about topics? Can one use the number of negative words
and vocal pitch to determine what are the angriest topics? Unfortunately, answering
this question is di cult since CSPAN does not assign a topic to each speech in its
Video Library. While one could use the speech title to try to ascertain the topic of
the speech, I found this to be extraordinarily di cult since, by far the most popular
words in a speech title are things like “act” and “resolution.” Certainly, one could
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develop a dictionary that attempts to exclude these words to focus on the words that
have more substantive meaning, but I found this to be unsatisfying, since for every
word I added to said dictionary their seemed to be three more that were also worthy
of addition. In the end, it seemed as though the dictionary’s contents became more
and more subjective as the dictionary grew, which, ultimately caused me to abandon
this approach all together.
This left me in a di cult position. While I was interested in figuring out which
topics were the most and least angry, I really had no systematic way to study these
given the data set. From here, I began to peruse the data to see whether there were
any other variables that I could use which could give us some idea about whether
certain topics are angrier than others. Ultimately, I settled on the floor speech’s date.
Here, I noticed that often times whole days of congressional debates were dedicated
to only a handful of topics. Indeed, in February 2011 nearly the whole month was
dedicated to debating the stimulus package. Given that, my new strategy was to first
determine which days were the angriest, then see what topics were being discussed
on those days. When this was done, I found considerable di↵erences between the
most and least angry days, with the former being considerably angrier than the latter
according to all three measures. These results are shown in Table 4.5.
As you can see, there is a noticeable di↵erence between the most and least angry
days, with the former having an average level of anger (0.15) one and half times larger
than their less angry counterparts (0.10). Not only is this di↵erence statistically
significant at the .05-level (t = 14.93, df = 18, p  .05), but it is quite a bit larger
than the di↵erence found between the most and least angry groups. Indeed, the
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angriest groups were only 0.01 angrier than groups with the least amount of anger.
While one could argue that di↵erentiating between the most and least angry groups
cannot be done, one could certainly not make the same claim when it comes to
the angriest days. Here, we not only find a noticeable di↵erence between the two
lists, but we also find that the former is ranked higher by the experts as compared
to the latter. Specifically, on average 27 percent more experts saw representatives
delivering speeches on the most angry days as being one of the three angriest members
of congress as compared to the least angry days. Even though the di↵erence between
the expert ranks is not statistically significant at the .05-level (t = 0.78, t = 18,
p > .05), one does find a statistically significant di↵erence when the Almanac of
American Politics is considered. When this is done, one finds the angriest days have
an average level of “Almanac Anger” of 0.34 which is nearly one and half times
larger than the average level of “Almanac Anger” for the least angry days (0.27).
In this instance, the di↵erence between the two is highly significant, returning a
p-value less than 0.01 (t = 8.7, df = 18). This suggests, regardless of measure,
speeches delivered on the angriest days were given by angrier members of Congress,
as compared to speeches delivered on the least angry days. However, only significant
di↵erences are found for “Almanac Anger” and the measure of anger used in this
study.
Unfortunately, Table 4.5 does not really tell us what we need to know. Indeed,
days are only important because they can give us some insights into what topics make
members of Congress angry. Given that, what was being discussed on the most angry
days? Are these topics any di↵erent than those discussed on the least angry days?
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If di↵erences are found, then it suggests that some topics are angrier than others.
However, if the inverse is found to be true, then it suggests that something else may
be driving the di↵erences between these two groups of days. Fortunately, we find
strong evidence of the former. All of which can be found in Table 4.6. Here, I report
the most popular topic on each of the most and least angry days. As you can see,
there is considerable di↵erences found between the two lists. In terms of the former,
we find a lot of discussion of issues related to national security and the economy,
whereas in terms of the latter we mostly find discussions related to commemorations
of one sort or another. Of these, I find the “James Zadroga” topic to the be most
interesting, mostly because of the press coverage this bill got on the Daily Show with
John Stewart (see Williams, 2012).
Specifically, “James Zadroga” refers to the James Zadroga 9/11 Health and
Compensation Act of 2010 which sought to provide health care for 9/11 first
responders. Even though this seems like an uncontroversial piece of legislation, it
actually ended up being extremely divisive, pitting Democrats and Republicans from
New York against one another, with the former claiming we have a moral obligation
to help first responders anyway we can and the latter claiming the legislation was
simply being used by Democrats to score political points. Beginning in summer of
2010 with the heated exchange between Peter King and Anthony Weiner discussed
in Chapter 1 and ending with a December 9th vote in the Senate where Democrats
were unable to overcome a Republican filibuster (Lombardi and McCauli↵, 2010),
the James Zadroga bill was a hot topic inside and outside of New York. While most
thought there was no chance the legislation was going to pass, Jon Stewart used a
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funny sketch on The Daily Show called “No Responders” to pressure Congress to
pass the legislation despite the setback in the Senate. Finally, on December 22, 2010,
Stewart’s e↵orts payed o↵ when, in a surprising change of events, the Senate passed
a revised version of the bill (Hernandez, 2010). The speeches captured in Table 4.5
mostly reflect Republican e↵orts to prevent the legislation from passing the House
one last time. Ultimately, they failed when the James Zadroga bill was signed into
law on January 2, 2011.
While Jon Stewart’s involvement does not automatically mean a topic is “angry,”
these results do seem to suggest that some topics are angrier than others. To further
test this claim, I considered whether speeches with these angrier topics in their titles
were angrier than those with less angry topics in their tittles. Specifically, when
speakers give speeches with “JAMES ZADROGA” in their title do they use more
negative words and speak at a higher vocal pitch than when speakers give speeches
with “JIM OBERSTAR” in their title? Similarly, when a speech is given with the
phrase “NATIONAL DEFENSE” in the title does it tend to be angrier than a speech
with “ENERGY” in the title? To answer these questions, I calculated the average
level of anger for all the speakers giving a speech on the given topic. These results
are presented in Table 4.7.
As you can see, there is a noticeable di↵erence between the most and least angry
topics, with the former having an average level of anger (0.15) one and half times
larger than latter (0.10). Not only is this di↵erence statistically significant at the
.05-level (t = 8.01, t = 18, p  .05), but it is nearly identical to the di↵erence we
found between the most and least angry days. A slightly di↵erent story is found
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in the expert rankings. As before, on average more experts ranked representatives
giving speeches on the most angry topics (2.16) as compared to the least angry topics
(0.70). However, this time the di↵erence is statistically significant at the .05-level
(t = 2.17, df = 18, p  .05). This sizable di↵erence is also found in the Almanac of
American Politics, where angry topics return an average level of “Almanac Anger”
of 0.33 which is significantly higher (t = 2.11, df = 18, p  .05) than the average for
the least angry topics (0.29).This provides additional evidence that one can use text
and audio data to reasonably di↵erentiate between the most and least angry topics.
4.6 What Makes a Member of Congress Angry?
With these results in mind, what makes a member of Congress angry? In order
to answer this question, let’s return to our fictitious couple. When you get into
an argument with a loved one, what makes you angry? Certainly, the issue being
discussed probably matters. For example, people are probably going to be more
angry if they are falsely accused of infidelity as compared to taking out the trash. In
this way, some topics are undoubtedly more angry than others. Similarly, your own
disposition probably matters. Indeed, some individuals are angrier than others. Even
though Jimmy Fallon probably gets angry from time to time, it is probably more
di cult to get him hopping mad than it is to get Lewis Back into a similar emotional
state. From this, we can imagine that a couple of hot-heads arguing about infidelity
are going to be considerably more angry than an average couple arguing about a
more mundane topic. All and all, thinking about how topics and individuals interact
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is relatively straightforward, but wrapping our heads around group membership is a
bit more di cult.
Depending on the group, one could imagine group membership could have both
a positive and negative a↵ect on an individual’s level of anger. For example, imagine
before you came home you swung by your friend’s house. Here, you expressed how
your loved one is always complaining about the smallest things. Like a good friend,
your buddy agrees with you and explains how your loved one is definitely in the
wrong. This, in turn, makes you angrier, since your original frustration has been
confirmed. Consequently, when you get home, you are more ready for a fight, knowing
that your friend has backed you up.
Conversely, other groups may have the opposite a↵ect. For example, imagine
instead of heading to your friend’s house, you decided to head to your church. Here,
you talked with your pastor about how angry you get when your loved one yells at
you about things like taking out the trash. Like a good mentor, your pastor explains
that relationships sometimes take work, meaning the last thing you should do is
escalate the situation. Instead, the next time your loved one yells, you should calmly
explain how yelling and screaming does not help the situation. This, in turn, makes
you less angry, since your original frustration has been ameliorated, to some extent.
Consequently, when you get home, you are more ready to cooperate as opposed to
fight, knowing that your pastor is probably right.
These two examples highlight, when it comes to groups, selection plays a very
important role. Some individuals select to participate in groups that make them
less angry, whereas others select to participate in groups where the inverse is true.
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However, what causes an individual to select one group over another? While there
are probably several factors influencing this decision, one’s proclivity towards anger
is certainly an important component. Some of us simply do not like to be angry.
Indeed, regardless of the situation, we will try to avoid anger at all costs. For people
like this, when they are angry they are much more likely to visit friends or mentors
who help them deal with their anger as opposed to escalate it. For others, anger is
the name of the game, meaning when they are angry they are more likely to seek out
people who are also angry. For people like this, they enjoy the excitement they get
from being angry. To them, being happy is boring.
When we extend this argument to Capitol Hill, we can begin to understand how
the individuals, issues, and groups interact in order to define congressional anger.
Some members of Congress are angrier than others. These individuals are more likely
to participate in angry groups. Consequently, this makes those groups angrier than
their less angry counterparts. The groups and individuals are then more likely to
speak about angry issues. Thus, the angriest members of Congress will be those
who have a natural tendency towards anger, participate in angry groups, and speak
about angry issues. Unfortunately, given the approach used in this book, it is nearly
impossible to directly test this type of complex interaction. Instead, we can only find
suggestive evidence by examining subsets of the data. Specifically, I am interested in
finding members of Congress who meet all of these criteria, then determining whether
they are in fact angrier than the rest. This is shown in Figure 4.2.
Here, we see the intersection of three circles. The left circle represents the average
level of anger for the top-50 most angry members of Congress (0.25). While one
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could use the top-10, I decided to use the top-50 to make the subsets I use in other
circles more meaningful. The right circle represents the average level of anger for
the members of the Tea Party (0.14). This is the exact same number reported in
Table 4.3. While one could use a number of angry groups, the Tea Party was used
in this instance because, according to both my data and our experts, they are by
far the most angry. The bottom circle represents the average level of anger for those
who spoke on June 24, 2011 (0.19). I chose this day because it was not only one of
the angriest day, but it also had 85 speeches from a diversity of sources, making it
particularly useful for this demonstration. Even though one could use specific topics,
I found these topics typically contained fewer speeches, and not as many members
of Congress spoke, making June 24, 2011 more useful.
From this point, some of the intersections are straightforward. The intersection
between the left and right circles is the average level of anger for the top-50 most
angry members of Congress who are also members of the Tea Party (0.21). Here,
while we think of the Tea Party as the angriest group, its membership who are in
the top-50 are less angry than the rest of the top-50 who are not members of the
Tea Party. Initially, this may seem odd, but once you think about what it means
to be one of the angriest members of Congress this drop in anger become easier to
understand. Specifically, the Tea Party is composed of those who are angry and those
who are not. Indeed, when you are the most angry member of Congress, whenever
you are grouped with other people the group’s average level of anger will be less than
your level of anger since you are, by definition, the most angry member of Congress.
With that said, we can see that members of the Tea Party who are part of the top-50
123
are substantially more angry than the rest of the Tea Party. In fact, they are one
and half time angrier.
Even though the intersection between the individual and group is easy to
understand, the intersection between the issue and group is a bit more complicated.
Here, the overlapping region represents the average level of anger for group members
who spoke on June 24, 2011. For example, imagine there are four members of the
Tea Party: Joe Wilson, Tom Graves, Cynthia Lummis, and Tom McClintock. If Joe
Wilson and Cynthia Lummis spoke on June 24, 2011, then the intersection between
the bottom and right circles would represent the average level of anger for these
speeches. With this in mind, we can see that Tea Party members who spoke on
June 24, 2011 were much angrier than those who did not. This suggests that when
members of an angry group talk about angry issues, they tend to be angrier than
when they do not.
More evidence is found when we consider whether members of the Tea Party were
angrier on June 24, 2011 than on other days. Here, we find definitive evidence that
June 24th did, in fact, seem to make members of the Tea Party angrier. Specifically,
the average level of Tea Party anger on days other than June 24, 2011 is 0.12 which
is over two times less than the average level of Tea Party anger on that day (0.28).
This suggests that some issues may make angry groups angrier. While it is unclear
whether our intervention in Libya is a “Tea Party” issue, the point of this analysis
is to simply demonstrate how angry issues are more likely to trigger anger in angry
groups as compared to less angry issues. For example, if one considers the level of
Tea Party anger for all the least angry days, one find the average (0.08) is nearly
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two times less than the average level of Tea Party anger for all the most angry days
(0.15). While the number of observations is too low to conduct a meaningful test of
Tea Party anger on June 24, 2011 in comparison to other days, there are more than
enough observations to test Tea Party anger on the most and least angry days. When
this is done, one finds, the former is significantly larger than the latter (t = 3.93,
df = 211, p  .05).
A similar story is found when we consider speeches delivered by the top-50
angriest members of Congress on June 24, 2011. This is found in the intersection
between the left and bottom circles. Here, we find that the average level of anger
(0.28) is more than both the average level of anger for the top-50 angriest members
of Congress and for speeches delivered on June 24, 2011. Similar to the intersection
between groups and issues, it seems as though when angry members of Congress
speak about angry issues they tend to be more angry than the typical speaker.
This same interpretation can be found when you consider Tea Party members who
delivered speeches on June 24, 2011. Again, while most may have been angry on
June 24th, the Tea Party was angrier than the average speaker. Similar to the
pervious findings, we may not have enough observations to conduct a meaningful
test, but when we consider the average level of anger for the top-50 angriest members
of Congress on the most (0.19) and least angry days (0.17) we find the former is
larger than the latter, even though the di↵erence between the two is not significantly
di↵erent from zero (t = 0.71, df = 128, p > .05). Collectively, this provides some
evidence that members of Congress who tend to be angry become angrier when
discussing angry issues, but the e↵ect may be more pronounced in groups.
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However, this does not entirely answer our question. What makes the angriest
member of Congress angrier? Are there certain situations when hot-heads really lose
their cool? Coming in, it seems as though the angriest members of Congress will
become the most angry when they are party of angry groups, speaking about angry
issues. This is what we find in the intersection between all three circles. Here, we
find the average level of anger for speeches delivered by members of the Tea Party
who are also members of the top-50 angriest members of Congress on June 24, 2011.
In many ways, you can think of this intersection as the pinnacle of anger, which is
exactly what we find. In these four speeches, we find that the average level of anger
is 0.37. Even though it is impossible to conduct a meaningful statistical test with so
few speeches, I think these results taken together with those outlined above give us
a better picture of the characteristics of congressional anger.
Some members of Congress tend to be angrier than others. Often times these
individuals are members of common groups, but in many instances they are not.
While it is unclear what role group membership plays, one thing is readily apparent.
When angry groups talk about angry issues, they become angrier, suggesting that
some issues trigger group anger more than others. While the same relationship is not
as pronounced for angry individuals, it does seems as though members of Congress
who tend to be angry tend to be angrier than the average member of Congress when
these issues are discussed. The same thing is found for angry groups. In this way,
one can say that angry individuals and angry groups tend to define the debate when
angry issues are considered. Thus, it is not too surprising to find that by far the
greatest instance of anger is when an angry representative who is a member of an
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angry group talks about an issue which typically garners anger. Even though these
instances are rare, they comport well with our expectations.
Indeed, people like Joe Wilson may be angry themselves, but often times they
surround themselves with groups, like the Tea Party, who we typically view as being
equally angry. Within a given congressional debate, these individuals and groups
may set the tone, but sometimes the tone gets out of hand, regardless of whether
these individuals and groups participate. For example, when the Patriot Act was
discussed emotions were high. To say that Joe Wilson or the Tea Party drove this
level of emotionality would be a misunderstanding of how anger operates on Capitol
Hill. Lots of things contribute to congressional anger, some more than others. Even
though we can gain some insights into what contributed to the higher temperature
in the House, there will never be one thing that we can say is the lynch pin of anger.
This is what makes addressing anger so di cult. Indeed, for every Joe Wilson we
censure, there are groups we allow to run rampant.
Collectively, the individual, issue, and group intersect to create instances where
anger is more pronounced. The same is true in Congress as it is in our every day lives.
The question becomes, how do voters react when they encounter these instances
of anger? Do they withdraw from politics? Or do they become more mobilized?
In Chapter 2, we discussed some initial expectations in this regard, but given our
findings in this chapter, maybe some of these expectations should be modified. The
beginning of the next chapter will address this issue, then later in the chapter I
will begin to show that congressional anger does have a meaningful e↵ect on voting
behavior. The end goal is to show, using observational data, how this relationship
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is distinct from political incivility. Chapter 6 will achieve this end, but for now,
we will simply consider whether anger has a positive or negative e↵ect on political
participation, which is where we now turn.
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4.7 Figures and Tables
Figure 4.1: Operationalizing the Valence-Arousal Model
Activated
Deactivated
Positive Negative
Angry
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Excited
Happy
Contented
Calm Droopy
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Words
Note: In this study, the mean fundamental frequency (F0) is scaled to range from 0 to 1, with the
former representing the minimum for each Congress, whereas the latter represents the maximum. In
each instance, the variable is gender specific. For example, a male in the 111th Congress a 0 means
he had the lowest vocal pitch among males in the 111th Congress. To be consistent, “Negative
Words” is scaled in the same way, but instead of vocal pitch, the number of negative emotional
words is counted. Here, “negative emotional words” is calculated using the same category in the
Linguistic Inquiry Word Count (LIWC) dictionary.
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Table 4.1: Who is the Angriest Member of Congress?
(a) Most Angry
Most Text/Audio Almanac Expert
Angry Name Anger Anger Ranks
1 DINGELL (D MI-15) 0.39 0.27 0
2 PAUL (R TX-14) 0.30 0.31 6
3 HARMAN (D CA-36) 0.29 0.48 0
4 KING (R NY-3) 0.28 0.44 10
5 ROYBAL-A (D CA-34) 0.26 0.30 0
6 THORNBER (R TX-13) 0.23 0.58 0
7 MCCLINTOCK (R CA-4) 0.22 0.26 1
8 SCOTT (D VA-3) 0.20 0.69 0
9 PETERS (D MI-9) 0.20 0.32 0
10 WILSON (R SC-2) 0.20 0.30 19
(b) Least Angry
Least Text/Audio Almanac Expert
Angry Name Anger Anger Ranks
1 CHU (D CA-32) 0.00 0.00 0
2 TIBERI (R OH-12) 0.01 0.30 0
3 FILNER (D CA-51) 0.02 0.51 0
4 KILDEE (D MI-5) 0.03 0.30 0
5 CLYBURN (D SC-6) 0.05 0.10 0
6 GRIJALVA (D AZ-7) 0.05 0.16 0
7 LARSON (D CT-1) 0.05 0.20 0
8 PASTOR (D AZ-4) 0.08 0.00 0
9 SHULER (D NC-11) 0.08 0.27 1
10 GALLEGLY (R CA-24) 0.11 0.30 0
Note: “Text/Audio Anger” is the product of the average scaled vocal pitch and negative emotion
words (see Figure 4.1) for each speaker over the 111th and 112th U.S. House of Representatives.
“Almanac Anger” is the number of “angry” words used by the Almanac of American Politics to
describe each representative. Here, “anger” is determined using the corresponding category in the
Linguistic Inquiry Word Count (LIWC). Similar to “Text/Audio Anger” this variable was scaled
to range from 0 to 1, with each representing the minimum and maximum within each Congress,
respectively. “Expert Ranked” is the number of experts who ranked each representative as being
either the first, second, or third angriest member of Congress by either the scholars (see Footnote
3) or journalist survey (see Footnote 4). Only members of both Congresses were considered.
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Table 4.2: Predicting Expert and Almanac “Anger”
Almanac Expert
Anger Ranks
(Intercept) 0.91⇤  8.03⇤
(0.08) (0.44)
Text/Audio Anger 0.73⇤ 4.58⇤
(0.19) (0.97)
Republican  0.07⇤ 3.32⇤
(0.03) (0.17)
DW-Nominate 0.33⇤ 9.13⇤
(0.08) (0.45)
Seniority 0.02⇤ 0.05⇤
(0.00) (0.01)
Male 0.01  1.01⇤
(0.03) (0.14)
White 0.21⇤  0.71⇤
(0.03) (0.16)
✓ 6.02 0.17
(0.30) (0.01)
N 341 341
pseudo-R2 0.04 0.06
logL  8131.61  3094.19
Note: The coe cient estimates are from a weighted negative binomial regression where the number
of angry words used by the Almanac of American Politics to describe each representative is regressed
on “Text/Audio Anger,” including various controls. While the first column reports the results
from this model, the second column reports the results from another weighted negative binomial
regression where the number of “Expert Ranks” is regressed on “Text/Audio Anger.” Here, “Expert
Ranks” corresponds with the total number of experts who ranked the representative as being either
the first, second, or third angriest member of Congress. A description of the “experts” can be
found in Footnotes 3 and 4. In each model, only members of both Congresses were considered and
the weights are equal to the total number of speeches. The standard errors are reported in the
parentheses, with each ⇤ indicating the estimate is statistically significant at the 0.05-level. Finally,
✓ is the estimated dispersion parameter and the pseudo-R2 is the ratio of the model’s log-likelihood
to the log-likelihood of an intercept-only model.
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Table 4.3: Which Are the Angriest Groups?
(a) Most Angry
Most Text/Audio Almanac Expert
Angry Group Anger Anger Ranks
1 Latino 0.15 0.24 0.06
2 South 0.15 0.33 0.49
3 Northeast 0.14 0.35 0.34
4 Follower 0.14 0.35 0.57
5 Tea Party 0.14 0.34 2.42
6 Republican 0.14 0.35 0.96
7 White 0.14 0.35 0.65
8 Conservative 0.14 0.34 0.98
9 Male 0.14 0.35 0.50
10 Senior 0.14 0.37 0.51
(b) Least Angry
Least Text/Audio Almanac Expert
Angry Group Anger Anger Ranks
1 Leader 0.09 0.24 1.44
2 Asian 0.12 0.38 0.00
3 Progressive Caucus 0.13 0.33 0.70
4 Midwest 0.13 0.34 1.15
5 Black 0.14 0.35 0.66
6 Liberal 0.14 0.35 0.33
7 West 0.14 0.36 0.43
8 Democrat 0.14 0.34 0.31
9 Female 0.14 0.34 1.12
10 Junior 0.14 0.32 0.70
Note: “Text/Audio Anger” is the product of the average scaled vocal pitch and negative emotion
words (see Figure 4.1) for each group member averaged over the 111th and 112th U.S. House of
Representatives. “Almanac Anger” is the average number of “angry” words used by the Almanac
of American Politics to describe each group member. Here, “anger” is determined using the
corresponding category in the Linguistic Inquiry Word Count (LIWC). Similar to “Text/Audio
Anger” this variable was scaled to range from 0 to 1, with each representing the minimum and
maximum within each Congress, respectively. “Expert Ranked” is the average number of experts
who ranked each group member as being either the first, second, or third angriest member of
Congress by either the scholars (see Footnote 3) or journalist survey (see Footnote 4).
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Table 4.4: Predicting Group “Anger”
Text/Audio Almanac Expert
Anger Anger Ranks
(Intercept)  1.77⇤  0.85⇤  3.76⇤
(0.03) (0.05) (0.07)
Male  0.14⇤ 0.16⇤  0.24⇤
(0.02) (0.03) (0.04)
Asian  1.25⇤  0.42⇤  0.27⇤
(0.07) (0.09) (0.09)
Black 0.10⇤ 0.26⇤ 0.29⇤
(0.03) (0.04) (0.05)
Latino  0.02  0.84⇤  0.18⇤
(0.04) (0.08) (0.08)
South  0.02  0.17⇤  0.07⇤
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
DW-Nominate 0.18⇤ 0.38⇤ 0.44⇤
(0.05) (0.07) (0.08)
Republican  0.24⇤  0.46⇤  0.36⇤
(0.06) (0.09) (0.10)
Tea Party 0.14⇤ 0.10⇤ 0.43⇤
(0.02) (0.04) (0.04)
Progressive Party 0.04  0.31⇤ 0.39⇤
(0.02) (0.03) (0.04)
Minority Party 0.19⇤ 0.07⇤ 0.08⇤
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
Seniority 0.00 0.01⇤ 0.01⇤
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Leader  0.31⇤  0.20⇤ 0.45⇤
(0.04) (0.05) (0.06)
  24.31⇤ 4.62⇤ 6.68⇤
(0.43) (0.08) (0.22)
N 682 682 682
pseudo-R2 0.03 0.05 0.13
log L 8901.09 2503.7 42362.74
Note: The coe cient estimates are from a weighted beta regressions where “Text/Audio Anger” was regressed on
various group controls, with a particular focus on minority party status which varies from congress-to-congress.
Unlink Table 4.2, “Almanac Anger” is the number of angry words used to describe each representative, scaled to
range from 0 to 1, where each corresponds with the minimum and maximum for each Congress, respectively. As
before, “anger” is determined using the Linguistic Inquiry Word Count (LIWC) category of the same name. To
be consistent, “Expert Ranks” was also scaled to range from the minimum (0) to maximum (1) for each Congress.
For all the models, the weights are proportional to the number of speeches, and a ⇤ indicates the estimate is
statistically significant at the 0.05-level, with the standard errors being reported in the parentheses. Finally, ✓ is the
estimated dispersion parameter and the pseudo-R2 is the ratio of the model’s log-likelihood to the log-likelihood of
an intercept-only model.
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Table 4.5: What Are the Angriest Days?
(a) Most Angry
Most Text/Audio Almanac Expert
Angry Date Anger Anger Ranks
1 December 22, 2010 0.15 0.34 1.85
2 February 14, 2011 0.15 0.35 0.78
3 January 14, 2009 0.15 0.33 2.19
4 February 13, 2009 0.15 0.34 0.60
5 October 13, 2011 0.15 0.32 0.71
6 January 15, 2009 0.15 0.35 3.07
7 February 10, 2009 0.14 0.37 1.21
8 January 27, 2009 0.14 0.32 0.57
9 May 25, 2011 0.14 0.34 0.66
10 June 24, 2011 0.14 0.36 1.26
(b) Least Angry
Least Text/Audio Almanac Expert
Angry Date Anger Anger Ranks
1 December 14, 2010 0.08 0.28 0.48
2 May 23, 2011 0.09 0.28 0.32
3 April 15, 2011 0.09 0.24 1.41
4 March 30, 2011 0.10 0.27 1.33
5 July 22, 2011 0.10 0.30 1.94
6 July 20, 2011 0.10 0.24 0.32
7 July 15, 2011 0.10 0.29 2.56
8 July 11, 2011 0.10 0.28 0.60
9 September 13, 2011 0.11 0.25 0.61
10 July 13, 2011 0.11 0.27 0.52
Note: “Text/Audio Anger” is the product of the average scaled vocal pitch and negative emotion
words (see Figure 4.1) for each representative who spoke on the given day, averaged over the 111th
and 112th U.S. House of Representatives. “Almanac Anger” is the average number of “angry”
words used by the Almanac of American Politics to describe each representative who spoke on the
given day. Here, “anger” is determined using the corresponding category in the Linguistic Inquiry
Word Count (LIWC). Similar to “Text/Audio Anger” this variable was scaled to range from 0 to
1, with each representing the minimum and maximum within each Congress, respectively. “Expert
Ranked” is the average number of experts who ranked each speaker as being either the first, second,
or third angriest member of Congress by either the scholars (see Footnote 3) or journalist survey
(see Footnote 4).
134
Table 4.6: What Are the Angriest Days? (Continued)
(a) Most Angry
Most
Angry Date Title
1 December 22, 2010 JAMES ZADROGA
2 February 14, 2011 TERRORISM
3 January 14, 2009 ECONOMY
4 February 13, 2009 ECONOMIC STIMULUS
5 October 13, 2011 PROGRESSIVE MESSAGE
6 January 15, 2009 TARP REFORM
7 February 10, 2009 HR 1
8 January 27, 2009 AMERICAN RECOVERY
9 May 25, 2011 NATIONAL DEFENSE
10 June 24, 2011 LIBYA
(b) Least Angry
Least
Angry Date Title
1 December 14, 2010 JIM OBERSTAR
2 May 23, 2011 HONORING VETERANS
3 April 15, 2011 BUDGET
4 March 30, 2011 SCHOLARSHIPS
5 July 22, 2011 LEGISLATIVE BRANCH
6 July 20, 2011 AIRPORT
7 July 15, 2011 ENERGY
8 July 11, 2011 PERSONAL EXPLANATION
9 September 13, 2011 JOBS
10 July 13, 2011 CLEAN WATER
Note: “Title” is the modal title for each day. For example, on December 22, 2010 43% of the
speeches were titled “JAMES ZADROGA 911 HEALTH AND COMPENSATION ACT OF 2010.”
Outside of these speeches, no speech had a title in common with any other speech. To broaden the
later searches, the title was recorded as “JAMES ZADROGA.”
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Table 4.7: Which Are the Angriest Topics?
(a) Most Angry
Most Text/Audio Almanac Expert
Angry Title Anger Anger Ranked
1 JAMES ZADROGA 0.17 0.34 1.11
2 PROGRESSIVE MESSAGE 0.16 0.32 1.31
3 ECONOMY 0.15 0.22 4.01
4 TARP REFORM 0.15 0.35 3.78
5 LIBYA 0.15 0.36 1.27
6 NATIONAL DEFENSE 0.15 0.36 0.77
7 TERRORISM 0.14 0.30 0.87
8 AMERICAN RECOVERY 0.14 0.33 0.77
9 HR 1 0.13 0.32 0.84
10 ECONOMIC STIMULUS 0.13 0.37 6.86
(b) Least Angry
Least Text/Audio Almanac Expert
Angry Title Anger Anger Ranks
1 HONORING VETERANS 0.07 0.39 1.20
2 JIM OBERSTAR 0.08 0.28 0.00
3 SCHOLARSHIPS 0.08 0.25 1.73
4 AIRPORT 0.09 0.24 0.36
5 LEGISLATIVE BRANCH 0.09 0.34 0.73
6 BUDGET 0.11 0.27 0.84
7 ENERGY 0.11 0.28 0.45
8 PERSONAL EXPLANATION 0.11 0.27 0.21
9 CLEAN WATER 0.11 0.27 0.61
10 JOBS 0.11 0.26 0.92
Note: “Text/Audio Anger” is the product of the average scaled vocal pitch and negative emotion
words (see Figure 4.1) for each representative who gave a speech with the given title, averaged over
the 111th and 112th U.S. House of Representatives. “Almanac Anger” is the average number of
“angry” words used by the Almanac of American Politics to describe each representative who gave
a speech with the given title. Here, “anger” is determined using the corresponding category in the
Linguistic Inquiry Word Count (LIWC). Similar to “Text/Audio Anger” this variable was scaled
to range from 0 to 1, with each representing the minimum and maximum within each Congress,
respectively. “Expert Ranked” is the average number of experts who ranked each speaker as being
either the first, second, or third angriest member of Congress by either the scholars (see Footnote
3) or journalist survey (see Footnote 4).
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Figure 4.2: What Makes a Member of Congress Angry?
Note: The upper left circle corresponds with the average anger of the 50 angriest members of
Congress (see Table 4.1). The upper right circle corresponds with the average anger of the Tea
Party (see Table 4.3). While one could use a number of groups, I chose to focus on the Tea Party
since it thought to be one of the most angry. The bottom circle corresponds with the average anger
of those who gave speeches on June 24, 2011 (see Table 4.5). I chose this day because it was not
only one of the angriest day, but it also had 85 speeches from a diversity of sources, making it useful
for this type of diagram. The intersections correspond with the anger level in the actual speeches.
For example, 0.28 means that in the speeches given by the angriest members of Congress on June
24, 2011 (n = 19) the average level of anger in those speeches was 0.28.
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Chapter 5
The Consequences of Anger
5.1 Introduction
What are the consequences of anger? When you get into a fight with a loved one,
what are the repercussions? More specifically, when you get angry about taking out
the trash, are you more or less likely to actually take out the trash? One could make
an argument one way or another. On the one hand, when you get into a fight with
a loved one, the other person’s anger draws your attention to an issue you may have
not noticed otherwise. Perhaps the trash does need to be taken out. In this instance,
your loved one’s anger may actually motivate you to act. On the other hand, maybe
your loved one’s anger puts you o↵ so much you storm out of the house. In this
way, while your loved one’s anger may have drawn your attention to an issue, you
are simply fed up with the constant bickering, making withdrawal from the situation
seem reasonable. Sometimes you simply say, “enough is enough.”
When Joe Wilson yells and screams on the House floor his anger may have a
similar e↵ect on voters. On the one hand, a certain percentage of voters will become
more motivated to act after hearing an outburst of anger. For these individuals, anger
draws their attention to something that they too are angry about. Perhaps they too
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thought that Obamacare was a sham. Or maybe they thought that President Obama
has been lying to the American people. Either way, when Joe Wilson yelled “You
Lie!” he struck a very responsive chord with some voters, meaning not only was
his anger acceptable to them, but it was applauded since it reflected some voters’
own angst towards specific polices or the political system as a whole. Conversely,
for others, this same outburst was just another example of how flawed the political
system is. To these voters, compromise and cooperation have been replaced by
bickering and bullying. Not only does this make it more di cult to get things done,
but it also emphasizes how little one’s vote counts. For years voters have been calling
on members of Congress to “tone down the rhetoric” with nothing to show for it.
Consequently, when Joe Wilson yelled “You Lie!” he may have caused some voters
to withdraw in the same way that many withdraw from a heated argument with a
loved one. If one does not feel as though one can accomplish anything by arguing,
then why continue to argue?
With the foundation provided in the four previous chapters, this chapter will
explore these relationships empirically. In doing so, I will move from these generalities
to specific hypotheses which attempt to not only determine whether anger has
a positive or negative e↵ect on political participation, but also whether specific
segments of the population are a↵ected by anger di↵erently. Specifically, Chapter
2 argues that supporters and opponents will respond to anger in di↵erent ways,
which is why this chapter focuses on how party identification a↵ects the response to
anger. Although there are many ways to consider these types of relationships this
chapter will focus primarily on the aggregate. Even though this makes it di cult to
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make individual-level inferences, aggregate-level analysis is helpful in mapping out
the general relationships between anger and the various variables of interest. Using
these results, the final chapter will introduce an experimental design which hopes to
build upon what is found here.
5.2 What Are the Consequences of
Congressional Anger?
5.2.1 Voter Turnout
Generally, when it comes to congressional anger people respond in one of two ways,
either anger reinforces their own cynicism towards the political process, or they see
anger as an important reflection of their own angst and outrage. The demobilization
hypothesis argues that some voters are simply fed up with the way members of
Congress are acting, meaning when they encounter anger they simply withdraw from
the political process all together. This choice is made either out of protest, meaning
they refuse to vote as a way to send a signal to members of Congress to “tone down
the rhetoric,” or this choice is grounded in a rational assessment of the value of
one’s own vote. If one elects a representative to get things done, then yelling and
screaming seems counter productive. To these voters, representatives have grown
angrier and angrier, meaning regardless of who they vote for the outcome will be the
same: nothing gets done. Indeed, for years pundits and politicians have been calling
on members of Congress to “lower the temperature” on Capitol Hill. However, to
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these voters they see little to no change leading them to ask, “if they cannot behave
properly, how are they ever supposed to deal with the major problems of the day?”
For those who think this, voting becomes seemingly unnecessary. Regardless of the
outcome, griping and gridlock will still be the status quo.
Demobilization Hypothesis
Voters in districts represented by exceptionally angry members of Congress
are less likely to turn out as compared to voters in districts where
representatives are less angry.
Conversely, the mobilization hypothesis, argues that congressional anger simply
reflects the anger that many people feel on a daily basis. Here, things like Obamacare
and the stimulus package have created outrage in both Republicans and Democrats.
For these Republicans, President Obama has consistently overstepped his bounds.
While they agree that the nation faces real problems, they do not feel as though more
government is the answer. Instead, they view government as part of the problem.
While for many Republicans yelling and screaming is the furthest thing from their
mind when they see these expansions of government, for others, like members of the
Tea Party, anger is a natural reaction. For these individuals, voters need to get more,
not less angry. Consequently, they expect their representatives to express a similar
sentiment. To them, it is time to take a stand. One way to do so is yelling and
screaming on Capitol Hill.
For Democrats, these same outbursts are seen as a politics of “no.” Groups like
the Tea Party are viewed as strategic actors, where anger is used to force things
onto the agenda. Given that, when Democrats see people like Joe Wilson yelling
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and screaming they see another attempt by Republicans to prevent Democrats from
passing legislation which is necessary to solve the nation’s problems. This is why they
respond so negatively to outbursts of Republican anger. Coincidentally, Republicans
can also get angry for similar reasons. For example, when Republicans see something
like Obamacare they see a policy that not only fails to address the problems with our
healthcare system, but actually makes those problems worse. In this way, Republican
and Democratic anger often arises from a similar place, a genuine concern for the
nation as a whole.
Whereas the demobilization hypothesis states that for some, the natural reaction
to anger is to withdraw from the political process, the mobilization hypothesis posits
that the inverse is true. For those people who care passionately about politics, when
they see anger they are more, not less, likely to act. This is because the anger they see
on Capitol Hill either reflects their own feelings about a given issue or they see these
same expressions of anger as a bullying tactic used by the opposition to force the issue.
Consequently, when Republicans and Democrats see instances of anger that aligns
with their own interests they are more likely to turn out because that anger reflects
their own angst and outrage towards the status quo. Conversely, when these same
voters see anger used to advance something they do not support, then anger becomes
something that is less desirable. In this way, when Republicans see Republican anger
they see a natural reaction to a bad policy, whereas when Republicans see Democratic
anger they see a ploy to pass unwanted policies. Undoubtedly, Democrats respond
similarly to anger from inside and outside their party. Either way, the reaction is
more, not less, participation.
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Mobilization Hypothesis
Voters in districts represented by exceptionally angry members of Congress
are more likely to turn out as compared to voters in districts where
representatives are less angry.
5.2.2 Margin of Victory
Even though the main focus of this chapter is on whether congressional anger increases
or decreases voter turnout, considering how anger a↵ects the margin of victory may
help untangle all of these countervailing forces. For example, some districts may
have more voters who become turned o↵ when they see instances of anger, whereas
others may have more voters who see anger as a necessary evil. In reality, most
districts are probably composed of a mixture of these two groups. Given that, one
cannot simply consider political participation in isolation, because in some instances
congressional anger may have an important e↵ect on voter turnout, but since it has
a positive e↵ect on one group and a negative e↵ect on another, the net relationship
will be zero. Fortunately, the mobilization hypothesis gives us some insights into
how to determine whether or not these types of relationships exist at the district
level.
Specifically, while the mobilization hypothesis speaks of Republicans and
Democrats, in reality, the mobilization hypothesis centers on supporters and
opponents. For example, many Democrats may see Republican anger against
Obamacare as being obstructionist, but the same can be said for how many
Republicans view Democratic anger against something like the Keystone pipeline.
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In this instance, Republicans view the Keystone pipeline as an important part of
our energy security. Consequently, when Democrats yell and scream about how the
pipeline will a↵ect the environment, many Republicans respond negatively. Thus,
while the previous chapter shows that some groups, like the Tea Party, are angrier
than others, when it comes to the consequences of congressional anger, what is most
important is whether you are a supporter or opponent of the member of Congress
who is exceptionally angry.
In this instance, considering the margin of victory is important. Essentially, when
one thinks of the margin of victory one can contemplate two sets of hypotheses. In
the first set, congressional anger can help a member of Congress win reelection for
one of two reasons, either an angry member of Congress mobilizes more supporters
than opponents, or the same member of Congress has little to no e↵ect on supporters
and simply turns o↵ opponents making them withdraw from the political process as
a whole. For example, Joe Wilson’s outburst of anger may have resonated extremely
well with his supporters, making them much more likely to turn out on Election Day.
While his opponents may have been outraged by the same outburst, they show up
less at the polls, either because they are fed up with the political process or they are
in the minority, meaning they may show up at the same rate as supporters, but they
ultimately have no e↵ect on the election result. In terms of the former, the supporter
mobilization hypothesis predicts an increase in the margin of victory, whereas the
latter argues an increase in voter turnout, but no increase or decrease in the margin
of victory.
Supporter Mobilization Hypothesis
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Supporters in districts represented by exceptionally angry members of
Congress are more likely to turn out as compared to opponents. Consequently,
angry members of Congress win by larger margins as compared to their
less angry counterparts.
In the opponent demobilization hypothesis, a similar argument is made. However,
instead of opponents simply turning out less than supporters, opponents withdraw
from the political process all together whereas supporters are una↵ected by
congressional anger. For example, most may have responded negatively to Joe
Wilson’s outburst, making voting less likely, but supporters may have turned out
anyway since the other things Joe Wilson brings to the table outweigh his temper.
Since opponents do not have a similar disposition towards Joe Wilson, they are
unable to find things to counteract their anger towards Joe Wilson’s outburst.
However, instead of mobilizing, they are more likely to refrain from voting since
they, like supporters, see Joe Wilson’s outburst as being indicative of a broken
system, but, unlike supporters, there are no redeeming qualities that bring them
to the polls anyway. When comparing this to the supporter mobilization hypothesis,
one sees that in the opponent demobilization hypothesis one should expect to see
congressional anger decrease voter turnout, but increase the vote margin. Indeed,
both supporters and opponents will be turned o↵ by congressional anger, but only
the former is able to overcome this reaction.
Opponent Demobilization Hypothesis
Both supporters and opponents in districts represented by exceptionally
angry members of Congress are less likely to turn out as compared to
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supporters and opponents in districts where representatives are less angry.
However, some supporters still vote to ensure that an otherwise good
candidate will win. Consequently, angry members of Congress win by
larger margins as compared to their less angry counterparts.
The second set of hypotheses focuses on how congressional anger can lower a
representative’s margin of victory. Here, the opponent mobilization hypothesis argues
that opponents are more likely to turnout in order to oppose what they see as an
inherent flaw with our political system. For example, when Joe Wilson yelled “You
Lie!”, many were outraged. While some probably threw up their hands and said
“enough is enough,” others became more mobilized. The campaign contributions
to Joe Wilson’s opponent, Rob Miller, are indicative of this reaction. To these
individuals, simply sitting back and doing nothing was not an option. Instead, in
order to begin to fix the problems inherent in the way members of Congress carry
themselves on the House floor, these opponents rallied and not only turned out
more on Election Day, but also called on others to do the same. Even though some
supporters may have been mobilized by Joe Wilson’s outburst, their added support
for Joe Wilson was overwhelmingly outpaced by the added outrage, making the net
e↵ect an increase in voter turnout, but a decrease in vote margin.
Opponent Mobilization Hypothesis
Opponents in districts represented by exceptionally angry members of
Congress are more likely to turn out as compared to supporters. Consequently,
angry members of Congress win by smaller margins as compared to their
less angry counterparts.
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In the supporter demobilization hypothesis, supporters become less willing to
vote for a member of Congress who is exceptionally angry. For example, voters in
South Carolina were given two options on Election Day, Joe Wilson and Rob Miller.
While supporters may prefer Joe Wilson to Rob Miller, they oppose Joe Wilson’s
anger. In this scenario, they can express their opposition in one of two ways, either
they vote for Rob Miller or they abstain from voting all together. In terms of the
former, supporters may have become so outraged by the level of anger on Capitol
Hill that they feel as though the only way to truly reflect their degree of disgust
is to vote against Joe Wilson, a candidate they otherwise prefer. In terms of the
latter, supporters may dislike what they saw during President Obama’s State of the
Union address, but they are not willing to vote for a candidate that they disagree
with on other, more important, levels. Supporters are more likely to fall into the
latter category, meaning, regardless of the level of anger, they are not going to all
of a sudden vote for the opposition. Instead, in order to voice their opposition, they
will simply refrain from voting for candidates that display an exorbitant amount of
anger. In this way, opponents will turn out at the same rate when exposed to anger,
but supporters will withdraw, making winning the election less likely.
Supporter Demobilization Hypothesis
Both supporters and opponents in districts represented by exceptionally
angry members of Congress are less likely to turn out as compared to
supporters and opponents in districts where representatives are less angry.
However, this e↵ect is more pronounced in supporters where there is
no reasonable alternative, meaning they are more likely to abstain from
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voting than vote for another candidate. Consequently, angry members
of Congress win by smaller margins as compared to their less angry
counterparts.
With these hypotheses, this chapter has a clear analytic strategy which is outlined
in Figure 5.1. The first question this chapter will address is whether congressional
anger has a positive or negative e↵ect on voter turnout. If a positive relationship
is found, then I will consider whether congressional anger has a positive or negative
e↵ect on the margin of victory. If a null relationship is found here, then it suggests
that voters are generally mobilized by members of Congress who are exceptionally
angry. Alternatively, if a significant relationship is found between congressional
anger and the margin of victory, then it suggests there is a more complex story to
be told. Specifically, if congressional anger is found to be a positive predictor of
both turnout and the vote margin, then it suggests that supporters are mobilized
more than opponents, all else being equal. Conversely, if the relationship between
congressional anger and vote margin is negative, then it suggests the increase in voter
turnout can be attributed to opponent mobilization.
If congressional anger tends to decrease voter turnout, then a similar strategy
will be employed. Specifically, I will then consider whether congressional anger has
a positive or negative e↵ect on the margin of victory. Again, if a null relationship is
found here, then it suggests voters are generally turned o↵ by the angriest members
of Congress. In this instance, we would find evidence that both supporters and
opponents are equally fed up with the political process and consequently have
withdrawn from voting all together. If a positive relationship is found, then it
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suggests that the decrease in voter turnout can be attributed to opponents failing
to turnout on Election Day. Conversely, if a negative relationship is found, then it
suggests that supporters are abstaining from voting, suggesting that supporters have
become fed up with the level of anger, but they are not yet willing to vote for the
opposition.
5.3 Operationalizing the Consequences of
Congressional Anger
5.3.1 Variables
As explained in Chapter 4, text and audio data for this study were obtained from
the CSPAN Video Library and the House Video Archives, with the former capturing
the degree to which a member of Congress is generally in a positive or negative
emotional state and the latter capturing the degree to which a member of Congress
is emotionally activated. Collectively, an “angry” member of Congress is one who
uses more negative words and speaks at a higher vocal pitch, both of which are
scaled to range from 0 to 1. While considering individual speeches would be of some
use, this chapter is interested in each representative’s overall level of anger for the
111th and 112th U.S. House of Representatives. Given that, I took the average level
of anger for each speech delivered by a given member of Congress for both Houses,
meaning if a representative appeared in both Houses, then the representative will
be included twice in the analysis. To create these measures, I ensured that each
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representative had at least 5 speeches in each Congress, leading to 7,453 speeches
overall.
The primary dependent variable is voter turnout. While there are a number of
ways to measure voter turnout, I used the percentage of the voting aged population
who cast a vote in the 2010 and 2012 House Elections. For 2010, I obtained this
measure from the Federal Election Commission.1 Unfortunately, the FEC does not
currently have the results from the 2012 House Elections, so turnout data for these
Congressional districts were obtained from Politico.2 From these same sources, I also
obtained the percentage of the two-party vote each member of Congress received
in these same elections. These results were then merged with other FEC and
Census data to determine the total campaign receipts, voting population, median
age, median income, the percentage of the population who was white, the percentage
of the population who lived in an urban area, and whether the district was in
the South. With these measures in hand, I used Real Clear Politics to determine
whether the district had House3 or Senate4 races that were considered toss-ups. These
demographic and electoral variables were then combined with structural variables,
such as whether the state had same-day registration or required voters to present
photo identification at the polls. These variables were obtained from the National
Conference of State Legislatures.5
1http://www.fec.gov/pubrec/fe2010/federalelections2010.shtml
2http://www.politico.com/2012-election/map/#/House/2012/
3http://www.realclearpolitics.com/epolls/2010/house/2010_elections_house_map.
html
4http://www.realclearpolitics.com/epolls/2010/senate/2010_elections_senate_map.
html
5http://www.ncsl.org/legislatures-elections/elections/voter-id.aspx
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Collectively, these variables were used to control for several competing hypotheses
(see Appendix A). For example, districts which are considered toss-ups are more
likely to increase voter turnout since voters know that their vote could potentially
swing the election to their preferred candidate. Similarly, the more money that
is spent in a given campaign is likely to increase voter turnout, since television
advertising (i.e., Finkel and Geer, 1998; Geer, 2008) and campaign events (i.e.,
Shaw, 1999; Shaw and Roberts, 2000) are thought to increase interest in the election.
Outside of these explanations, the demographic make-up of a district also matters,
since some populations, such as those who are older and have more expendable
resources, are more likely to vote as compared to others, such as racial and ethnic
minorities. All of these processes also exist within a given voting system, in which
things like same-day registration are thought to decrease the costs of voting, whereas
other things like requiring photo identification at the polls are thought to increase
the costs of voting. Consequently, these too are thought to a↵ect the level of voter
turnout.
More importantly, many of these variables can also a↵ect the level of anger felt
within a given district. For example, low-income districts face more hardships than
their more wealthy counterparts, meaning the anger they express at the ballot box
may be more reflective of their current situation than anything that takes place
on Capitol Hill. Similar stories could be made for disadvantaged groups, such
as minorities, where they may be angry at the their lack of representation in the
House, which has little, to nothing, to do with the anger expressed by their member
of Congress. Ultimately, one could construct similar hypotheses for almost every
151
campaign, demographic, or structural variable, meaning the variables I included
in the final analysis could potentially a↵ect both the independent and dependent
variables, as well as the relationship between the two.
5.3.2 Controlling for Body Size
Outside of these variables, I included a control for body size. Chapter 3 shows how
the fundamental frequency is a↵ected by both the size and stress applied to the vocal
cords. While emotional activation can a↵ect the latter, it has no e↵ect on the former,
meaning vocal pitch may have more to do with the height and weight of a speaker,
and less to do with whether the speaker is emotionally activated. Unfortunately,
there is no readily available data which gives the height and weight of every member
of Congress. Given that, I used “head size” as a proxy for “body size.” Countless
studies have found a high positive correlation between the circumference of one’s
head and one’s height and weight (Saunders, Lejarraga, and del Pino, 2006; Sullivan,
2010; Wikland et al., 2002), where the former are correlated between 0.86 and .95
and the latter are correlated between .94 and .96.6
Using ImageJ 7 and the Congressional Biographical Directory I obtained the head
size of every member of Congress in the 111th and 112th U.S. House of Representatives.
ImageJ is a free program developed by the National Institute of Health (NIH) (for
review see Abra´mo↵, Magalhaes, and Ram, 2004; Schneider, Rasband, and Eliceiri,
2012) and has been used by scholars to measure a variety of things like cellular
6In the case of Sullivan (2010) and Wikland et al. (2002) the results were found by re-analyzing
their data.
7http://rsb.info.nih.gov/ij/
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diameter (for review see Collins, 2007), fish movement
(Salvanes, Moberg, and Braithwaite, 2007), and facial dimensions (Wong, Ormiston,
and Haselhuhn, 2011). In some instances, the Congressional Biographical Directory
photo was not available. When this was encountered, I used Google Image to find a
comparable photo. For the most part these images are nearly identical to the ones
found in the Congressional Biographical Directory.
Using the “Measure” tool8 I was then able to measure the size of each
representative’s head (see Figure 5.2). To ensure the accuracy of the measure
one has to find some reference point where one can count the number of pixels
associated with a known length. In this study, I used the knot of a representative’s
tie for male members of Congress, and for female members of Congress I used either
the Congressional security pin or their earrings. To calibrate the lengths of these
items I used a survey on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. In this survey, I showed
every respondent a test image of a ballpoint pen with a known length, then each
respondent was randomly assigned an image of a given representative’s tie, pin, or
earring. In each instance, I asked the respondents to estimate the length of the object
in the photograph. With two respondents assigned to each representative, I then
calculated the group mean, weighting each respondent’s answer using the test image
with those coming closer to the actual length of the ballpoint pen being weighted
more. Generally, the respondents did very well with most giving an estimate within
one inch of the actual length of the pen. Although the error associated with each
representative’s image is unknown, I did notice that occasionally the respondents
8http://serc.carleton.edu/eyesinthesky2/week2/get_to_know_imagej.html
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severely disagreed about the length of the representative’s tie, pin, or earring. Given
that, I ran another wave of the survey for all images where the estimated lengths
were more than one inch apart. Using the results from this second survey, I then used
the two respondents who agreed the most for the final group estimate. On average,
this resulted in estimated lengths of 1.29, 0.89, and 0.61 inches for a representative’s
tie, pin, and earring, respectively.
Undoubtedly, these estimates are not as precise as one would like, but the resulting
measure of head size should be unbiased. As a check, I looked at the correlation
between head size and vocal pitch for every member of Congress in the 111th and
112th U.S. House of Representatives and found the weighted correlation to be  0.16
and statistically significant at the .05-level (t =  13.45, df = 7485, p  .05). As
before, the weights are proportional to the number of speeches which does not a↵ect
the measurement of head size but does improve the accuracy of the pitch estimate.
The resulting correlation is consistent with previous studies (i.e., Evans, Neave, and
Wakelin, 2006; Fitch and Giedd, 1999; Gaddol and Swann, 1983). To provide some
frame of reference, I the weighted correlation between negative words and head size
is 0.02.
5.3.3 Creating A Measure of Congressional Anger
The main variable of interest is congressional anger which I argue is best defined
using text and audio data. Here, according to the valence-arousal model anger exists
when an individual is in an activated negative emotional state. In terms of “Pitch”
and “Negative Words” this implies representatives who use lots of negative words
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while speaking at a higher vocal pitch are the angriest. Given that both “Pitch” and
“Negative Words” are scaled to range from 0 to 1, the ideal measure of congressional
anger would vary similarly, meaning it would return a 0 when both “Pitch” and
“Negative Words” were at their minimum and would return a 1 when “Pitch” and
“Negative Words” were at their maximum. With this in mind, I considered three
di↵erent ways to combine vocal pitch and the use of negative words into a common
measure of anger. Each of these approaches are shown in Figure 5.3.
Here, both “Pitch” and “Negative Words” are simulated using a thousand random
draws from a uniform distribution ranging from 0 to 1, truncated to fit within a unit
circle. In the first panel, “Product Anger” is simply “Pitch” times “Negative Words.”
As you can see, when this is done the entire upper right quadrant of the emotional
circumplex is covered. Conversely, when the average of “Pitch” and “Negative
Words” is used instead (see “Average Anger”), the points are more concentrated
along the diagonal. Given that, if one were interested in only focusing on the
most activated negative emotional states, similar to Marcus, Neuman, and MacKuen
(2000), then this would be the best definition of anger. This is essentially how the
anxiety and enthusiasm dimensions are defined in A↵ective Intelligence. However,
instead of using the average Marcus, Neuman, and MacKuen (2000) use the sum.
Finally, in the bottom panel we find “Modified Product Anger” which is defined
using the following equation:
Anger = (Pitch+ Negative Words)⇥ (1  |Pitch  Negative Words|) (5.1)
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The benefit of this approach is that “Modified Product Anger” increases as both
“Pitch” and “Negative Words” rise together. To understand how this works, suppose
the sum of “Pitch” and “Negative Words” is 1. This could occur when (1) “Pitch”
is 1 and “Negative Words” is 0; (2) “Pitch” is .75 and “Negative Words” is .25; (3)
“Pitch” and “Negative Words” are both .50. Even though there are many other
combinations of “Pitch” and “Negative Words” which would also sum to one, let us
focus on these three. When this is done, Equation 5.1 returns the following:
1. (1 + 0)⇥ (1  |1  0|) = 0
2. (.75 + .25)⇥ (1  |.75  .25|) = .50
3. (.50 + .50)⇥ (1  |.50  .50|) = 1
At first glance, this seems to do exactly what we want. Indeed, the measure
is highest when “Pitch” and “Negative Words” are both .50. If one were to use
“Product Anger,” this scenario would return .25. Thus, “Modified Product Anger”
is the highest when “Pitch” and “Negative Words” increase together. Again this can
be seen when “Pitch” is .75 and “Negative Words” is .25. In this instance, “Product
Anger” would return approximately .19, whereas “Modified Product Anger” returns
.50. Notice that both measures prefer “Pitch” and “Negative Words” to be high,
but “Modified Product Anger” places greater emphasis on this point. Specifically,
“Modified Product Anger” is twice as high in the first scenario (1) as compared to the
second (.50), whereas “Product Anger” is only 1.33 times higher, returning values of
.25 and .19 in each scenario, respectively.
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Another important di↵erence between “Product Anger” and “Modified Product
Anger” is found when either “Pitch” or “Negative Words” is zero. Here, “Modified
Product Anger” only returns zero when both “Pitch” and “Negative Words” is zero,
whereas “Product Anger” will return the same result if either is zero. Again, this
seems to suggest that “Modified Product Anger” is closest to the ideal measure.
However, Figure 5.3 shows this measure has one unfortunate property. As you can
see, Equation 5.1 is essentially a hybrid of both “Product Anger” and “Average
Anger,” but instead of placing all points along the diagonal only points that are
below approximately .25 on either the “Pitch” or “Negative Words” dimensions are
repositioned in this way. Specifically, low “Pitch” values are placed towards the top
of the diagonal and low “Negative Words” values are found towards the bottom. In
this way, if one were interested in excluding lesser forms of anger, then “Modified
Product Anger” would be more appropriate.
For the purposes of this study, it is unclear which approach is best even though
“Average Anger” seems to be the least useful given that it excludes so much of
the spectrum of anger. Indeed, one of the arguments made in Chapter 2 is that
research to date has mostly ignored these lesser forms of emotional expression,
something which the valence-arousal model not only takes into account but argues
is fundamentally important to understanding emotion as a whole. Given that, when
choosing between “Product Anger” and “Modified Product Anger” the former seems
to be more consistent with the theoretical argument advanced throughout. However,
even here there are some limitations. For example, when “Pitch” is 0 and “Negative
Words” is 1 then “Product Anger” would return a 0, which is not ideal. In an ideal
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world, our definition of congressional anger would only return a 0 when both “Pitch”
and “Negative Words” were 0. Unfortunately, this is not the case when it comes to
“Product Anger.” Although “Modified Product Anger” is better able to deal with
this situation, it encounters problems when “Pitch” and “Negative Words” are low.
Thus, neither approach is without flaw.
Given that, I ultimately decided to focus the majority of my e↵orts on “Product
Anger,” even though as a robustness check I will also report the results using the other
definitions. This was done because “Product Anger” captures the entire emotional
spectrum, whereas “Modified Product Anger” seems to cover a little less. With that
said, all of the approaches are highly correlated. Specifically, the correlation between
“Product Anger” and “Average Anger” is .93, whereas the correlation between
“Product Anger” and “Modified Product Anger” is .75. The lowest correlation
is found between “Modified Product Anger” and “Average Anger,” but even here
the correlation is quite high (.59). Unsurprisingly, each correlation is statistically
significant at the .05-level. Thus, while it is di cult to create the ideal measure of
congressional anger, each of the approaches outlined in Figure 5.3 seem to function
similarly, with “Product Anger” being most consistent with the theoretical story
advanced throughout this study.
5.3.4 Predictions
Once these measures were obtained, each was lagged one year. This was done to
gain some leverage on the direction of causation, which is particularly important
when considering the e↵ect of congressional anger on voter turnout. For example,
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a member of Congress could get angry because voters are not turning out in the
district. Conversely, voters may not turn out for a member of Congress who they
see as being too angry. In both instances congressional anger would have a negative
e↵ect on voter turnout, but only in the latter would the finding be consistent with
the hypotheses outlined above. In the former, congressional anger would not be
driving voter turnout; instead, voter turnout would be driving congressional anger.
The lagged variable helps di↵erentiate between these competing explanations.
With that said, operationalizing the hypotheses outlined above is easier said than
done. Specifically, determining the percentage of “supporters” and “opponents” in
a district is extraordinarily di cult since one cannot di↵erentiate between one voter
and the next using aggregate data. To capture this relationship, I focused on the
percentage of the district who voted for President Obama, the assumption being
that Democrats are more likely to turnout in districts where Obama received a
higher percentage of the two-party vote as compared to districts where the inverse is
true. Unfortunately, this only gets us part of the way since Democrats can turnout
in districts represented by either a Republican or Democratic member of Congress.
To overcome this limitation, I focused this portion of the analysis on Democratic
members of Congress. In this way, “supporters” are primarily Democratic districts
with a Democratic member of Congress. To make this operationalization a bit more
clear, I re-wrote each hypothesis using this approach. These are provided in Table 5.1.
If one finds that voters in primarily Democratic districts represented by Democratic
members of Congress are less likely to turn out when their representatives are
generally angry, but that the same representatives tend to win by larger margins,
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then it suggests that the opponents may be the ones failing to turnout on Election
Day. Conversely, if the margin of victory is lower in these same districts, then
it suggests that supporters may be the ones who are being negatively a↵ected by
congressional anger. To help understand how each of these expectations relate to
one another, Table 5.1 provides predictions for both voter turnout and the margin of
victory. Similarly, because the independent variable is lagged, the operationalizations
are written in terms of the 111th U.S. House and the 2010 House Elections. To save
space in Table 5.1, I did not include operationalizations for the 112th U.S. House and
the 2012 House Elections, but these operationalizations are included in the analysis.
Note, these predictions are also reflected in Figure 5.1, which can also be used to
walk through the results.
5.4 Results
5.4.1 Does Congressional Anger Increase Voter Turnout?
To begin to understand the consequences of congressional anger, we must begin
with a very basic question, does congressional anger increase political participation?
For this chapter, I have operationalized political participation using voter turnout.
Specifically, the proportion of the voting age population that voted. Given that the
dependent variable is the percentage of the voting age population that voted, a beta
regression is recommended since any OLS estimate can yield fitted values which are
less than 0 and greater than 1 (Ferrari and Cribari-Neto, 2004). In this instance, I
used a logistic link function and assumed the precision parameter ( ) was constant,
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making the coe cients in Table 5.2 logged odd ratios. Similar to before, the models
are weighted using the lagged number of speeches. However, before we look at the
results there are a couple of things to note.
First, I debated considerably about whether to include “Pitch” and “Negative
Words” as predictors. Ultimately, I concluded that including these component terms
would be theoretically inconsistent with how I view anger throughout this study.
Unlike a traditional interaction term where one variable is thought the moderate
another, “Pitch” and “Negative Words” both contribute equally to the definition of
anger. In this way, “Pitch” and “Negative Words” are more like two survey questions
that are combined to form a single scale. Even though the questions are di↵erent they
are not thought to be independent. Instead, they are both thought to help capture
the same underlying concept. Indeed, one does not measure political knowledge by
interacting a respondent’s answers to ten knowledge questions. Instead, political
knowledge is often measured by counting the number of correct answers. Although
di↵erent, I see “Pitch” and “Negative Words” as achieving similar ends when it comes
to anger.
Second, I only show the results for the variable of interest and two controls,
“Head Size” and “Percent Votedt 1”, where the first controls for body size in order
to isolate the e↵ect of vocal pitch and the second controls for voter turnout from the
previous House election. In each column, I include twelve additional controls, all of
which are outlined above. Unfortunately, space prohibited printing these results in
Table 5.2, instead they can be found in Appendix A. In all columns, I excluded open
seats and elections in which the incumbent was unopposed. With that said, does
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anger increase voter turnout?
In all three columns of Table 5.2 the answer is yes. Anger is a positive and
statistically significant predictor (p  .05) of voter turnout, regardless of how anger
is defined. This suggests that congressional anger motivates people to vote on
Election Day. To support these results, I conducted two robustness checks. First, for
each column, I regressed lagged voter turnout on the current level of anger. Here,
regardless of whether one uses the product (  =  0.03, se( ) = 0.08, p > .05),
average (  =  0.03, se( ) = 0.07, p > .05) or the modified product (  = 0.15,
se( ) = 0.08, p > .05) definition, the current level of anger is not a significant
predictor of the previous percentage of the voting age population that voted. Second,
for each column, I regressed lagged anger on the current level of turnout in the
district. Again, regardless of whether one uses the product (  =  0.13, se( ) = 0.07,
p > .05), average (  =  0.03, se( ) = 0.05, p > .05) or the modified product (  =
0.03, se( ) = 0.04, p > .05) definition, the current level of turnout is not a significant
predictor of lagged anger. Collectively, these results suggest that congressional anger
is not only a significant predictor of voter turnout, but the positive relationship
between the two is relatively robust.
Unfortunately, directly interpreting the coe cients is di cult. Given that, I
decided to consider predicted values for various levels of anger as the control variables
are held constant at their respective mean and modal values. Similar to Chapter 4, I
will only consider product anger. When this is done, one finds that anger has a slight,
but noticeable e↵ect on voter turnout. Specifically, when anger is allowed to vary
from its minimum (0) to its maximum (0.70) the predicted level of voter turnout
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increases from 0.55 to 0.58. While this seems rather small, when this di↵erence
is compared to other variables one finds it is relatively large. For example, when
the percent that voted for President Obama is allowed to vary from its minimum
(0.23) to its maximum (0.95) the predicted level of voter turnout increases from
0.55 to 0.56. Similarly, when one compares districts that require photo identification
to those that do not, one finds a 0.01 di↵erence between the predicted levels of
turnout when everything else is held constant at their respective mean and modal
values. Undoubtedly, these are only two examples, but when other variables are
considered one finds similar results. Indeed, when all variables - excluding the
variables controlling for the 112th Congress and the voter turnout from the previous
election - are allowed to vary from their minimum to their maximum one finds on
average the predicted voter turnout for the latter is .04 higher than the former with
a standard deviation of .03. This suggests the e↵ect of anger is not extraordinarily
large, but it is consistent with the rest of the control variables, excluding the two
which have, by far, the largest e↵ect.
To emphasize the degree to which the variables controlling for the 112th Congress
and the voter turnout from the previous election explain the variance in the dependent
variable, I estimated a model in which these two variables are the only predictors.
When this was done, not only was each variable positive and statistically significant
at the .05-level, but the pseudo-R2 for the model was 0.71, suggesting these two
variables capture a considerable amount of the variance in voter turnout. To give
you a sense of how these variables a↵ect the relationship between anger and voter
turnout, I estimated a model in which I excluded the control for the 112th Congress.
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Not only did this model return a coe cient for anger nearly four times larger and
statistically significant, but when anger was allowed to vary from its minimum (0)
to its maximum (.70) the predicted level of voter turnout increased from 0.35 to 0.48
which is noticeably larger than the predicted values outlined above. Collectively,
this demonstrates that the small e↵ect of anger outlined in Table 5.2 is partially due
to the degree to which the variables controlling for previous voter turnout and the
112th Congress explain the dependent variable. Ultimately, these variables should
be included in the model, but their sizable e↵ect should be kept in mind when
interpreting the results.
5.4.2 Does Congressional Anger Increase the Margin of
Victory?
Collectively, these results suggest that congressional anger mobilizes the electorate,
meaning instead of simply staying at home because of the anger they see on Capitol
Hill, voters seem to turn out more. However, it is unclear what this says about
the general sentiment towards congressional anger. On the one hand, the opponent
mobilization hypothesis argues that voters could be taking their representatives to
the “woodshed,” meaning when they encounter angry members of Congress their
immediate reaction is to try to vote their representatives out of o ce. On the other
hand, the supporter mobilization hypothesis argues the inverse is true. Here, the
positive relationship between anger and turnout suggests that the angriest
representatives are striking a responsive chord within the electorate. Instead of
angry members of Congress being voted out of o ce this hypothesis suggests not
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only will these representatives stay in o ce, but they will tend to win by larger
margins. This chapter will now consider whether congressional anger increases or
decreases the margin of victory. If a negative relationship is found, then it suggests
that opponents are being mobilized, whereas a positive relationship would suggest
supporters are the ones turning out in response to congressional anger.
Similar to Table 5.2, to test this relationship I regressed each representative’s
percentage of the two-party vote on three versions of lagged anger using a weighted
beta regression, where the weights are again equal to the lagged number of speeches.
As before, I will only present the coe cients for the variable of interest, head size,
and the percent of the two-party vote the representative received in the previous
election. The results are shown in Table 5.3. As you can see, in each instance anger
is a negative predictor of the vote margin. However, unlike the models predicting
voter turnout, only two variations of anger are statistically significant. With that
said, when anger is defined using either the product or average definition one finds
the coe cients are remarkably similar to those found above, suggesting the strength
of the relationship is similar.
As before, I conducted two robustness checks. First, I regressed the lagged
percentage of the two party vote received on the current level of anger. Here,
regardless of whether one uses the product (  =  0.00, se( ) = 0.17, p > .05),
average (  = 0.00, se( ) = 0.13, p > .05) or the modified product (  = 0.04, se( ) =
0.09, p > .05) definition, the current level of anger is not a significant predictor of the
previous vote margin. Second, I regressed lagged anger on the current vote margin.
Unfortunately, in these tests, both the product (  =  0.13, se( ) = 0.05) and
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average (  =  0.16, se( ) = 0.04) definitions returned statistically significant results
(p  .05), suggesting the results found in Table 5.3 may not be as robust as those
found in Table 5.2. With that said, the model using the modified product definition
returned a statistically insignificant result (  = 0.04, se( ) = 0.03, p > .05) and
the pseudo-R2 for the other two models ranged between 0.04 and 0.07, suggesting
the relationship between congressional anger and the vote margin is most likely
meaningful, even though it is not a robust as the relationship between congressional
anger and voter turnout.
Collectively, these results suggest that voters are turning out on Election Day
to express their frustration with the level of anger on Capitol Hill. Indeed, each
version of anger negatively predicts the margin of victory, suggesting members of
Congress who are angry not only increase turnout in their districts, but they receive
a smaller share of the two-party vote. As before, to help interpret the results I
will consider the predicted vote margin as anger varies from the its minimum (0)
to maximum (0.70) while all other variables are held constant at their respective
mean and modal values. When this is done, one finds the predicted percentage of
the two-party vote decreases from 0.67 to 0.65. Again, even though this seems like
a small decrease it is relatively large when compared to the other variables. For
example, when one considers the median age, percent urban, or whether the district
had a Senate race that was considered a toss-up one finds there are essentially no
di↵erences between the predicted percentages when the minimums and maximums
are considered. Indeed, when one allows all the variables - excluding the variables
controlling for the 112th Congress and the voter turnout from the previous election
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- to range from their minimums to maximums one finds on average the latter is .04
larger than the former with a standard deviation of .03. Thus, while anger is less
predictive of the margin of victory its relative strength is similar to the relationship
found in the models of turnout.
Even though the turnout models could largely be explained using previous voter
turnout and the dichotomous variable controlling for the 112th Congress, the same
cannot be said for the models considering the margin of victory. Here, when I
estimated a model in which I only included the percentage of the two-party vote
received in the previous election and a control for the 112th Congress as the only
predictors, the pseudo-R2 was only 0.27. This suggests these two variables capture
a noticeable portion of the variance, but not nearly as much as their counterparts
in the turnout models. As before, to give you a sense of how these variables a↵ect
the relationship between anger and voter turnout, I estimated a model in which
I excluded the control for the 112th Congress. Even though this model returned a
coe cient for anger that was .09 larger than the coe cient returned in the full model,
the predicted percentage of the two-party vote received was not a↵ected substantially.
Indeed, when anger is allowed to vary from its minimum (0) to its maximum (.70)
the predicted vote margin decreases from 0.68 to 0.63, which is only slightly more
pronounced than the results from the full model. Ultimately, this suggests the e↵ect
of anger is mostly unhindered by the variables controlling for the 112th Congress and
the previous margin of victory.
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5.4.3 Do Supporters and Opponents Respond Di↵erently?
Up to this point, we have found that voters seem to turn out more in response
to instances of congressional anger. However, when they do they tend to vote
against angry members of Congress. Collectively, this is more indicative of opponent
mobilization. However, this evidence is far from definitive, because we do not have
any way to tease out the di↵erential e↵ects of anger using this type of model.
Specifically, in order to determine whether opponents are the ones being mobilized we
need to consider whether voters are mobilized by angry members of the opposition,
where the inverse is true for angry members of their own party. Unfortunately,
this is di cult to do using aggregate-level data. Given that, in order to gain some
traction on this question I will consider the interaction between anger, the percent
of the district that voted for President Obama, and whether the representative is a
Democrat. Here, I assume that districts where Obama received a greater share of
the two-party vote probably contain more Democrats than districts where Obama
did not fare as well. Using marginal e↵ects plots I will then determine whether
predominantly Democratic districts respond di↵erently to anger from a Democratic
representative as compared to districts where Democrats are less common. While
at first this approach may seem to be somewhat complicated, it becomes more clear
when we consider the plots. However, before we get to these I will first outline the
results of the interaction term which can be found in Tables 5.4 and 5.5.
First, in Table 5.4, we find that the interaction term functions similarly regardless
of the definition of anger. Unfortunately, similar to the general vote margin results,
using the modified version of product anger yields results that are in the same
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direction as the other two models, but are not statistically significant at the .05-level.
Collectively, this suggests the general turnout model is the most robust, followed by
the model predicting the overall percentage of the two-party vote received and this
model. With that said, when anger is defined using the product of negative words
and vocal pitch one finds the interaction term and all its components are highly
significant. Even though the level of significance is slightly lower when anger is
defined using the average of vocal pitch and negative words, the results are essentially
the same. In Table 5.5, we find a similar story, but this time all three versions of anger
are statistically significant. While the interaction term provided somewhat conflicting
results when used to predict voter turnout, when it comes to the margin of victory
the interaction term seems relatively robust. As before, when the lagged three-way
interaction is regressed on either dependent variable no significant relationships are
found, suggesting one cannot predict the lagged variable using either the current
level of voter turnout in the district or the percentage of the two-party vote received.
Again, this adds to the robustness of the results.
Even though it seems as though the models are consistent regardless of how anger
is defined using text and audio data, the interaction itself is extraordinarily complex.
Given that, the best way to observe how the variables a↵ect one another is to plot
the marginal e↵ect of anger as the percentage of the district who voted for Obama
increases from the relative first to third quartile. For Democrats, this is shown in
Figure 5.4. Here, we see on average President Obama received between 56 and 73
percent of the two-party vote in districts represented by a Democratic member of
Congress (see right panel). Conversely, for districted represented by Republicans
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Obama received between 39 and 50 percent of the two-party vote (see left panel).
When these values are taken into consideration, we find that more Democratic
districts tend to turn out less on Election Day when members of Congress display
anger, regardless of whether the representative is Democratic or Republican. This
pattern is no longer present when we consider the margin of victory where Democratic
districts respond to representative anger di↵erently depending on whether the member
of Congress is Republican or Democratic. In terms of the former, the marginal e↵ect
of anger increases as the district becomes more Democratic where the inverse is
true for latter. This suggests that supporters are being demobilized in Democratic
districts represented by Democratic members of Congress, whereas opponents are
being demobilized when the same districts are represented by Republicans.
While it is somewhat di cult to place all of these results in the appropriate
context, the way this interaction works in relation to voter turnout is peculiar to
say the least. Specifically, in the previous models we found that anger is a positive
predictor of voter turnout and a negative predictor of the percentage of the two-party
vote received. However, now it seems as though the former is also negative. Indeed,
regardless of whether the representative is Republican or Democratic, as the district
becomes more Democratic voting becomes less likely as anger increases. To tease
out this relationship, I estimated another model where I considered the interaction
between anger, the percent of the district that voted for John McCain, and whether
the representative is a Republican. Although this interaction will return essentially
the same results as Tables 5.4 and 5.5, plotting this interaction term will help us
substantively interpret Figure 5.4.
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Similar to the plot shown above, Figure 5.5 plots the marginal e↵ect of anger on
both turnout (solid line) and the margin of victory (dotted line) while the percent of
the district that voted for McCain varies from the respective first to third quartile,
which is .50 to .62 for Republicans and .27 to .44 for Democrats. When this plot
is compared to Figure 5.4, one finds simply the inverted relationship between the
horizontal and vertical axes. Placed together, this suggests what is driving the
general relationships found above is not necessarily supporters and opponents, but
rather Democrats and Republicans, with the former being more opposed to anger
as compared to the latter. This can be seen by comparing the “Democrat” panel
in Figure 5.4 and the “Republican” panel in Figure 5.5. In the former, we see
a supporter demobilization story, meaning as a district become more Democratic
anger from a Democratic member of Congress contributes to a decrease in both
voter turnout and the margin of victory. Conversely, in the latter we see an opponent
mobilization story. Specifically, as the district becomes increasingly Republican when
Republican members of Congress get angry voters tend to vote more on Election
Day, but when they do, they seemingly vote for the opposition, decreasing the vote
margin. Given that, regardless of the story, Democrats are the ones moving against
congressional anger.
Returning to the operationalization found in Table 5.1, based on our initial results
we found evidence consistent with the opponent mobilization hypothesis. Indeed, we
not only found that congressional anger was a positive and statistically significant
predictor of turnout, but it also was a negative and statistically significant predictor
of the margin of victory. When we considered how changes in the percentage of
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Democrats in the district a↵ected this relationship, we found additional evidence
supporting this hypothesis. Specifically, it seems as though Democrats are the
ones who are mobilized by congressional anger, especially when representatives are
Republican. In these instances, Democrats seem to turn out more on Election Day,
but they do so to vote against anger.
What is interesting is that the e↵ects of congressional anger are the same when one
consider Republican representatives. Here, as “Percent Voted for McCain” increases
the relationship between anger and voter turnout becomes increasingly positive.
However, congressional anger a↵ects the margin of victory di↵erently depending on
whether the representative is Republican or Democratic. In terms of the former,
the margin of victory decreases, whereas in terms of the latter the margin of victory
increases. Collectively, these results and the ones outline above suggest that both
Republicans and Democrats are mobilized by congressional anger, with the latter
being more likely to turn out to vote against angry representatives. While I think
these results speak less to Republicans, I think there is some indication of Republicans
mobilizing in favor of congressional anger when one considers the “Democrat” panel
of Figure 5.5. However, the evidence is far from definitive. While this relationship
suggests that the consequences of congressional anger are slightly more complex than
originally thought, the question becomes which mobilization story is more prevalent
in the data? Are opponents being mobilized more than supporters?
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5.5 Conclusion
Unfortunately, it is di cult to answer these questions definitively using aggregate-level
data. However, given that congressional anger is a significant negative predictor of
the margin of victory, we can say, at the very least, that supporters are not being
mobilized more than opponents. If this was the case, then we should find a positive
relationship between congressional anger and the margin of victory. Similarly, using
this same logic, we can say that supporters and opponents are not being mobilized
at equal rates. If this was the case, then we should find no relationship between
congressional anger and the margin of victory. Thus, it seems as though the positive
relationship between congressional anger and voter turnout is likely attributed to
opponent mobilization, even though it seems as though this relationship is di↵erent
for Democrats and Republicans.
While this latter finding was somewhat unexpected, perhaps this is consistent
with what we know about the nature of congressional anger. We know from Chapter
4 that Republicans are considered to be more angry than Democrats, regardless
of whether one uses the measure derived for this book, expert rankings, or the
number of angry words in the Almanac of American Politics. Perhaps this means
that Republican representatives are held to a di↵erent standard when it comes to
anger as compared to their Democratic counterparts? One plausible scenario is that
Democrats value cooperation and compromise more than Republicans. In this way,
when it comes to anger, Republicans and Democrats respond di↵erently with the
latter generally being opposed.
Even though there is no polling data that directly considers this question, most
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polls show that Republicans tend to report more anger than Democrats, but this
pattern has changed recently. Specifically, a 2010 Pew survey showed that 36 percent
of conservative Republicans reported being angry with the federal government,
whereas only 8 percent of liberal Democrats reported a similar sentiment. However,
in a 2011 Pew survey, these margins changed slightly, with the level of anger rising
for liberal Democrats (+4%) and falling for conservative Republicans ( 4%). A
similar story is found when one considers moderate Republicans and Democrats,
with the latter’s (22%) anger overcoming the former’s (21%) in 2011. This lead Pew
to conclude, “There is certainly more anger among conservative Republicans (32%
angry) than liberal Democrats (12%). But compared with a year ago, the political
gap has narrowed as anger has risen among Democrats and remained high among
Republicans” (Pew Research Center, 2011).
Placing the above results in this context can help explain some of the di↵erences
we found between Democratic and Republican districts. What this polling data
shows is that Republican anger has remained relatively constant from 2010 to 2011,
whereas Democrats have become increasingly angry. This is essentially what we
found when we interacted anger with the party identification of the representative
and district. During these years, Democrats seem to be the ones driving the results,
which is consistent with Pew’s conclusion.
With that said, according to Pew anger fluctuates from one year to the next.
For example, in October of 2006, liberal Democrats (44% angry) and conservative
Republicans (5%) were by far the most and least angry groups, respectively. By
September 2010, this pattern had been reversed, with conservative Republicans
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now being the most angry (36%). Even though August 2011 saw an uptick in
liberal Democratic anger, this pattern still held. Conservative Republicans were
the most angry (32%) and liberal Democrats were the least angry (12%). However,
anger among conservative Republicans had decreased while the inverse is true for
liberal Democrats. While a Pew poll conducted in September 2013 shows again
that conservative Republicans are the angriest (41%), liberal Democratic anger
had increased yet again (18%). Collectively, these polling results demonstrate that
partisan anger seems to be in flux, with 2010 and 2011 being a particularly interesting
time period for anger amongst Democrats. Indeed, even moderate Republicans were
less angry in August 2011 (26%) as they were in September 2010 (21%), whereas the
inverse is true for moderate Democrats.
For this study, regardless of the polling results, the party identification of the
representative and district seem to matter when it comes to anger. Whether this
is attributed more to supporter or opponent mobilization is less clear, even though
the overall results seem to provide more evidence of the latter. When members of
Congress are angry they tend to mobilize voters in their districts, but when they do
so, they also tend to decrease their margin of victory. This seems to suggest that it
is somewhat irrational for members of Congress to be angry. Indeed, it seems as you
get angrier you are less likely to win. However, this is not necessarily the case. In
fact, if one considers representatives in the top quartile of anger one finds that they
got re-elected 97 percent of the time, suggesting anger may decrease the margin of
victory, but it has little a↵ect on the ultimate electoral result. Either way, angry
members of Congress seem to win.
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The question becomes, why should we care about congressional anger? If anger
has no a↵ect on the electoral outcome, then why is anger a variable of interest?
The answer lies in the relationship between anger and voter turnout. Even though
the angriest members of Congress may always get re-elected, they do so with fewer
voters in their districts turning out on Election Day. Specifically, if one considers
representatives in the top quartile of anger one finds, on average, 41 percent of eligible
voters vote. Conversely, if one considers the bottom quartile of anger one finds the
same is true for, on average, 45 percent of eligible voters. While this di↵erence may be
small, if participation is valuable, then this four percent is meaningful, especially in
instances when elections are close. For example, in the data set, 95 House races were
decided by plus or minus 4 percent, suggesting even this small percentage of voters
can make a di↵erence. Indeed, 37 percent of races were decided by 2 percentage
points or less. Whether voters mobilized by congressional anger could swing these
races one way or another is impossible to tell. Even so, while the e↵ect of anger
on voter turnout is relatively small, it is still substantively meaningful, especially
in conjunction with what we know about the relationship between anger and the
margin of victory. If voters are turning out to take angry members of Congress to
the “woodshed,” then one could easily imagine scenarios were these voters could make
a meaningful di↵erence on electoral outcomes. For that reason alone, congressional
anger is not only a variable of interest, but an important part of explaining voter
turnout in these elections. The next chapter will emphasize this point by showing
how the e↵ects of anger di↵er from the e↵ects of political incivility, with the former
being more pronounced.
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5.6 Figures and Tables
Figure 5.1: What Are the Consequences of Congressional Anger?
Does Congressional Anger Increase Voter Turnout?
Yes No
Does Congressional Anger
Increase the
Margin of Victory?
Yes No
Supporter
Mobilization
Opponent
Mobilization
Does Congressional Anger
Increase the
Margin of Victory?
Yes No
Opponent
Demobilization
Supporter
Demobilization
Note: This figure outlines the analytical strategy used in this study. Specifically, Section 5.4.1
considers whether congressional anger is a positive or negative predictor of voter turnout. If the
former is found to be true, then Section 5.4.2 considers whether congressional anger is a positive
predictor of the vote margin. If the answer is yes, then it suggests supporters are more mobilized by
congressional anger, where opponent mobilization is more likely if the answer is no. If no significant
relationship is found, then it suggests anger mobilizes each group equally. The same strategy is
followed if voter turnout is found the be a negative predictor of voter turnout.
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Figure 5.2: Measuring Head Size
Note: This figure demonstrates the ImageJ “Measure” tool. To ensure the accuracy of the measure,
a reference point is needed. For a male member of Congress, the width of each representative’s
necktie was used, measured at the middle of the knot. For women, either the Congressional security
pin or their earrings were used. To calibrate the reference points, I used a survey on Amazon’s
Mechanical Turk in which each Congressional Biography photo was shown to two respondents.
The “length” was determined using the average of each respondent’s estimate, weighted using a
common test question. If the estimates were more than 1 inch apart, I asked another respondent
in a second wave of the survey, using the two closest estimates as the final “length.” On average,
this resulted in estimated lengths of 1.29, 0.89, and 0.61 inches for a representative’s tie, pin, and
earring, respectively.
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Table 5.1: Predicting the Consequences of Congressional Anger
Turnout Margin
Hypothesis Operationalization Prediction Prediction
Demobilization Districts represented by a member of
Congress who was exceptionally angry in
the 111th U.S. House are less likely to
turnout in 2010 as compared to districts
where the representative was less angry in
the 111th U.S. House.
  ?
Mobilization Districts represented by a member of
Congress who was exceptionally angry in
the 111th U.S. House are more likely to
turnout in 2010 as compared to districts
where the representative was less angry in
the 111th U.S. House.
+ ?
Supporter
Demobilization
Democrats represented by a Democratic
member of Congress who was exceptionally
angry in the 111th U.S. House are less
likely to turnout in 2010 as compared to
Democrats represented by a Democrat who
was less angry in the 111th U.S. House.
   
Supporter
Mobilization
Democrats represented by a Democratic
member of Congress who was exceptionally
angry in the 111th U.S. House are more
likely to turnout in 2010 as compared to
Democrats represented by a Democrat who
was less angry in the 111th U.S. House.
+ +
Opponent
Demobilization
Republicans represented by a Democratic
member of Congress who was exceptionally
angry in the 111th U.S. House are less
likely to turnout in 2010 as compared to
Republicans represented by a Democrat
who was less angry in the 111th U.S. House.
  +
Opponent
Mobilization
Republicans represented by a Democratic
member of Congress who was exceptionally
angry in the 111th U.S. House are more
likely to turnout in 2010 as compared to
Republicans represented by a Democrat
who was less angry in the 111th U.S. House.
+  
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Figure 5.3: Creating a Measure of Congressional Anger
Note: This figure outlines three di↵erent ways to measure anger using “Negative Words” and
“Pitch.” In each panel, a random uniform distribution is used to plot points onto the valence-arousal
model. As you can see, the main di↵erence between “Product Anger” and “Modified Product
Anger” is found along the edges where the points are placed along the diagonal in the latter as
opposed to the former. This should give the reader an understanding of how each measure di↵ers.
Although all of these measures could arguably be used, “Product Anger” which is simply “Negative
Words” times “Pitch” is employed throughout the majority of this study.
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Table 5.2: Anger and Voter Turnout
Modified
Product Average Product
Anger Anger Anger
(Intercept)  5.77⇤  5.79⇤  5.75⇤
(0.18) (0.18) (0.18)
Angert 1 0.21⇤ 0.18⇤ 0.06⇤
(0.05) (0.04) (0.02)
Head Size 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Percent Voted t 1 2.86⇤ 2.85⇤ 2.85⇤
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
  69.03⇤ 69.07⇤ 68.87⇤
(1.20) (1.21) (1.20)
N 731 731 731
pseudo-R2 0.77 0.77 0.77
logL 9209.95 9212.01 9202.88
Note: The coe cient estimates are from a weighted beta regression where the percentage of the
voting age population who voted is regressed on three definitions of anger, the first of which is the
product of the average scaled vocal pitch and negative emotion words (see Figure 4.1). “Average
Anger” is the sum of the average scaled vocal pitch and negative emotion words divided by two.
“Modified Product Anger” is described in Equation 5.1. Each of these variables is lagged one-year.
The weights are proportional to the number of speeches, and a ⇤ indicates the estimate is statistically
significant at the 0.05-level, with the standard errors being reported in the parentheses. Finally,  
is the estimated precision parameter and the pseudo-R2 is the ratio of the model’s log-likelihood to
the log-likelihood of an intercept-only model. Please consult Appendix A for the estimates for the
control variables. These are included in the each model but are not reported here.
181
Table 5.3: Anger and the Margin of Victory
Modified
Product Average Product
Anger Anger Anger
(Intercept)  2.88⇤  2.85⇤  2.91⇤
(0.25) (0.25) (0.25)
Angert 1  0.18⇤  0.19⇤  0.01
(0.06) (0.05) (0.03)
Head Size 0.00⇤ 0.00⇤ 0.00⇤
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Percent Received t 1 1.23⇤ 1.22⇤ 1.23⇤
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
  39.51⇤ 39.55⇤ 39.46⇤
(0.69) (0.69) (0.69)
N 731 731 731
pseudo-R2 0.43 0.43 0.43
logL 7699.36 7702.66 7695.19
Note: The coe cient estimates are from a weighted beta regression where the percentage of the
two-party vote received is regressed on three definitions of anger, the first of which is the product
of the average scaled vocal pitch and negative emotion words (see Figure 4.1). “Average Anger” is
the sum of the average scaled vocal pitch and negative emotion words divided by two. “Modified
Product Anger” is described in Equation 5.1. Each of these variables is lagged one-year. The
weights are proportional to the number of speeches, and a ⇤ indicates the estimate is statistically
significant at the 0.05-level, with the standard errors being reported in the parentheses. Finally,  
is the estimated precision parameter and the pseudo-R2 is the ratio of the model’s log-likelihood to
the log-likelihood of an intercept-only model. Please consult Appendix A for the estimates for the
control variables. These are included in the each model but are not reported here.
182
Table 5.4: Democratic Anger and Voter Turnout
Modified
Product Average Product
Anger Anger Anger
(Intercept)  6.01⇤  6.47⇤  5.80⇤
(0.19) (0.21) (0.21)
Angert 1 2.00⇤ 2.00⇤ 0.16
(0.35) (0.26) (0.16)
Head Size 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Percent Voted t 1 2.86⇤ 2.85⇤ 2.86⇤
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Angert 1 ⇥ Percent Obama  4.11⇤  4.14⇤  0.34
(0.73) (0.56) (0.37)
Angert 1 ⇥ Democrat  1.00⇤  0.95⇤ 0.12
(0.46) (0.35) (0.23)
Percent Obama ⇥ Democrat  0.34⇤  0.99⇤ 0.00
(0.14) (0.26) (0.27)
Angert 1 ⇥ Percent Obama ⇥ Democrat 3.01⇤ 2.90⇤ 0.04
(0.87) (0.66) (0.45)
  69.51⇤ 69.82⇤ 68.94⇤
(1.21) (1.22) (1.20)
N 731 731 731
pseudo-R2 0.77 0.77 0.77
logL 9232.41 9246.93 9205.92
Note: The coe cient estimates are from a weighted beta regression where the percentage of the
voting age population who voted is regressed on the interaction between anger, the percent of
the district that voted for President Obama (“President Obama”), and whether the district is
represented by a Democrat (“Democrat”). As before, each column corresponds with a di↵erent
definition of “Anger,” first of which is used in the majority of the analysis. Each of these variables
is lagged one-year. The weights are proportional to the number of speeches, and a ⇤ indicates the
estimate is statistically significant at the 0.05-level, with the standard errors being reported in the
parentheses. Finally,   is the estimated precision parameter and the pseudo-R2 is the ratio of the
model’s log-likelihood to the log-likelihood of an intercept-only model. Please consult Appendix A
for the estimates for the control variables. These are included in the each model but are not reported
here.
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Table 5.5: Democratic Anger and the Margin of Victory
Modified
Product Average Product
Anger Anger Anger
(Intercept)  0.91⇤  0.65⇤  0.05
(0.24) (0.26) (0.26)
Angert 1  3.08⇤  2.00⇤  1.96⇤
(0.41) (0.31) (0.19)
Head Size 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Percent Received t 1 0.42⇤ 0.43⇤ 0.40⇤
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Angert 1 ⇥ Percent Obama 7.86⇤ 5.22⇤ 4.73⇤
(0.85) (0.66) (0.43)
Angert 1 ⇥ Democrat 3.82⇤ 3.14⇤ 1.49⇤
(0.54) (0.41) (0.28)
Percent Obama ⇥ Democrat 5.90⇤ 7.39⇤ 7.06⇤
(0.18) (0.32) (0.33)
Angert 1 ⇥ Percent Obama ⇥ Democrat  9.66⇤  7.59⇤  3.98⇤
(1.03) (0.78) (0.53)
  51.7⇤ 51.69⇤ 51.46⇤
(0.90) (0.90) (0.90)
N 731 731 731
pseudo-R2 0.57 0.57 0.57
logL 8569.45 8569.21 8554.52
Note: The coe cient estimates are from a weighted beta regression where the percentage of the
two-party vote received is regressed on the interaction between anger, the percent of the district
that voted for President Obama (“President Obama”), and whether the district is represented by a
Democrat (“Democrat”). As before, each column corresponds with a di↵erent definition of “Anger,”
first of which is used in the majority of the analysis. Each of these variables is lagged one-year. The
weights are proportional to the number of speeches, and a ⇤ indicates the estimate is statistically
significant at the 0.05-level, with the standard errors being reported in the parentheses. Finally,  
is the estimated precision parameter and the pseudo-R2 is the ratio of the model’s log-likelihood to
the log-likelihood of an intercept-only model. Please consult Appendix A for the estimates for the
control variables. These are included in the each model but are not reported here.
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Figure 5.4: Marginal E↵ect of Anger on Voter Turnout and the Margin of Victory
(Democrats)
0.40 0.44 0.48
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
Republican
Percent Obama
0.60 0.65 0.70
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
Democrat
Percent Obama
Note: The dashed line represents the marginal e↵ect of a unit increase in “Anger” on the percentage
of the district that voted for President Obama increases from the respective first to third quartile.
For example, on average in Democratic districts President Obama received between 56 and 73
percent of the two-party vote, when the first and third quartiles are considered, respectively. In
each panel, this relationship is conditioned on whether the district was represented by a Democratic
member of Congress, with the “Republican” panel meaning “Democrat” = 0. The solid line
represents the marginal e↵ect of a unit increase in “Anger,” moderated by both “Percent Obama”
and “Democrat.” In each instance, the coe cients from “Product Anger” were used.
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Figure 5.5: Marginal E↵ect of Anger on Voter Turnout and the Margin of Victory
(Republicans)
0.50 0.54 0.58 0.62
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
Republican
Percent McCain
0.30 0.35 0.40
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
Democrat
Percent McCain
Note: The dashed line represents the marginal e↵ect of a unit increase in “Anger” while the
percentage of the district that voted for John McCain increases from the respective first to third
quartile. For example, on average in Democratic districts John McCain received between 28 and
44 percent of the two-party vote, when the first and third quartiles are considered, respectively. In
each panel, this relationship is conditioned on whether the district was represented by a Democratic
member of Congress, with the “Republican” panel meaning “Democrat” = 0. The solid line
represents the marginal e↵ect of a unit increase in “Anger,” moderated by both “Percent McCain”
and “Democrat.” In each instance, the coe cients from “Product Anger” were used. Notice the
plot is the inverse of Figure 5.4. Given that, it should only be used as a way to understand the
dynamics of Tables 5.4 and 5.5.
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Chapter 6
The Consequences of Incivility
6.1 Introduction
Chapter 5 shows that generally congressional anger increases political participation.
Although this result could be attributed to either supporter or opponent mobilization,
more evidence is found consistent with the latter, suggesting voters are turning out
to take members of Congress to the “woodshed.” Even though these results seem to
vary depending on party identification, they are fairly robust. To some, these findings
emphasize the importance of studying congressional anger, while to others, “anger”
may simply be another way to describe other phenomena, like political incivility.
The goal of this chapter is to demonstrate that displays of anger are distinct from
displays of incivility, a point emphasized consistently throughout this dissertation.
In doing so, not only will I show how anger di↵ers, but I will also further demonstrate
the utility of the results outlined in the previous chapter.
To position these goals in the context of what we have already discussed, let us
return to our fictitious couple. When we get into an argument with a loved one, how
do we know when the argument is “angry”? How do we know when the argument is
“uncivil”? Unfortunately, answering these questions is particularly di cult because
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the line between anger and incivility is relatively thin. As explained in Chapter 2,
the majority of arguments between loved ones are rather tame. You get home from
work and your loved one yells at you about forgetting to take out the trash. Tempers
flair, but at no point are feelings hurt. However, sometimes these arguments get out
of hand. In these instances, instead of expressing your own angst and outrage you
are hurling expletives and insults. Somewhere in the midst of the chaos the argument
has crossed from a typical fight into something much worse. It is here where incivility
becomes distinct from anger.
While in political science scholars like Diana Mutz and Byron Reeves provide
a more detailed discussion of what is and is not “uncivil,” this is essentially how
incivility is defined in the literature. Specifically, citing Tannen (1998) and Uslaner
(1993), Mutz and Reeves (2005) argue that when members of Congress are being
uncivil to one another they are violating “norms of politeness in their discourse,”
creating a “pervasive warlike atmosphere” (1). While it is generally di cult to
define what these norms are, we know them when we see them. For example, a
civil exchange between members of Congress would involve phrases such as “I’m
really glad Bob raise the issue of. . . ” and “I don’t disagree with all of your points,
Bob, but. . . ,” whereas an uncivil exchange would replace these pleasantries with
“gratuitous asides that suggested a lack of respect for and/or frustration with the
opposition” (Mutz and Reeves, 2005, 5). In this way, the topics of civil and uncivil
conversations do not di↵er. Instead, the di↵erence lies in the manner by which those
topics are discussed.
From this point, defining “incivility” using the valence-arousal model is relatively
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straightforward since incivility, like anger, is generally an activated negative emotional
state. In terms of the former, Diana Mutz is rather clear on this point in both her 2005
article with Byron Reeves and her American Political Science Review piece published
in 2007. In both, Mutz uses skin conductance to determine whether her experimental
treatments were having the desired e↵ect on respondents. Ultimately, Mutz and
Reeves (2005) argue reactions to incivility “are rooted in emotional, gut-level responses
to viewing political incivility,” which they equate to di↵ering levels of emotional
arousal. Despite being somewhat di↵erent, Mutz (2007) makes a similar conclusion,
arguing “uncivil public discourse was significantly more arousing than civil versions
of the same discussions” (627). Collectively, these findings suggest, like anger, when
people are being uncivil they are more likely to be activated emotionally.
Similarly, it is di cult to imagine incivility as being a positive emotional state.
In fact, Brooks and Geer (2007) go as far as to say that it is impossible to have an
uncivil positive message. Specifically, they argue “Because the concept of incivility
only applies to negative messages (there are no uncivil positive messages, of course),
the positive/negative and civil/uncivil dimensions combine into a single dimension
(which we will generically refer to as ‘tone’) for analytical purposes” (5). Even
though Mutz and Reeves (2005) do not give any indication of whether they define
incivility in these terms, in the results of their manipulation checks they do find
that uncivil political exchanges are more hostile, agitated, quarrelsome, and rude,
all of which are more consistent with a negative as opposed to positive emotional
state. While Mutz (2007) does not provide as many manipulation checks, she does
indicate “the uncivil versions of the issue exchanges were consistently perceived as
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significantly less polite, more quarrelsome, and less friendly” (625). Again, this
suggests, like anger, when members of Congress are being uncivil they are expressing
negative emotions.
Although it is apparent that incivility is generally an activated negative emotional
state, sometimes incivility can be deactivated. For example, calling the President a
liar on the House floor is considered to be uncivil regardless of whether the comment
is yelled or stated quietly. Similarly, using profanity in church is generally frowned
upon, even if that profanity is uttered below one’s breath. This is because the main
di↵erence between anger and incivility lies in how each relates to social norms. In
terms of the former, anger is a completely acceptable response in most situations.
This is especially true on the House floor where tempers often flair over contentious
issues, such as Obamacare. While members of Congress would probably prefer to
speak about these issues in a calm and collected manner, the nature of these issues
makes anger more likely because many of the issues are seen as matters of life and
death. In these instances, anger is completely understandable, especially to those
who feel similarly about the issue. The same could be said for angry individuals
and groups. Even though many people wish that the Joe Wilson’s of the world
would keep their anger in check, others understand that anger is simply a part of
who they are. For these individuals, Joe Wilson’s anger is not seen as a detriment,
but instead as an important part of his personality. While groups are undoubtedly
di↵erent, I think a similar argument can be made. Indeed, most probably expect the
Congressional Black Caucus to get emotional when discussing civil rights, just like
Obamcare is likely to make the Tea Party angry.
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However, while many people probably expect a certain level of anger when dealing
with certain issues, individuals, and groups, these same people also expect this anger
to be expressed civilly. Here, we expect a certain level of politeness when we talk to
one another, even when we are discussing heated issues. For example, while people
expect some level of anger from the Tea Party when discussing Obamacare, they
also expect the Tea Party to express that anger civilly. Joe Wilson’s outburst is
perhaps the best way to understand this di↵erence. While many were upset with
Obamacare, a member of Congress should not call someone else a liar, regardless of
the situation, especially when that person is the President of the United States. It
is one thing to get angry about an issue, and another thing to hurl insults at others
simply because they disagree with you. Similarly, while some members of Congress
may be hot-heads, they cannot simply throw expletives left and right. We simply
expect more from our representatives.
Even though the line between anger and incivility is fine, I think many of us know
where it lies. Unfortunately, this does not make quantifying incivility any easier.
Instead, like anger, it is extraordinarily di cult to determine systematically whether
someone is civil or uncivil. Fortunately, the words people use can help us in this
regard. In fact, one of the first scholars to empirically examine the ebb and flow of
congressional incivility, Kathleen Hall Jaimeson, used this approach, among others.
While Jaimeson used a variety of measures to achieve this end, one measure that
is particularly useful for this study is the use of profanity, which many (Andersson
and Pearson, 1999; Pearson, 2001), including Jamieson and Falk (2001), equate with
incivility. For example, in a 2013 survey by Weber and Shadwick entitled “Incivility,”
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seventy-two percent of Americans consider cursing to be uncivil (Weber-Shandwick,
2013). Even though to these respondents, “cursing is most uncivil when it’s done by”
teachers (fifty-three percent), politicians and civil servants are second and third, with
thirty-seven and thirty-three percent of respondents believing cursing is particularly
uncivil when done by these groups, respectively (Weber-Shandwick, 2013).
Collectively, these findings suggest that both surveys and scholars see profanity as
being an important indicator of the degree to which someone is uncivil.
However, the goal of this chapter is not to simply re-test what we already know
about political incivility. Instead, this chapter uses incivility as a way to further
understand what we know about congressional anger. Even though there is good
reason to expect incivility is distinct from anger, it is unclear whether evidence
will be found consistent with this claim. Indeed, perhaps we will find that the
e↵ect of congressional incivility on political participation is the same as the e↵ect
of congressional anger. If this is the case, then it suggests both may be capturing
the same phenomenon. However, if the e↵ects are di↵erent, then it suggest the two
concepts are distinct, supporting the idea that congressional anger is worthy of study
in and of itself.
To achieve this end, this chapter will follow a similar strategy as Chapter 5. In
that chapter, we began with some basic hypotheses, then moved to more specific
hypotheses that were later operationalized using the best available measures. While
a similar approach will be used here, this chapter will diverge slightly. Specifically,
instead of walking through each and every hypothesis, this chapter will reference the
hypotheses found in Chapter 5, highlighting theoretical di↵erences between the two.
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Once these hypotheses are established, similar empirical tests will be conducted.
6.2 What are the Consequences of Congressional
Incivility?
6.2.1 Voter Turnout
While the definition of anger and incivility may be similar, the e↵ects of each
on political participation are fundamentally di↵erent. This is because displays of
incivility, unlike anger, are seen as violating rules that most think are necessary
to advance societal goals. Indeed, regardless of whether one is a Republican or
Democrat, most agree that members of Congress should treat one another civilly,
meaning while one could imagine scenarios where people want more, not less, anger,
it is di cult to imagine similar scenarios when it comes to incivility. Interestingly
enough, for these reasons either the Mobilization Hypothesis or Demobilization
Hypothesis could be true, but some of the sub-hypotheses outlined in Chapter 5 are
incredibly unlikely. However, before we get to how supporters and opponents respond
to incivility, we should first consider more broadly whether hurling expletives on the
House floor will increase or decrease voter turnout.
For both, the vast majority of voters agree that civility is important to democratic
governance. Specifically, in the 2010 Allegheny College survey introduced in Chapter
1, a whopping ninety-five percent of respondents agreed that political civility was
necessary for a healthy democracy. However, respondents di↵ered in how they reacted
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to displays of incivility. For some, more, not less, action is needed. For example,
in the survey, forty percent of respondents believed the least civil politicians should
su↵er a “trip to the woodshed.” While it is unclear what this means electorally,
arguably the best way to take members of Congress to the “woodshed” is to vote
them out of o ce. If so, then districts represented by uncivil members of Congress
should vote more on Election Day as compared to districts where representatives are
more civil. However, unlike anger, mobilization is only likely to occur in this way.
Indeed, the mobilization hypothesis is unlikely to be driven by voters turning out in
order to increase the degree to which members of Congress are uncivil. In this way,
while similar, the mobilization hypothesis in this chapter is slightly di↵erent than
the one found in Chapter 5.
Mobilization Hypothesis
Voters in districts represented by exceptionally uncivil members of Congress
are more likely to turnout as compared to voters in districts where
representatives are more civil. However, most will do so in order to vote
against uncivil representatives.
However, similar to the previous chapter, others may respond di↵erently to the
same displays of incivility. For these individuals, profanity on the House floor is
indicative of a system beyond repair. While they would undoubtedly love to see the
system fixed, they have simply concluded “enough is enough.” Again, we can see
remnants of this sentiment in the Allegheny College survey. Specifically, a majority
of respondents said that they have become “turned o↵” from politics as the climate
has become increasingly “rude and nasty.” Similarly, when asked whether the current
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political climate, which most see as being increasingly uncivil, made them more or less
likely to participate, some forty-six percent of Democrats said it made them less likely,
whereas the same can be said for thirty-four percent of Republicans. Collectively, this
suggests that incivility may actually demobilize certain segments of voters, suggesting
on Election Day, districts represented by uncivil members of Congress may vote
less. Here, the demobilization hypothesis is essentially identical to the one found
in Chapter 5, except instead of voters responding negatively to congressional anger
they are responding negatively to instances of incivility on Capitol Hill.
Demobilization Hypothesis
Voters in districts represented by exceptionally uncivil members of Congress
are less likely to turnout as compared to voters in districts where representatives
are more civil.
While, so far, there are no stark di↵erences found in these hypotheses, given
what we know, we can also make additional hypotheses regarding the strengths of
these relationships. Here, there are two ways to think of incivility in relation to
anger. First, one can think of incivility as being a subset of anger, meaning incivility
and anger are nearly identical, but the former contains an element that makes it
distinct. As explained above, this element is the violation of social norms, which
make individuals uncivil where they would be angry otherwise. Even though this
relationship is plausible, another way to think of incivility is that it is entirely distinct
from anger, meaning that both may be activated negative emotional states, but they
are unique phenomena. In this instance, when voters think members of Congress are
being uncivil they do not simply think they are very angry. Instead, they simply
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think that their representatives are uncivil, putting little or no weight into whether
they are angry.
Undoubtedly, it is di cult to isolate these subtle di↵erences using aggregate
analysis. However, some progress can be made using the strength of the relationships
found in this chapter in comparison to those found in Chapter 5. Specifically, if
incivility is a subset of anger, then one would expect the relationship between political
incivility and voter turnout to be in the same direction, but stronger. Here, the logic
is simple. When people think of congressional anger, there are mixed feelings about
whether or not it is good for our democracy. For some, anger is detrimental because
it makes cooperation and compromise more di cult. Whereas for others, anger is not
only a necessary evil, but an important way to express angst and outrage towards
specific policies and the political process as a whole. Conversely, nearly everyone
agrees that incivility has no place in politics. Consequently, given that and what we
discovered in Chapter 5, if incivility is a subset of anger, then we should find the
same relationship, only magnified. Conversely, if incivility is a distinct phenomenon,
then we should expect to find the inverse to be true, meaning, when operationalized,
we should find that political incivility decreases voter turnout.
6.2.2 Margin of Victory
Even though exploring the degree to which the results found below di↵er from those
found in Chapter 5 is an important part of this chapter, one of the main di↵erences
between congressional anger and incivility is how each relates to the margin of victory.
If you recall, there are good reasons to suspect that people may want more, not less
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anger. Indeed, this is what we found for some Republican districts. However, when
it comes to incivility it is di cult to imagine a similar story being told. Here, most
people agree that members of Congress should be more civil to one another. Given
that, while Chapter 5 went into great detail explaining how supporters and opponents
could be equally mobilized and demobilized by congressional anger, this chapter will
only focus on two variations of these sub-hypotheses.
Opponent Mobilization Hypothesis
Opponents in districts represented by exceptionally uncivil members of
Congress are more likely to turnout as compared to supporters. Consequently,
uncivil members of Congress win by a smaller margins as compared to
their more civil counterparts.
First, the Opponent Mobilization Hypothesis argues that all voters become more
active in the face of congressional incivility, but opponents are more active than
supporters either because opponents want to take their representative to the
“woodshed,” or because supporters are less willing to turnout for a member of
Congress who is exceptionally uncivil. Ultimately, regardless of the mechanism, one
would expect congressional incivility to increase voter turnout while simultaneously
decreasing the margin of victory. Conversely, the Supporter Demobilization
Hypothesis argues that supporters are more likely to withdraw from the political
process in response to increasing displays of incivility from their representatives.
While opponents are also upset over congressional incivility, they either vote at the
same rate or they vote more. Even though both scenarios are plausible, the former
is more likely since opponents already have things they dislike about their uncivil
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representatives, meaning they were probably likely to vote against them regardless of
whether they displayed incivility. Either way, what is important is that supporters
are being a↵ected more by these same displays, suggesting demobilization as opposed
to mobilization plays a larger role. Consequently, if this hypothesis were true, then
one would expect both turnout and the margin of victory to be lower.
Supporter Demobilization Hypothesis
Both supporters and opponents in districts represented by exceptionally
uncivil members of Congress are less likely to turnout as compared to
supporters and opponents in districts where representatives are more
civil. However, this e↵ect is more pronounced in supporters where there
are no reasonable alternatives, meaning they are more likely to abstain
from voting than vote for other candidates. Consequently, uncivil members
of Congress will win by smaller margins as compared to their more civil
counterparts.
Notice that in both of these hypotheses the margin of victory is expected to be
lower. The reason for this follows directly from the relationship between anger and
incivility. Most people agree that members of Congress should treat each other with
mutual respect. Given that, it is di cult to imagine scenarios where congressional
incivility increases the margin of victory. For example, consider the Supporter
Mobilization Hypothesis in Chapter 5. In this hypothesis, congressional anger is
thought to reflect the anger found in the district. While this argument makes sense
in a world where things like Obamacare have made people exceptionally mad, it is
di cult to imagine people asking representatives to be more uncivil because they
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feel uncivil themselves. Even though there may be some instances where this could
be the case, they seem incredibly unlikely.
The same can be said for the Opponent Demobilization Hypothesis. While this
seems more plausible, it su↵ers from a similar limitation. Specifically, in this
hypothesis, both supporters and opponents respond negatively to displays of
congressional anger, but the former is more willing to set aside this objection due
to other things angry representatives bring to the table. Even though one could
certainly imagine some supporters may respond similarly to displays of incivility, in
order for this hypothesis to work opponents must also be una↵ected by those same
displays. For anger, this makes some sense given that there is generally no objection
to emotional outbursts. However, for incivility, it is di cult to imagine opponents
sitting on their hands. Instead, opponents, like supporters, expect members of
Congress to treat each other with some degree of respect, meaning they can be
angry, but their anger should not cause them to be uncivil to one another.
Again, the Allegheny College survey is useful in this regard. Here, respondents
were asked whether the tone of political campaigns have hurt our democracy. While
nineteen percent believe that the tone is “healthy for our democracy,” sixty-one
percent felt that it “hurts our democracy.” However, when asked what can and
cannot be changed in order to rectify the situation, respondents seem to lean more
heavily on civility as opposed to anger. Specifically, when asked whether candidates
can run for o ce in aggressive but respectful ways, eighty-five percent of respondents
said it was possible. In this way, “Americans have grown accustomed to hard-hitting
campaigning. They know it is not a beanbag toss. But a big chunk of Americans
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think campaigns have gotten uglier and that campaigners are coloring perceptions
of the overall tone of politics” (Solberg, 2010). Given that, voters are probably more
likely to give anger a free pass as opposed to incivility, an argument we will find
holds some water when we consider the results in this chapter.
6.3 Operationalizing the Consequences of
Congressional Incivility
6.3.1 Variables
However, before we get to the results we must first operationalize political incivility.
As eluded to before, we are primarily interested in the use of profanity on Capitol
Hill. While profanity is not necessarily synonymous with incivility, many scholars,
including Kathleen Hall Jamieson, think profanity is an important part of what it
means to be uncivil in congress. Outside of this literature and the polling data
outlined above, many institutions, including the U.S. House of Representatives view
“o↵ensive language” as being indicative of incivility (Dreier et al., 2014). Of these,
the Federal Communication Commission is probably the most well-known. Here,
beginning with the 1978 Supreme Court case, Federal Communication Commission
v. Pacifica Foundation, the federal government has actively restricted the use of
profanity during hours in which children could be exposed to such language. As
popularized by George Carlin’s “Seven Words You Can Never Say on Television,”
the line between when words are considered to be obscene is relatively thin, but,
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generally speaking, profanity is defined as “including language so grossly o↵ensive
to members of the public who actually hear it as to amount to a nuisance” (FCC,
2014).
For our purposes, we will define profanity using the Linguist Inquiry Word Count
(LIWC) dictionary. Specifically, this chapter will use the “Swearing” category, which
has been used by scholars to predict a variety of things, such as personality (Holtgraves,
2011; Yarkoni, 2010). Similar to “Negative Emotion Words” this category consists of
all the words we think of when we think of profanity as well as their extensions. While
the context of these words undoubtedly matters, for this chapter we are primarily
interested in speeches which use profanity while speaking at a higher vocal pitch. Not
only will focusing on this interaction allow us to maintain consistency between this
and the previous chapter, but also vocal pitch has been found to work in conjunction
with the “Swearing” category to be predictive of an individual’s personality (Mairesse
et al., 2007). This suggests that operationalizing incivility in this way is both
theoretically justified and reasonably grounded in the literature. Outside of this
variable, the rest of the controls are identical to those found in Chapter 5.
With that said, one limitation to using “Swearing” is that it is used sparingly on
Capitol Hill. Indeed, unlike “Negative Words,” the majority of representatives do
not use profanity. Specifically, 70 percent of the representatives have not used any
swear words in their speeches, whereas the same can only be said for 1 percent of the
representatives when it comes to “Negative Words.” Undoubtedly, this severely limits
the variance. However, even more troubling, when it is combined with vocal pitch,
it will return zero for 70 percent of the cases, if the variable is scaled to range from
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its minimum (0) to maximum (1). Given that, I decided to use a slightly di↵erent
scaling approach. Unfortunately, this will not help with the limited variance, but it
will prevent all the cases from being essentially removed from the analysis.
To achieve this end, I used three approaches. First, Madin, Gaines, and Warner
(2010) suggest adding a common factor then taking the log of the re-scaled variable
(see also Madin et al., 2010). For this study, I added 2.6 to the swearing variable
and took the log. This was done so the mean of the resulting variable (0.418)
would be similar to the mean of lagged vocal pitch (0.424). Again, this did nothing
to address the standard deviation, which is (0.02) for the re-scaled variable and
(0.19) for lagged vocal pitch. Second, unlike Madin, Gaines, and Warner (2010), I
also created a variable where I just added a common factor (0.80) to the variable
capturing profanity. Again, the factor was chosen so the mean of the resulting
variable (0.41) would be similar to the mean of lagged vocal pitch. As before, this
did not improve the standard deviation, even though the resulting variable’s standard
deviation increased to 0.05. Finally, I assumed all the zeros were missing, then used
multiple imputation to fill in the values. This returned a variable with a mean of
0.13 and a standard deviation of 0.12.
Undoubtedly, none of these are ideal, but I chose the second approach for the
purpose of this study, even though the results are exactly the same regardless of
how the variable is scaled. This was done because it was the most straightforward
and had a higher standard deviation than the approach used by Madin, Gaines, and
Warner (2010). With that said, as explained in Chapter 2, this is one of the main
limitations to studying incivility. For example, Kathleen Hall Jamieson finds that
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in the House “the average number of name calling words used per session is 40 per
1,000 pages” of the Congressional Record (Jamieson and Falk, 2001, 9). Similarly,
“on average about 3.8 vulgar words are used every 1,000 pages of the Congressional
Record” (Jamieson and Falk, 2001, 13). While Jamieson provides no indication of
how many words are on a given page of the Congressional Record, even if we assumed
each page only had a 100 words we are talking about very few words. Indeed, if this
were the case, then 0.04 and 0.0038 percent of the words would be considered name
calling and vulgarity, respectively. This makes the use of name calling and vulgarity
incredibly rare.
The same can be said for Jamieson’s preferred metric of incivility - the number
of words taken down. Here, “taking down is the standard procedure employed when
someone says something outside the bounds of civility prescribed by the Rules of the
House” (Jamieson and Falk, 2001, 7). For the 99th to 106th Congresses, there were
on average 0.50 take down requests per 1,000 pages of the Congressional Record.
This is again an extraordinarily rare event. While the number of words ruled out of
order, something that happens on average 0.07 times per 1,000 pages, is slightly more
rare, in either instance, incivility just does not happen very much. To put this into
perspective, if one were to take 1,000 floor speeches from the data compiled for this
study, one found find on average 897.68 contained at least one negative emotional
word.
Given that, while re-scaling “Swearing” is not the best, it is an inevitable outcome
if one wishes to study congressional incivility. For all the talk about the causes
and consequences of incivility, it simply does not happen very often, at least as
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measured with respect to swearing and take down requests. Not only does this mean
that anger is more indicative of expressions on the House floor, but it also means
that the problem of zeros is simply unavoidable. Specifically, how does one study
“incivility” when members of Congress are mostly civil to one another? This is why
the models introduced in this chapter are meant to emphasize how anger is distinct
from incivility. Indeed, not only do we see anger more often, but anger itself is easier
to quantify, making our inferences about anger more robust than similar inferences
regarding incivility. With that said, this chapter will show there are meaningful
di↵erences to be found, suggesting anger is a distinct phenomenon.
6.3.2 Predictions
As before, in order to gain some traction on the causal direction, political incivility
was lagged by one year. For example, a member of Congress could become more
uncivil as a last ditch e↵ort to get voters to the polls after turnout has dwindled.
Conversely, voters may not turn out for a member of Congress who they see as
being too uncivil. In both instances congressional incivility would have a negative
e↵ect on voter turnout, but only in the latter would the finding be consistent with
the hypotheses outlined above. In the former, congressional incivility would not be
driving voter turnout, instead, voter turnout would be driving congressional incivility.
The lagged variable helps di↵erentiate between these competing explanations.
To help understand the predictions that follow from this operationalization,
Table 6.1 re-writes each hypothesis using the approach found in the previous chapter.
However, unlike Chapter 5, I will highlight the plausible predictions. While we may
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find evidence of the other hypotheses, I do not expect this to be the case. As
you can see, most of the hypotheses are plausible (see grey highlights). However,
both the “Supporter Mobilization” and “Opponent Demobilization” hypotheses are
both incredibly unlikely, with the former being probably the most unlikely. Indeed,
while one can perhaps imagine scenarios where opponents of an uncivil member
of Congress fail to turn out on Election Day, it is di cult to imagine meaningful
scenarios where supporters vote more for an uncivil representative.1 As before, even
though the predictions are written in terms of the 111th U.S. House and the 2010
House Elections. To save space in Table 6.1, I did not include operationalizations for
112th House and the 2012 House Elections, but these operationalizations are included
in the analysis.
6.4 Results
6.4.1 Does Congressional Incivility Increase Voter
Turnout?
To begin to understand the consequences of congressional incivility, we must begin
with a very basic question, does incivility increase political participation? Similar to
Chapter 5, political participation is operationalized using the proportion of the voting
1With that said, there could be spurious relationships where this could be the case. For example,
incivility may allow members of Congress to push through legislation that is beneficial to their
districts, to which voters respond favorably. This would create a positive relationship between
turnout and incivility. However, from a theoretical standpoint, these scenarios are unlikely given
what we know about voters’ perceptions of incivility. Generally, voters are opposed to incivility
which is why I will focus most of my e↵orts in understanding the negative relationship between the
two, even though other relationships will also be tested.
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age population that voted, meaning a beta regression, with a logistic link function,
was used. Again, the model assumes the precision parameter ( ) is constant, making
the coe cients logged odd ratios. The results can be found in Table 6.2.
Here, I again estimated three di↵erent versions of the model, with the first
column defining “Incivility” as the product of “Pitch” and “Swearing.” Similarly,
the second and third columns define “Incivility” using the average and modified
product of “Pitch” and “Swearing,” respectively. However, unlike the previous
chapter, incivility is not considered in isolation. Instead, “Incivility” and “Anger”
are both included as predictors. When this is done, if the e↵ect of anger is washed
out by the inclusion of incivility, then it suggests congressional anger and incivility
are one in the same. Conversely, if anger is still an important predictor, then it
suggests the inverse is true. Moreover, if both anger and incivility are significant
predictors, then it not only suggests congressional anger and incivility are distinct,
but it also suggests that both have an important e↵ect on political participation,
something that scholars of incivility have suggested for quite sometime. In this
way, these results simultaneously bolster both claims, meaning our understanding of
congressional anger and incivility increases when both variables are included in the
same model.
As before, I will only show the results for the variables of interest and two controls,
“Head Size” and “Percent Votedt 1”, where the first controls for body size in order
to isolate the e↵ect of vocal pitch and the second controls for the voter turnout from
the previous House election. In each column, I added twelve additional controls, all
of which are outlined in Chapter 5. Unfortunately, space prohibited printing these
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results in Table 6.2, instead they can be found in Appendix B. In all three columns,
I excluded open seats and elections in which the incumbent was unopposed. As
you can see, in each, “Incivility” and “Anger” are both statistically significant (p
 .05) with the former returning a negative coe cient, whereas the inverse is true
for the latter. This suggests voters are less likely to turn out on Election Day when
they encounter congressional incivility, something which cannot be said for instances
of anger which seem to have the opposite e↵ect. Given that both are not only
statistically significant but in the opposite direction, we can say with some degree of
confidence that congressional anger is distinct from congressional incivility, at least
when it comes to voter turnout.
As a robustness check, I first regressed lagged voter turnout on the the current
level of incivility. Here, both product (  = 0.12, se( ) = 0.08, p > .05) and modified
product (  =  0.03, se( ) = 0.05, p > .05) definitions returned insignificant results,
meaning, in these models, the current level of incivility is not a significant predictor of
the previous percentage of the voting age population that voted. With that said, the
average definition did return a significant result (  = 0.14, se( ) = 0.07, p  .05),
suggesting congressional incivility may be a significant negative predictor, but this
results is not as robust as the positive relationship between congressional anger and
voter turnout. As before, I also regressed lagged incivility on the current level of
turnout in the district. Here, regardless of whether one uses the product (  = 0.00,
se( ) = 0.11, p > .05), average (  = 0.03, se( ) = 0.08, p > .05) or modified
product (  = 0.00, se( ) = 0.07, p > .05) definition, the current level of turnout is
not a significant predictor of lagged incivility. Given that I also considered various
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scaling approaches, I estimated two other versions of the model found in the first
column of Table 6.2. In the first, I used the re-scaling approach found in Madin,
Gaines, and Warner (2010). In the second, I used multiple imputation to replace the
zeros found in “Swearing.” Either way, the variable was negative and statistically
significant at the .05-level, with the former returning a coe cient of  0.27 and the
latter returning a coe cient of  0.42. Collectively, these results suggest that the
relationship between congressional incivility and voter turnout is relatively robust.
Unfortunately, directly interpreting the coe cients is di cult. Given that, I
decided to consider predicted values for various levels of incivility, holding anger
and the control variables at their respective mean and modal values. Similar to
Chapter 5, I will only consider the model found in the first column. When this is
done, one finds that incivility has a slight, but noticeable e↵ect on voter turnout.
Specifically, when incivility is allowed to vary from its minimum (0) to its maximum
(0.53) the predicted level of voter turnout decreases from 0.57 to 0.50. The same can
be said for congressional anger, where a similar e↵ect is found but in the opposite
direction. Here, when anger is allowed to vary from its minimum (0) to its maximum
(0.69), while all other variables are held constant, the predicted level of voter turnout
increases from 0.53 to 0.60. While both e↵ects seem rather small, when these
di↵erences are compared to other variables one finds they are quite similar. For
example, when one considers districts in the south versus district in the north, the
predicted level of voter turnout increases from 0.55 to 0.59. Similarly, when one
compares districts that had a Senate election that was considered a toss-up to those
that did not, one finds a 0.04 di↵erence between the predicted levels of turnout
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when everything else is held constant at their respective mean and modal values.
Undoubtedly, these are only two examples, but when other variables are considered,
such as the percent of the district that voted for President Obama and whether
the district requires photo identification, similar results are found. Indeed, when all
variables - excluding the variables controlling for the 112th Congress and the voter
turnout from the previous election - are allowed to vary from their minimum to
their maximum one finds on average the predicted voter turnout for the latter is .05
higher than the former with a standard deviation of .03. This suggests the e↵ects of
congressional incivility and anger may not be large, but they are consistent with the
majority of the control variables. Even when the two control variables that have, by
far, the largest e↵ect on voter turnout are included, the mean di↵erence between the
predicted voter turnout when the variables are set at their minimum and maximum
is only .08, suggesting that the e↵ects of anger and incivility are not substantially
lower than the e↵ects of the other controls.
Collectively, these results suggest that congressional incivility demobilizes the
electorate, meaning they are less likely to turn out on Election Day. The question
becomes, how does this relationship compare with what we found in Chapter 5?
Specifically, are voters more a↵ected by instances of anger or incivility? The results
found in Table 6.2 suggest they have a similar e↵ect, with the former having an
average coe cient of .30 across all three models whereas the average coe cient
for the latter is  .40. Although these coe cients suggest incivility has a more
pronounced e↵ect on political participation, when one considers the predicted values
one finds the e↵ect of each is similar. Specifically, when congressional incivility is
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allowed to vary from its minimum to maximum the net decrease is .07, which is
the same as the net increase when congressional anger is allowed to vary in the
same way. Perhaps more interesting is the fact that the direction of the coe cients
are di↵erent, suggesting congressional anger and incivility have distinctly di↵erent
e↵ects on political participation, with the former increasing voter turnout whereas
the inverse is true for the latter. Unsurprisingly, when one considers the correlation
between incivility and anger not only is the correlation insignificant, but is less than
0.10, regardless of the way anger is defined.
6.4.2 Does Congressional Incivility Increase the Margin of
Victory?
Even though the e↵ect of congressional incivility may be larger, it is unclear whether
voters are generally demobilizing or just supporters. Given that, this study will
consider whether congressional incivility increases or decreases the margin of victory.
If the latter is found to be true, then it suggests that supporters are more demobilized
by uncivil members of Congress. If evidence is found of the former, then it would call
into question what has already been said about incivility, and perhaps undermine
what we discovered in Chapter 5. Conversely, if no relationship is found, then it
suggests that voters are generally being demobilized, an e↵ect that would be distinct
from that of congressional anger.
Similar to voter turnout, to test this relationship I regressed each representative’s
percentage of the two-party vote on three definitions of incivility using a weighted
beta regression, where the weights are again equal to the lagged number of speeches.
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These results are shown in Table 3. As you can see, the relationship between
incivility and voter turnout is inconsistent across the three models, with two of
the models showing a positive relationship between the two, whereas as only one
(“Modified Product Incivility”) finds a negative relationship. Similarly, only two
models (“Average Incivility” and “Modified Product Incivility”) return significant
results (p  .05). Unfortunately, when this occurs the coe cients are in the opposite
direction, meaning no clear story is found. To emphasize this point, I used the
model in the first column to obtain the predicted percentage of the two-party vote
received as incivility varies from its minimum (0) to its maximum (0.53), holding all
other variables constant at their respective mean and modal values. When this was
done, the predicted vote margin decreases from 0.665 to 0.676, which is an incredibly
small di↵erence. In comparison, when “Product Anger” is allowed to vary from its
minimum (0) to its maximum (0.69) while all other variables are held constant the
predicted vote margin decreases from 0.68 to 0.64. The di↵erence between these
two values is over four and half times larger than the di↵erence between predicted
percentage of the two-party vote received when “Product Incivility” is allowed to
vary in a similar way.
Things improve when “Average Incivility” is considered. Here, when incivility
is allowed to vary from its minimum (0.20) to its maximum (0.75) while all other
variables are held constant, the predicted vote margin increases from 0.66 to 0.69,
which is a more noticeable di↵erence. However, even here anger seems to have a more
pronounced e↵ect on the vote margin. Specifically, when “Average Anger” is allowed
to vary from its minimum (0.06) to its maximum (0.85) the predicted percentage of
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the two-party vote received decreases from 0.69 to 0.64. A similar story is found when
the third column is considered. However, in this instance, when incivility increases
from its minimum to maximum the predicted vote margin decreases from 0.68 to
0.66. Unlike before, when the same is done for anger there is essentially no di↵erence
between the predicted values when “Modified Product Anger” is allowed to vary
from its minimum (0.11) to maximum (0.74). Collectively, these results suggest that
anger certainly has a distinct e↵ect from incivility, but the overall e↵ect of the latter
is inconsistent, to say the least. Indeed, it is troubling that incivility is a statistically
significant predictor in two di↵erent models, but the relationship between incivility
and the margin of victory is di↵erent in each.
When these results are considered in conjunction with Table 6.2, all we can
say is that incivility seems to have a negative e↵ect on voter turnout, but whether
this is due to supporter or opponent mobilization is less clear. Undoubtedly, given
the lack of profanity on Capitol Hill, it is di cult to determine whether this is a
meaningful relationship. However, even when one restricts the models to only include
cases where the representative used at least one swear word, one finds the same
results. Here, when voter turnout is predicted using each definition of incivility, the
average coe cient is  0.34. While only two of the definitions (product and average
incivility) were statistically significant at the .05-level, one finds less significant results
when these restricted models are used to predict the vote margin. In each of these
instances, the relationship between incivility and the percentage of the two-party vote
received varies in terms of direction and all but one (average incivility) is insignificant.
Fortunately, in these models anger is consistently a significant negative predictor of
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the vote margin, suggesting while the relationship between incivility and the vote
margin may vary, the same cannot be said for congressional anger. Not only is
the relationship between anger and the percentage of the two-party vote received
consistent, but when these restricted models are used to predict voter turnout the
same is found to be true, except this time anger is a positive predictor. Certainly,
restricting the data in this way is not appropriate, but these models provide more
evidence congressional anger and incivility are distinct phenomena.
6.5 Conclusion
The question becomes, how do these results help us understand congressional anger?
First, as explained in the introduction, anger is much more common on Capitol Hill
than incivility. Regardless of the measure one uses, one will find that members of
Congress are generally civil to one another. Given that, part of the reason why we
find inconsistencies in the relationship between incivility and the vote margin is due
to the lack of relevant cases. Indeed, the majority of the variance in the variable
used in this study is attributed to a handful of cases. While statistically this calls
into question what sort of answers one can gain using this type of data, I think
theoretically this is a much more important statement about where the literature
currently stands on issues related to congressional anger. Even though anger occurs
more often than incivility on the House floor, we seem to study the latter more
than the former. This study demonstrates not only is congressional anger interesting
in and of itself, but its e↵ect on political behavior is unique. Indeed, we can say
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definitely that political incivility negatively a↵ects voter turnout, but the inverse is
true for congressional anger.
Second, throughout this study I have debated whether incivility is a subset of
congressional anger. While there are reasons to believe that is the case, these results
demonstrate they are distinct phenomena. Specifically, even though both anger and
incivility can be activated negative emotional states, the latter is generally regarded
as being detrimental to the democratic process, whereas the same cannot be said for
the former. Here, when members of Congress get angry supporters and opponents
may respond di↵erently, whereas the same cannot be said when incivility is displayed
instead. If the results in this chapter were more consistent with those found in
Chapter 5, then a case could be made for anger and incivility being essentially one
in the same. However, this chapter finds the opposite results when each is used to
predict voter turnout. Moreover, while congressional anger is a significant predictor
of the vote margin, the same cannot be said for incivility. Collectively, these results
not only highlight the di↵erences between congressional anger and incivility, but
emphasize the former should be a topic of interest for scholars moving forward.
Ever since the shooting of Gabrielle Gi↵ords, politicians and pundits alike have
been calling on members of Congress to “tone down the rhetoric.” Most respond
to these calls by emphasizing the importance of political incivility. While political
incivility is certainly important, this chapter shows it has a much smaller e↵ect on
political behavior as compared to congressional anger. In this way, instead of telling
members of Congress they should behave more civilly, maybe we should be telling
them to be less angry? Unfortunately, this is easier said than done, since anger is a
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natural reaction, especially when discussing contentious issues. Moreover, this and
the previous chapter show that congressional anger and incivility a↵ect voter turnout
di↵erently, with the former making voters more likely to turn out on Election Day,
whereas the inverse is true for the latter. Consequently, in an ideal world, we would
have some degree of congressional anger, with little or no incivility.
In fact, this how many view the relationship between congressional anger and
incivility. Beginning with perhaps Madison, politicians have argued that anger is an
inevitable outcome of democracy. Specifically, in Federalist 10 Madison is very clear
on this point:
The latent causes of faction are thus sown in the nature of man; and we
see them everywhere brought into di↵erent degrees of activity, according
to the di↵erent circumstances of civil society. A zeal for di↵erent opinions
concerning religion, concerning government, and many other points, as
well of speculation as of practice; an attachment to di↵erent leaders
ambitiously contending for pre-eminence and power; or to persons of
other descriptions whose fortunes have been interesting to the human
passions, have, in turn, divided mankind into parties, inflamed them with
mutual animosity, and rendered them much more disposed to vex and
oppress each other than to co-operate for their common good. So strong
is this propensity of mankind to fall into mutual animosities, that where
no substantial occasion presents itself, the most frivolous and fanciful
distinctions have been su cient to kindle their unfriendly passions and
excite their most violent conflicts.
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This makes expressions of anger fundamentally di↵erent from expressions of
incivility. While incivility is seen as an unnecessary detriment to e↵ective political
discourse, anger is seen as an inevitable, and in some instances necessary, part of our
democracy. This is why we often times ask members of Congress to be more civil,
but we do not necessarily ask them to be less angry. Unfortunately, while anger
and incivility a↵ect voter turnout di↵erently, we also know that incivility is more
likely when anger is present. People are more likely to hurl insults when they are in
a heated argument, as compared to when they are not. Consequently, while these
results may suggest we want to decrease the level of incivility while not a↵ecting the
level of anger, this is easier said than done. Given that, this chapter may confirm
what we know about anger and incivility, but it also emphasizes the di cultly we
have in dealing with the latter without sacrificing the former. The final chapter will
explore this di culty with an eye towards future research.
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6.6 Figures and Tables
Table 6.1: Predicting the Consequences of Congressional Incivility
Turnout Margin
Hypothesis Operationalization Prediction Prediction
Demobilization Districts represented by members of Congress
who were exceptionally uncivil in the 111th
U.S. House are less likely to turnout in 2010
as compared to districts where representatives
were more civil in the 111th U.S. House.
  ?
Mobilization Districts represented by members of Congress
who were exceptionally uncivil in the 111th
U.S. House are more likely to turnout in 2010
as compared to districts where representatives
were more civil in the 111th U.S. House.
+ ?
Supporter
Demobilization
Democratic districts represented by
Democratic members of Congress who
were exceptionally uncivil in the 111th U.S.
House are less likely to turnout in 2010 as
compared to Democratic districts represented
by Democrats who were more civil in the 111th
U.S. House.
   
Supporter
Mobilization
Democratic districts represented by
Democratic members of Congress who
were exceptionally uncivil in the 111th U.S.
House are more likely to turnout in 2010 as
compared to Democratic districts represented
by Democrats who were more civil in the 111th
U.S. House.
+ +
Opponent
Demobilization
Republican districts represented by
Democratic members of Congress who
were exceptionally uncivil in the 111th U.S.
House are less likely to turnout in 2010 as
compared to Republican districts represented
by Democrats who were more civil in the 111th
U.S. House.
  +
Opponent
Mobilization
Republican districts represented by
Democratic members of Congress who
were exceptionally angry in the 111th U.S.
House are more likely to turnout in 2010 as
compared to Republican districts represented
by Democrats who were less angry in the 111th
U.S. House.
+  
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Table 6.2: Incivility and Voter Turnout
Modified
Product Average Product
Incivility Incivility Incivility
(Intercept)  5.76⇤  5.61⇤  5.85⇤
(0.19) (0.19) (0.19)
Incivilityt 1  0.49⇤  0.61⇤  0.09⇤
(0.06) (0.05) (0.03)
Angert 1 0.40⇤ 0.46⇤ 0.05⇤
(0.06) (0.05) (0.03)
Head Size 0.00⇤ 0.00⇤ 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Percent Voted t 1 2.74⇤ 2.74⇤ 2.73⇤
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
  67.63⇤ 68.30⇤ 66.94⇤
(1.18) (1.19) (1.17)
N 731 731 731
pseudo-R2 0.76 0.76 0.76
logL 9148.43 9180.10 9115.20
Note: The coe cient estimates are from a weighted beta regression where the percentage of the
voting age population who voted is regressed on three definitions of incivility, the first of which
is the product of the average scaled vocal pitch and swear words. “Average Incivility” is the sum
of the average scaled vocal pitch and swear words divided by two. “Modified Product Incivility”
is the sum of “Pitch” and “Swearing” multiplied by one minus the absolute value of “Swearing”
subtracted from “Pitch.” Each of these variables is lagged one-year. The weights are proportional
to the number of speeches, and a ⇤ indicates the estimate is statistically significant at the 0.05-level,
with the standard errors being reported in the parentheses. Finally,   is the estimated precision
parameter and the pseudo-R2 is the ratio of the model’s log-likelihood to the log-likelihood of an
intercept-only model. Please consult Appendix B for the estimates for the control variables. These
are included in the each model but are not reported here.
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Table 6.3: Incivility and the Margin of Victory
Modified
Product Average Product
Incivility Incivility Incivility
(Intercept)  2.88⇤  2.96⇤  2.86⇤
(0.25) (0.26) (0.25)
Incivilityt 1 0.09 0.24⇤  0.09⇤
(0.08) (0.07) (0.04)
Angert 1  0.24⇤  0.32⇤  0.01
(0.07) (0.06) (0.03)
Head Size 0.00⇤ 0.00⇤ 0.00⇤
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Percent Received t 1 1.22⇤ 1.22⇤ 1.22⇤
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
  39.06⇤ 39.14⇤ 39.02⇤
(0.68) (0.68) (0.68)
N 731 731 731
pseudo-R2 0.43 0.43 0.43
logL 7672.04 7679.30 7669.47
Note: The coe cient estimates are from a weighted beta regression where the percentage of the
two-party vote received is regressed on three definitions of incivility, the first of which is the product
of the average scaled vocal pitch and swear words. “Average Incivility” is the sum of the average
scaled vocal pitch and swear words divided by two. “Modified Product Incivility” is the sum of
“Pitch” and “Swearing” multiplied by one minus the absolute value of “Swearing” subtracted from
“Pitch.” Each of these variables is lagged one-year. The weights are proportional to the number
of speeches, and a ⇤ indicates the estimate is statistically significant at the 0.05-level, with the
standard errors being reported in the parentheses. Finally,   is the estimated precision parameter
and the pseudo-R2 is the ratio of the model’s log-likelihood to the log-likelihood of an intercept-only
model. Please consult Appendix B for the estimates for the control variables. These are included
in the each model but are not reported here.
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Chapter 7
Moving Forward
7.1 Introduction
What are the consequences of congressional anger? Ever since the shooting of
Gabrielle Gi↵ords, politicians and pundits alike have assumed the worst when
answering this question. To them, when members of Congress yell and scream at one
another the natural reaction for voters is to withdraw from the political process. This
is why many call on representatives to “tone down the rhetoric.” Unfortunately, to
date, no one has tested these claims empirically. Do voters actually vote less when
they view anger on Capitol Hill? When the Joe Wilson’s of the world lose their
temper, do voters respond by saying “enough is enough”? Although anecdotally we
can find instances where voters respond in this way, in the aggregate we know very
little about whether this is the case.
With that said, political scientists have not been entirely silent on the matter.
Indeed, Diana Mutz and others have demonstrated that political incivility can have
an important negative e↵ect on things like voter trust, many of which are directly
related to turnout in the electorate. However, political incivility and anger are not
one in the same. In terms of the former, when one is uncivil one demonstrates
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an open disrespect towards norms which many believe are necessary for society to
progress. Although anger often breeds incivility, the two concepts are fundamentally
distinct. For example, on the House floor calling the President a liar is considered
uncivil regardless of whether the accusation is yelled or said in a calm and collected
manner. Similarly, insulting someone is objectionable regardless of whether one does
so angrily.
Unfortunately, while many advances have been made in understanding
congressional incivility, similar gains have not been made in terms of congressional
anger. Although it is understandable why research has progressed in this way, this
trajectory must be altered. Anger, unlike incivility, happens on a daily basis. For
every Joe Wilson yelling “You Lie!,” there are literally hundreds if not thousands of
instances of anger that, to date, have been understudied. Not only is congressional
anger more common, but, I argue, it is more fundamental to understanding how
emotion a↵ects behavior on and o↵ Capitol Hill. Joe Wilson’s outburst is the
exception, not the rule. Indeed, most members of Congress are civil to one another,
meaning the bulk of the research that has been conducted in this area has focused
on a small, albeit interesting, phenomenon which has little to do with how emotion
is typically expressed in congress.
Perhaps one of the reasons for the dearth of research in this area may be the
lack of readily available data. Indeed, members of Congress, like justices of the
Supreme Court and presidents of the United States are unlikely to answer questions
regarding how they feel. Using the approach outlined in this dissertation, scholars can
begin to answer these and other related questions. Was President Bush angrier than
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President Obama? When justices of the Supreme Court consider controversial cases
do they express more emotion? Do angry committee members make committees less
e↵ective? Prior to this study, it would have been di cult to answer these types of
questions. Fortunately, this dissertation gives scholars the necessary tools to pursue
these lines of inquiry.
Specifically, beginning with Chapter 3, this study demonstrates how text and
audio data can be used in combination to quantify congressional anger. Although
both have been used by scholars in political science, no study has used them
simultaneously for the purpose of emotional classification. Not only is this approach
unique, but it is important to capture the dynamics of anger on Capitol Hill. Indeed,
“it is not what you say that matters but the manner in which you say it. . . ,” meaning
although text and audio have been shown to be useful for studying a variety of
phenomena in political science, in order to understand congressional anger one cannot
have one without the other (William Carlos Williams). For example, some members
of Congress may consistently be in a negative emotional state, but if they are not
activated as well, then we would say they are “upset” rather than “angry.” Similarly,
other representatives may be extremely emotional, but if they are generally positive
as well, then they are more likely to be “happy” than “angry.” Either way, to fully
capture what is and is not “anger,” one must have a measure of both valence and
activation. This dissertation argues text and audio data can be used to achieve this
end.
However, it is one thing to say that text and audio data can quantify congressional
anger and another thing to provide evidence consistent with this claim. Fortunately,
222
Chapter 4 helps in this regard. Specifically, in this chapter not only was vocal pitch
in combination with the use of negative emotional words shown to be able to predict
expert rankings, but these same measures where shown to be consistent with how
representatives were described in the Almanac of American Politics. Although the
same cannot be said for “angry” groups, a similar story was found for the topics
of speeches. Here, all three measures of anger returned essentially the same results,
suggesting that some topics seem to be angrier than others. Collectively, these
results demonstrate not only can anger be measured using text and audio data, but
when this is done one obtains both meaningful and theoretically consistent results.
For example, not only was Joe Wilson found to be one of the angriest members
of Congress, but the Tea Party was also found to be one of the angriest groups.
Similarly, topics related to national defense and the economy were angrier than
commemorative topics. Regardless of the type of anger one considers, the results are
consistent with most people’s expectations regarding anger. Indeed, if Joe Wilson
was found to be one of the happiest members of Congress, then the use of text
and audio data for the purpose of anger classification would be called into question.
Fortunately, this study found the opposite to be true.
Although these findings are useful methodologically, the goal of this dissertation
was not to simply describe the characteristics of congressional anger. Instead, this
study hoped to understand how anger a↵ects the electorate. When members of
Congress yell and scream does this increase or decrease turnout in their district?
Although arguments could be made one way or another, Chapter 5 finds evidence
of the former, suggesting congressional anger mobilizes voters on Election Day. The
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question becomes, why are voters turning out in this way? Are they turning out
to demonstrate their opposition to anger? Or are they coming to the polls as a
sign of support? Ultimately, Chapter 5 finds more evidence suggesting the latter.
Specifically, not only are people more likely to vote when they see instances of
congressional anger, but when they do, they vote against members of Congress who
are exceptionally angry.
With that said, angry representatives do not necessarily lose more elections.
Rather, Chapter 5 simply shows that the mobilization we find is attributed to voters
turning out against anger. Although one could imagine scenarios were these voters
could swing an election, this is not what is found in the data. Indeed, angry members
of Congress mostly get re-elected, meaning even though people may be turning out
on Election Day to vote against angry representatives, ultimately there is little to no
incentive for representatives to be less angry. Specifically, if members of Congress are
single-minded seekers of re-election, then the results of Chapter 5 would give them
little motivation to “tone down the rhetoric.”
Perhaps this is why congress has been consistently angry over time. Whether it
is Charles Sumner beating Preston Brooks with a cane or Joe Wilson yelling “You
Lie!” outbursts of anger have always been a part of our democracy. While we may
call on members of Congress to lower the temperature, for the most part, these calls
have gone unanswered. Chapter 5 provides a plausible explanation for why this is the
case. Anger may mobilize voters to turn out against those who are angry, but these
same voters are not mobilized enough to throw angry representatives out of o ce.
In this way, voters may say they oppose anger, but they do not oppose it enough in
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order to overcome other factors that may be of equal, if not greater import. Given
that, why would representatives become less angry? Ultimately, there seems to be
little incentive for them to do so.
To me, these results underline the importance of studying congressional anger, but
to others, these same findings may simply be another way of saying political incivility
matters. Indeed, when Joe Wilson yelled “You Lie” he not only displayed anger, but
he also displayed incivility. Similarly, while Charles Sumner was extremely angry
when he was attacking Preston Brooks, he was also extraordinarily uncivil. Given
that, Chapter 6 considers whether the e↵ects of congressional anger are unique from
those of incivility. Ultimately, more evidence is found supporting their distinctiveness.
Specifically, in this chapter not only is congressional anger distinct from incivility,
but the former has a positive e↵ect on voter turnout whereas the inverse is true
for the latter, meaning when members of Congress display incivility people are less
likely to vote on Election Day. Although no other meaningful relationships are
found in Chapter 6, this result alone demonstrates that anger is worthy of study in
and of itself. Not only does anger and incivility relate di↵erently to voter turnout,
but a more interesting story can be told about the former. One of the reasons for
these disparate results is the lack of incivility on Capitol Hill. Whether one defines
incivility using profanity, as done in Chapter 6, or using take-down requests, incivility
is extremely rare, meaning Joe Wilson is much more likely to yell than he is to call
the president a “liar.” Unfortunately, to date, we know very little about the former.
This study hopes to reverse this pattern.
Members of Congress, like you and I, are emotional beings. Sometimes they wear
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their hearts on their sleeves. While they are consistently asked to “tone down the
rhetoric,” this is easier said than done. Not only are some people naturally angrier
than others, but many issues foster anger, even amongst the most level-headed
individuals. This dissertation shows that anger, unlike incivility, seems to mobilize
the electorate. Even though it is unclear whether this is due to either supporters
or opponents turning out more on Election Day, the majority of the results seem
to suggest the latter. Consequently, while congressional anger may have a positive
e↵ect on political participation, those who are participating tend to be those who
are the most upset with the current political system. In this way, this study presents
an interesting conundrum. Anger seems to be beneficial for our democracy precisely
because most voters wish there was less anger.
7.2 Future Directions
7.2.1 Experimental Design
Although this study has made many inroads into understanding congressional anger,
future research is needed in order to tease out some of these relationships. Specifically,
all of the findings outlined above use aggregate-level data. Even though this is useful
for understanding how anger a↵ects political participation outside the laboratory,
it is di cult to isolate casual relationships using this approach. With that said,
this study took many steps to improve the causal claims throughout. Not only was
a lagged variable used, but several robustness checks were included. Almost all of
which point to congressional anger driving voter turnout, and not the other way
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around. However, other research may be necessary in order to verify the direction of
this relationship. One way to achieve this end is through an experimental design, in
which anger is randomly assigned.
To give you a sense of what treatments would look like in this type of experiment,
consider Figure 7.1. In the first panel, I show you the text from one the “angriest”
speeches found in the data used for this study. In this speech, 8.97 percent of the
words are considered to be “negative” by the Linguistic Inquiry Word Count (LIWC)
dictionary. To refine the treatment, the second panel removes all references to specific
pieces of legislation. Ultimately, this ensures that the treatment solicits a subject’s
response to anger as opposed to the speech’s topic. To make the text more “positive”
the final panel removes all negative words (see highlighted) and replaces them with
words that seem more positive. For example, instead of saying, “harder yet may be
the fight,” the “positive” treatment says “harder yet may be the work.” When this
is done, no negative emotional words are found. In this way, the second and final
panels are diametrically opposed, with the former being identical to the latter in
every instance, except for the use of negative words.
However, as explained throughout, anger is also defined by the degree to which
someone is emotionally activated. One way to manipulate activation is to have an
actor read a prompt which puts the actor in either activated or de-activated state.
For example, if the actor professes to be an avid supporter of the arts, then one could
have the actor read an article about how funding for the arts is being cut nationwide.
If this was done then the actor would be more activated. Conversely, you could also
have the same actor read a page out of the dictionary. Even though some may
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get excited about the prospect of increasing their vocabulary, in comparison to the
previous prompt, this article would be much less stimulating. Consequently, the actor
would be placed in a more de-activated emotional state. Although this approach is
more di cult than simply directing an actor to be more or less emotional, it allows
the researcher to determine whether emotional activation triggers an increase in vocal
pitch. Specifically, if the actor speaks at a higher pitch after reading the activation
prompt, then one can assume that emotional activation results in an increase in vocal
pitch, something which has been asserted throughout this study, but has never fully
tested.
Additionally, using this type of design, one could actually determine whether
emotional activation is taking place, using other measures. For example, many
scholars have noted the relationship between electrodermal activity (EDA) and
emotional activation (for review see Kreibig, 2010). Given that, if researchers
manipulated emotional activation using prompts, then they could determine whether
skin conductance increases or decreases while the actor is reading either prompt.
Theoretically, if the activation prompt is more stimulating, then it should increase
skin conductance, whereas the inverse is true for the de-activation prompt. Moreover,
once this relationship is established, researchers could then determine whether the
same relationship is found in the actor’s vocal pitch. Specifically, if the activation
prompt increases skin conductance while the actor is reading the prompt and while
the actor is speaking, then it provides strong evidence that the prompt is not only
increasing emotional activation, but emotional activation increases vocal pitch.
However, the goal of this experimental design is not to simply determine whether
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emotional activation causes an increase in vocal pitch. Rather, an experiment would
be useful in order to help isolate the e↵ect of congressional anger. Specifically,
when respondents hear an “angrier” speech do they indicate a greater willingness
to vote? Using this design, researchers could answer this question. Indeed, one
could randomly assign some respondents to receive an “angry” speech and others to
receive a speech that was less angry. Then, once respondents were assigned to either
treatment, one could simply ask whether they would vote in an election where the
assigned candidate was running for o ce. Moreover, using this design, one could
also ask respondents whether they thought the speaker was “angry.” In this way, not
only could an experiment be useful in isolating whether anger causes an increase or
decrease in voter turnout, but it could also be useful in further validating the measure
used throughout this dissertation. For example, if an actor read the “negative” text
found in Figure 7.1 at a higher vocal pitch, then one would expect not only would
respondents be more likely vote, but they would also be more likely to view the
speech as being particularly angry. If either was not found to be the case, then it
would call into question the validity of the aggregate results found in the previous
chapters.
7.2.2 Legislative E↵ectiveness
Although, in the short-term, an experiment would be useful in advancing our
understanding of congressional anger, in the long-term, the results of this dissertation
could also be used to consider other related questions. For example, does anger make
a member of Congress more or less legislatively e↵ective? Here, many congressional
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scholars work under the assumption that anger makes one less e↵ective in the legislature
(e.g., Evans and Oleszek, 1998, 2000; Lehnen, 1967; Matthews, 1959; Schraufnagel,
2005; Uslaner, 1993). Indeed, “[p]ersonal attacks, unnecessary unpleasantness,
pursuing a line of thought or action that might embarrass a colleague needlessly, are
all thought to be self-defeating–‘after all, your enemies on one issue may be your
friends on the next’” (Matthews, 1959, 1070).
However, psychologists would say anger is not always counterproductive. Indeed,
often times angry people get what they want (for review see van Kleef, 2010).
Specifically, “emotions may signal what value one attaches to the di↵erent issues
and provide critical feedback about one’s mood and willingness to agree” (van Kleef,
de Dreu, and Manstead, 2004, 58). Here, anger in a negotiation may send the signal
that a person is unwilling to compromise, meaning it is either that person’s way
or the highway. Conversely, being happy in a negotiation may send the signal that
a person is content with the way the negotiation is going, meaning that person is
less likely to make additional claims. It is no wonder why van Kleef, de Dreu, and
Manstead (2004) and Sinaceur and Tiedens (2006) both found the display of anger
to be an e↵ective strategy in negotiations.
Undoubtedly, these same tactics also make angry people less likable. Indeed,
people tend to prefer to interact with those who are happy
(Lyubomirsky, King, and Diener, 2005; Salovey et al., 2000; Staw, Sutton, and
Pelled, 1994). Specifically, in the context of negotiations, van Kleef (2009) found
“negotiators whose counterparts expressed anger became angry themselves, disliked
the counterpart, were less satisfied, and were less willing to meet again, whereas
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those whose counterparts expressed happiness became happy themselves, liked the
other, were more satisfied, and were more willing to meet again” (186). Given that,
“Is there truth in the sentiment that happy people are disliked because they are
shallow and annoyingly cheerful? The existing cross-sectional studies actually show
the reverse pattern of results” (Lyubomirsky, King, and Diener, 2005, 827). In this
way, angry people may often times get what they want, but this influence comes with
a social cost.
Unfortunately, no one has tested these two countervailing forces in the U.S. House
of Representatives. Do angry members of Congress pass more pieces of legislation?
When bill sponsors give fiery speeches in supporter of their legislation, are they
more e↵ective? Is their legislation more likely to pass? Conversely, when these same
speakers take this approach, does it cost them interpersonally? One way to answer
this latter question is to consider sponsorship-cosponsorship networks which many
have used as an indicator of underlying working relationships on Capitol Hill (Fowler,
2006b,a; Cho and Fowler, 2010; Zhang et al., 2008; Kirkland, 2011). Specifically,
do angry representatives have more cosponsorship ties? Are they more central in
sponsorship-cosponsorship networks? Using the techniques outlined in this study,
researchers could answer these types of questions, adding to our understanding of
anger and congress as a whole.
231
7.3 Conclusion
Even though these future projects are meant to build on the results found within this
dissertation, the results stand for themselves. Congressional anger is an important,
yet understudied, aspect of American politics. While computer scientists,
psychologists, and communication scholars have long noted the relationship between
text, audio, and anger, political science has been less willing to use text and audio
data for the purpose of emotional classification. This study reverses this pattern, and
in doing so, demonstrates that anger has a meaningful e↵ect on political participation,
both in terms of the number of people who vote on Election Day and who they vote
for. Although some inconsistencies are found, the results are relatively robust. When
members of Congress display anger voters are less likely to turn out.
For many, anger will still be seen as a detriment to democracy. While districts
represented by angry members of Congress may vote more, they also are more likely
to vote against angry representatives. This suggests anger mobilizes the electorate,
but this increase in turnout is not because people see anger on Capitol Hill as being
a reflection of their own angst and outrage. Instead, they vote more because they see
anger as an inherent flaw of our political system. Conversely, others may see anger
as an inevitable outcome of democratic governance. Here, regardless of whether one
is a Republican or Democrat, some things simply make us angry, meaning when we
turn out in response to expressions of anger we do so because anger motivates us to
act politically. Even though this study does not take a stand one way or the other,
one thing is clear: anger matters.
On face, this statement seems rather uncontroversial. However, it fundamentally
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changes the way we relate to emotion in politics. Prior to this study, few scholars
viewed members of Congress as emotional beings. Instead, most members of Congress
were viewed as legislative automatons whose actions were entirely determined by
what was best for their districts. While this study does not necessarily argue against
this depiction of legislative behavior, it does open up other possibilities for those
studying political elites, whether those individuals are members of Congress, justices
of the Supreme Court, or presidents of the United States. Indeed, the fact that
text and audio from floor speeches is predictive of voter turnout, demonstrates that
di↵erent avenues of research can be undertaken when examining the U.S. House of
Representatives and other institutions.
How future scholars will build on the results and techniques used throughout this
study is unclear. What is clear is that congressional anger matters. Whether it is
Joe Wilson yelling “You Lie!” or Anthony Weiner pointing a finger at Republicans,
outbursts of anger seem to have an important e↵ect on the electorate. While
many believe this decreases political participation, this study shows the inverse
is true. The question becomes, how does partisanship a↵ect this relationship?
What about seniority? Or ideology? Is the Senate angrier than the House of
Representatives? How about anger over time? Are some years angrier than others?
Do some representatives become more angry from one year to the next? Until this
dissertation, these types of question would be di cult, if not impossible, to answer.
In this way, the previous chapters not only demonstrate that anger matters, but lay
an important foundation for the consideration of anger on and o↵ of Capitol Hill.
We all get angry from time to time. This study shows we should expect no less
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from our representatives. Although we may speak out against outbursts of anger,
in many ways those outbursts are not only part of the democratic process, but a
reflection of individual proclivities towards anger. Members of Congress, like you
and I, are emotional beings. Some are hot-heads. Some are not. Even though we
would like them to maintain their cool, especially when discussing important issues
of the day, sometimes this simply will not happen. Politics is contentious. In many
ways, politics is angry. From afar, this may seem like a flaw in our democratic
system, but this study shows that it is actually what makes our democracy unique.
People can get angry. People can fight with one another. Members of Congress are
no di↵erent. Instead of shying away from anger, many move towards it, even if it
is just to explain that we need less anger. In this way, anger not only mobilizes
the electorate, but is a fundamental reflection of emotion in politics. To say we
should “tone down the rhetoric,” is to say we should be less political. Certainly, our
representatives should be civil to one another, but do we really want them to be less
angry? Perhaps some do, but at the end of this study, I am reluctant to come to
a similar conclusion. For me, at least when it comes to political participation, the
results seem to suggest we need more, not less, anger.
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7.4 Figures and Tables
Figure 7.1: Text Used for Initial Experiment
(a) (b)
(c)
Note: This figure contains the text that was used in the pilot study. In the first panel, I show one of
the speeches in the dataset that uses the greatest number of negative words. These are highlighted
in yellow. In the second panel, I remove any indicators of specific pieces of legislation. This was
done to ensure that there is no residual e↵ect from the legislative topic being discussed. This panel
is the “negative” text used for the study. The bottom is the “positive” text. The only di↵erence
between the two can be found in the highlighted words, which exist in the former, but not the
latter.
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Appendix A
A.1 Additional Variables
Table A.1: Control Variables for Models in Chapter 5
Variable Description
House
Toss-Up
This variable is a binary indicator of whether the race was considered a
toss-up. In toss-up elections voter turnout is higher because people know
the race could go either way. Ultimately, there were 44 and 34 House
toss-ups in the 2010 and 2012 House elections, respectively. The variable
has a mean of 0.09 and a standard deviation of 0.29.
Senate
Toss-Up
This variable is a binary indicator of whether there was a senate race
which was considered a toss-up. Here, the logic is the same as above.
Toss-ups at the senate level will generate interest, causing voter turnout
to increase. Ultimately, there were 114 and 44 Senate toss-ups in the
2010 and 2012 House elections, respectively. The variable has a mean of
0.18 and a standard deviation of 0.39.
Campaign
Spending
This variable was the total amount of campaign receipts for the each
election cycle divided by the total population. This variable is fairly self
explanatory. More campaign spending per capita, which ranges from 0.32
to 117.56, is likely to generate more interest, making turnout more likely.
Ultimately, this variable has a mean of 6.68 and a standard deviation of
12.51.
Continued on next page
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Table A.1 – continued from previous page
Variable Description
Percent
Female
This variable captures the percentage of the population who is female.
One consistently finds that in recent election women tend to vote at a
higher rate than men, suggesting gender should play a role in turnout.
This variable ranges from 46.27 percent to 54.33 percent. It has a mean
of 0.51 and a standard deviation of 0.01.
Percent
White
This variable captures the percentage of the population which was white.
One consistently finds that racial majorities vote at a higher rate than
minorities, since they are more likely to a↵ected by the election outcome.
This variable ranges from 15.59 percent to 96.9 percent. It has a mean
of 0.74 and a standard deviation of 0.18.
Percent
Urban
This variable captures the percent of the district which was considered
to be urban. In urban districts voter turnout is more likely since voting
is generally easier, due to closer voting locations. This variable ranges
from 15.12 percent to 100 percent. It has a mean of 0.72 and a standard
deviation of 0.23.
Median Age This variable captures the median age, which ranges from 26.9 to 49.10.
Older generations are more likely to vote than their younger counterparts.
Median age is typically used to capture this general relationship. It has
a mean of 37.4 and a standard deviation of 3.44.
Median
Income
This variable captures the median income, which ranges from 26,630
dollars to 117,900 dollars. Wealth, both directly and indirectly through
education, is likely to increase voter turnout, since wealthy individuals
have more of a stake in the outcome. Similarly, if wealth is correlated
with education, then more wealthy people are also likely to value voting
more. It has a mean of 60785.08 and a standard deviation of 15764.13.
Same-Day
Registration
This variable is a binary indicator of whether there was same day
registration. Similar to the removal of other structural barriers, if a
district has same-day registration, then voters are more likely to vote,
since they do not have to worry about a registration deadline. There
were 29 districts which had same-day registration. It has a mean of 0.07
and a standard deviation of 0.25.
Continued on next page
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Table A.1 – continued from previous page
Variable Description
Identification
Required
This variable is a binary indicator of whether identification was required
to vote. Unlike same-day registration, if a district requires identification,
then voters are less likely to turnout since voting requires obtaining
some form of identification, which may be costly to some. There were
54 districts which required identification. It has a mean of 0.12 and a
standard deviation of 0.33.
South This variable is a binary indicator of whether the district is in the
South. Generally, the South is seen as somewhat of an outlier when it
comes to voting, primarily due to its past, which makes voting patterns
of some minority groups fundamentally di↵erent in the South. This
variable is included to control for these regional e↵ects. Here, districts
in Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North
Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and West Virginia
were considered to be in the South. The variable has a mean of 0.33 and
a standard deviation of 0.47.
112th
Congress
This variable is a binary indicator of whether the representative was
a member of the 112th Congress. Arguably, anger may vary from one
Congress to the next. This variable controls for this temporal variance,
and in doing so, helps isolate the general e↵ect of anger.
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A.2 Figures and Tables
Table A.2: Anger and Voter Turnout (Full Model)
Modified
Product Average Product
Anger Anger Anger
(Intercept)  5.77⇤  5.79⇤  5.75⇤
(0.18) (0.18) (0.18)
Angert 1 0.21⇤ 0.18⇤ 0.06⇤
(0.05) (0.04) (0.02)
Head Size 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Percent Voted t 1 2.86⇤ 2.85⇤ 2.85⇤
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
House Toss-Up 0.04⇤ 0.04⇤ 0.04⇤
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Senate Toss-Up 0.22⇤ 0.22⇤ 0.22⇤
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Spending Per Capita 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Percent Female 4.70⇤ 4.66⇤ 4.68⇤
(0.38) (0.38) (0.39)
Percent White 0.40⇤ 0.40⇤ 0.40⇤
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Percent Urban 0.49⇤ 0.49⇤ 0.49⇤
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Percent Obama 0.06 0.05 0.06⇤
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Median Age 0.02⇤ 0.02⇤ 0.02⇤
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Median Income 0.00⇤ 0.00⇤ 0.00⇤
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Same-Day Registration 0.31⇤ 0.31⇤ 0.31⇤
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Continued on next page
239
Table A.2 – continued from previous page
Modified
Product Average Product
Anger Anger Anger
Photo Identification Required  0.10⇤  0.10⇤  0.10⇤
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
South 0.16⇤ 0.15⇤ 0.16⇤
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
112th Congress 1.11⇤ 1.12⇤ 1.10⇤
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
  69.03⇤ 69.07⇤ 68.87⇤
(1.20) (1.21) (1.20)
N 731 731 731
pseudo-R2 0.77 0.77 0.77
logL 9209.95 9212.01 9202.88
Note: The coe cient estimates are from a weighted beta regression where the percentage of the
voting age population who voted is regressed on three definitions of anger, the first of which is the
product of the average scaled vocal pitch and negative emotion words (see Figure 4.1). “Average
Anger” is the sum of the average scaled vocal pitch and negative emotion words divided by two.
“Modified Product Anger” is described in Equation 5.1. Each of these variables is lagged one-year.
The weights are proportional to the number of speeches, and a ⇤ indicates the estimate is statistically
significant at the 0.05-level, with the standard errors being reported in the parentheses. Finally,  
is the estimated precision parameter and the pseudo-R2 is the ratio of the model’s log-likelihood to
the log-likelihood of an intercept-only model.
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Table A.3: Anger and the Margin of Victory (Full Model)
Modified
Product Average Product
Anger Anger Anger
(Intercept)  2.88⇤  2.85⇤  2.91⇤
(0.25) (0.25) (0.25)
Angert 1  0.18⇤  0.19⇤  0.01
(0.06) (0.05) (0.03)
Head Size 0.00⇤ 0.00⇤ 0.00⇤
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Percent Received t 1 1.23⇤ 1.22⇤ 1.23⇤
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
House Toss-Up  0.44⇤  0.44⇤  0.44⇤
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Senate Toss-Up  0.05⇤  0.05⇤  0.05⇤
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Spending Per Capita 0.00⇤ 0.00⇤ 0.00⇤
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Percent Female 5.78⇤ 5.83⇤ 5.79⇤
(0.53) (0.53) (0.53)
Percent White  0.25⇤  0.25⇤  0.25⇤
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Percent Urban 0.04 0.04 0.04
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Percent Obama 0.37⇤ 0.37⇤ 0.36⇤
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Median Age 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Median Income 0.00⇤ 0.00⇤ 0.00⇤
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Same-Day Registration  0.06⇤  0.06⇤  0.05⇤
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Continued on next page
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Table A.3 – continued from previous page
Modified
Product Average Product
Anger Anger Anger
Photo Identification Required 0.11⇤ 0.11⇤ 0.11⇤
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
South  0.13⇤  0.13⇤  0.13⇤
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
112th Congress 0.02 0.01 0.03⇤
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
  39.51⇤ 39.55⇤ 39.46⇤
(0.69) (0.69) (0.69)
N 731 731 731
pseudo-R2 0.43 0.43 0.43
logL 7699.36 7702.66 7695.19
Note: The coe cient estimates are from a weighted beta regression where the percentage of the
two-party vote received is regressed on three definitions of anger, the first of which is the product
of the average scaled vocal pitch and negative emotion words (see Figure 4.1). “Average Anger” is
the sum of the average scaled vocal pitch and negative emotion words divided by two. “Modified
Product Anger” is described in Equation 5.1. Each of these variables is lagged one-year. The
weights are proportional to the number of speeches, and a ⇤ indicates the estimate is statistically
significant at the 0.05-level, with the standard errors being reported in the parentheses. Finally,  
is the estimated precision parameter and the pseudo-R2 is the ratio of the model’s log-likelihood to
the log-likelihood of an intercept-only model.
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Table A.4: Democratic Anger and Voter Turnout (Full Model)
Modified
Product Average Product
Anger Anger Anger
(Intercept)  6.01⇤  6.47⇤  5.80⇤
(0.19) (0.21) (0.21)
Angert 1 2.00⇤ 2.00⇤ 0.16
(0.35) (0.26) (0.16)
Head Size 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Percent Voted t 1 2.86⇤ 2.85⇤ 2.86⇤
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
House Toss-Up 0.03⇤ 0.03⇤ 0.04⇤
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Senate Toss-Up 0.22⇤ 0.22⇤ 0.22⇤
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Spending Per Capita 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Percent Female 4.74⇤ 4.75⇤ 4.67⇤
(0.39) (0.39) (0.39)
Percent White 0.40⇤ 0.40⇤ 0.40⇤
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Percent Urban 0.49⇤ 0.50⇤ 0.49⇤
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Percent Obama 0.55⇤ 1.51⇤ 0.22
(0.12) (0.22) (0.23)
Democrat 0.11 1.51⇤  0.07
(0.12) (0.14) (0.14)
Median Age 0.02⇤ 0.02⇤ 0.02⇤
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Median Income 0.00⇤ 0.00⇤ 0.00⇤
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Same-Day Registration 0.31⇤ 0.31⇤ 0.31⇤
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Continued on next page
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Table A.4 – continued from previous page
Modified
Product Average Product
Anger Anger Anger
Photo Identification Required  0.10⇤  0.10⇤  0.10⇤
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
South 0.15⇤ 0.15⇤ 0.16⇤
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
112th Congress 1.12⇤ 1.12⇤ 1.10⇤
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Angert 1 ⇥ Percent Obama  4.11⇤  4.14⇤  0.34
(0.73) (0.56) (0.37)
Angert 1 ⇥ Democrat  1.00⇤  0.95⇤ 0.12
(0.46) (0.35) (0.23)
Percent Obama ⇥ Democrat  0.34⇤  0.99⇤ 0.00
(0.14) (0.26) (0.27)
Angert 1 ⇥ Percent Obama ⇥ Democrat 3.01⇤ 2.90⇤ 0.04
(0.87) (0.66) (0.45)
  69.51⇤ 69.82⇤ 68.94⇤
(1.21) (1.22) (1.20)
N 731 731 731
pseudo-R2 0.77 0.77 0.77
logL 9232.41 9246.93 9205.92
Note: The coe cient estimates are from a weighted beta regression where the percentage of the
voting age population who voted is regressed on the interaction between anger, the percent of
the district that voted for President Obama (“President Obama”), and whether the district is
represented by a Democrat (“Democrat”). As before, each column corresponds with a di↵erent
definition of “Anger,” first of which is used in the majority of the analysis. Each of these variables
is lagged one-year. The weights are proportional to the number of speeches, and a ⇤ indicates the
estimate is statistically significant at the 0.05-level, with the standard errors being reported in the
parentheses. Finally,   is the estimated precision parameter and the pseudo-R2 is the ratio of the
model’s log-likelihood to the log-likelihood of an intercept-only model.
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Table A.5: Democratic Anger and the Margin of Victory (Full Model)
Modified
Product Average Product
Anger Anger Anger
(Intercept)  0.91⇤  0.65⇤  0.05
(0.24) (0.26) (0.26)
Angert 1  3.08⇤  2.00⇤  1.96⇤
(0.41) (0.31) (0.19)
Head Size 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Percent Received t 1 0.42⇤ 0.43⇤ 0.40⇤
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
House Toss-Up  0.26⇤  0.26⇤  0.27⇤
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Senate Toss-Up 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Spending Per Capita 0.00⇤ 0.00⇤ 0.00⇤
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Percent Female 5.05⇤ 5.17⇤ 4.83⇤
(0.47) (0.47) (0.47)
Percent White  0.04  0.03  0.08⇤
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Percent Urban 0.09⇤ 0.10⇤ 0.09⇤
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Percent Obama  3.43⇤  4.27⇤  5.20⇤
(0.14) (0.26) (0.27)
Democrat  2.90⇤  3.54⇤  3.33⇤
(0.10) (0.17) (0.17)
Median Age 0.01⇤ 0.01⇤ 0.01⇤
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Median Income 0.00⇤ 0.00⇤ 0.00⇤
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Same-Day Registration  0.02  0.02  0.03
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Continued on next page
245
Table A.5 – continued from previous page
Modified
Product Average Product
Anger Anger Anger
Photo Identification Required 0.11⇤ 0.11⇤ 0.10⇤
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
South  0.15⇤  0.15⇤  0.15⇤
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
112th Congress  0.01  0.01  0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Angert 1 ⇥ Percent Obama 7.86⇤ 5.22⇤ 4.73⇤
(0.85) (0.66) (0.43)
Angert 1 ⇥ Democrat 3.82⇤ 3.14⇤ 1.49⇤
(0.54) (0.41) (0.28)
Percent Obama ⇥ Democrat 5.90⇤ 7.39⇤ 7.06⇤
(0.18) (0.32) (0.33)
Angert 1 ⇥ Percent Obama ⇥ Democrat  9.66⇤  7.59⇤  3.98⇤
(1.03) (0.78) (0.53)
  51.7⇤ 51.69⇤ 51.46⇤
(0.90) (0.90) (0.90)
N 731 731 731
pseudo-R2 0.57 0.57 0.57
logL 8569.45 8569.21 8554.52
Note: The coe cient estimates are from a weighted beta regression where the percentage of the
two-party vote received is regressed on the interaction between anger, the percent of the district
that voted for President Obama (“President Obama”), and whether the district is represented by a
Democrat (“Democrat”). As before, each column corresponds with a di↵erent definition of “Anger,”
first of which is used in the majority of the analysis. Each of these variables is lagged one-year. The
weights are proportional to the number of speeches, and a ⇤ indicates the estimate is statistically
significant at the 0.05-level, with the standard errors being reported in the parentheses. Finally,  
is the estimated precision parameter and the pseudo-R2 is the ratio of the model’s log-likelihood to
the log-likelihood of an intercept-only model.
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Appendix B
B.1 Additional Variables
Table B.1: Control Variables for Models in Chapter 6
Variable Description
House
Toss-Up
This variable is a binary indicator of whether the race was considered a
toss-up. In toss-up elections voter turnout is higher because people know
the race could go either way. Ultimately, there were 44 and 34 House
toss-ups in the 2010 and 2012 House elections, respectively. The variable
has a mean of 0.09 and a standard deviation of 0.29.
Senate
Toss-Up
This variable is a binary indicator of whether there was a senate race
which was considered a toss-up. Here, the logic is the same as above.
Toss-ups at the senate level will generate interest, causing voter turnout
to increase. Ultimately, there were 114 and 44 Senate toss-ups in the
2010 and 2012 House elections, respectively. The variable has a mean of
0.18 and a standard deviation of 0.39.
Campaign
Spending
This variable was the total amount of campaign receipts for the each
election cycle divided by the total population. This variable is fairly self
explanatory. More campaign spending per capita, which ranges from 0.32
to 117.56, is likely to generate more interest, making turnout more likely.
Ultimately, this variable has a mean of 6.68 and a standard deviation of
12.51.
Continued on next page
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Table B.1 – continued from previous page
Variable Description
Percent
Female
This variable captures the percentage of the population who is female.
One consistently finds that in recent election women tend to vote at a
higher rate than men, suggesting gender should play a role in turnout.
This variable ranges from 46.27 percent to 54.33 percent. It has a mean
of 0.51 and a standard deviation of 0.01.
Percent
White
This variable captures the percentage of the population which was white.
One consistently finds that racial majorities vote at a higher rate than
minorities, since they are more likely to a↵ected by the election outcome.
This variable ranges from 15.59 percent to 96.9 percent. It has a mean
of 0.74 and a standard deviation of 0.18.
Percent
Urban
This variable captures the percent of the district which was considered
to be urban. In urban districts voter turnout is more likely since voting
is generally easier, due to closer voting locations. This variable ranges
from 15.12 percent to 100 percent. It has a mean of 0.72 and a standard
deviation of 0.23.
Median Age This variable captures the median age, which ranges from 26.9 to 49.10.
Older generations are more likely to vote than their younger counterparts.
Median age is typically used to capture this general relationship. It has
a mean of 37.4 and a standard deviation of 3.44.
Median
Income
This variable captures the median income, which ranges from 26,630
dollars to 117,900 dollars. Wealth, both directly and indirectly through
education, is likely to increase voter turnout, since wealthy individuals
have more of a stake in the outcome. Similarly, if wealth is correlated
with education, then more wealthy people are also likely to value voting
more. It has a mean of 60785.08 and a standard deviation of 15764.13.
Same-Day
Registration
This variable is a binary indicator of whether there was same day
registration. Similar to the removal of other structural barriers, if a
district has same-day registration, then voters are more likely to vote,
since they do not have to worry about a registration deadline. There
were 29 districts which had same-day registration. It has a mean of 0.07
and a standard deviation of 0.25.
Continued on next page
248
Table B.1 – continued from previous page
Variable Description
Identification
Required
This variable is a binary indicator of whether identification was required
to vote. Unlike same-day registration, if a district requires identification,
then voters are less likely to turnout since voting requires obtaining
some form of identification, which may be costly to some. There were
54 districts which required identification. It has a mean of 0.12 and a
standard deviation of 0.33.
South This variable is a binary indicator of whether the district is in the
South. Generally, the South is seen as somewhat of an outlier when it
comes to voting, primarily due to its past, which makes voting patterns
of some minority groups fundamentally di↵erent in the South. This
variable is included to control for these regional e↵ects. Here, districts
in Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North
Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and West Virginia
were considered to be in the South. The variable has a mean of 0.33 and
a standard deviation of 0.47.
112th
Congress
This variable is a binary indicator of whether the representative was
a member of the 112th Congress. Arguably, anger may vary from one
Congress to the next. This variable controls for this temporal variance,
and in doing so, helps isolate the general e↵ect of anger.
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B.2 Figures and Tables
Table B.2: Incivility and Voter Turnout (Full Model)
Modified
Product Average Product
Incivility Incivility Incivility
(Intercept)  5.76⇤  5.61⇤  5.85⇤
(0.19) (0.19) (0.19)
Incivilityt 1  0.49⇤  0.61⇤  0.09⇤
(0.06) (0.05) (0.03)
Angert 1 0.40⇤ 0.46⇤ 0.05⇤
(0.06) (0.05) (0.03)
Head Size 0.00⇤ 0.00⇤ 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Percent Voted t 1 2.74⇤ 2.74⇤ 2.73⇤
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
House Toss-Up 0.05⇤ 0.05⇤ 0.05⇤
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Senate Toss-Up 0.19⇤ 0.19⇤ 0.20⇤
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Spending Per Capita 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Percent Female 4.86⇤ 4.64⇤ 5.08⇤
(0.39) (0.39) (0.39)
Percent White 0.41⇤ 0.40⇤ 0.41⇤
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Percent Urban 0.51⇤ 0.52⇤ 0.51⇤
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Percent Obama 0.06 0.05 0.06
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Median Age 0.02⇤ 0.02⇤ 0.02⇤
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Median Income 0.00⇤ 0.00⇤ 0.00⇤
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Continued on next page
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Table B.2 – continued from previous page
Modified
Product Average Product
Incivility Incivility Incivility
Same-Day Registration 0.33⇤ 0.34⇤ 0.33⇤
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Photo Identification Required  0.10⇤  0.10⇤  0.09⇤
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
South 0.16⇤ 0.16⇤ 0.16⇤
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
112th Congress 1.06⇤ 1.05⇤ 1.07⇤
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
  67.63⇤ 68.30⇤ 66.94⇤
(1.18) (1.19) (1.17)
N 731 731 731
pseudo-R2 0.76 0.76 0.76
logL 9148.43 9180.10 9115.20
Note: The coe cient estimates are from a weighted beta regression where the percentage of the
voting age population who voted is regressed on three definitions of incivility, the first of which is
the product of the average scaled vocal pitch and swear words. “Average Incivility” is the sum of
the average scaled vocal pitch and swear words divided by two. “Modified Product Incivility” is
described in Equation 5.1. Each of these variables is lagged one-year. The weights are proportional
to the number of speeches, and a ⇤ indicates the estimate is statistically significant at the 0.05-level,
with the standard errors being reported in the parentheses. Finally,   is the estimated precision
parameter and the pseudo-R2 is the ratio of the model’s log-likelihood to the log-likelihood of an
intercept-only model.
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Table B.3: Incivility and the Margin of Victory (Full Model)
Modified
Product Average Product
Incivility Incivility Incivility
(Intercept)  2.88⇤  2.96⇤  2.86⇤
(0.25) (0.26) (0.25)
Incivilityt 1 0.09 0.24⇤  0.09⇤
(0.08) (0.07) (0.04)
Angert 1  0.24⇤  0.32⇤  0.01
(0.07) (0.06) (0.03)
Head Size 0.00⇤ 0.00⇤ 0.00⇤
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Percent Received t 1 1.22⇤ 1.22⇤ 1.22⇤
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
House Toss-Up  0.44⇤  0.44⇤  0.44⇤
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Senate Toss-Up  0.05⇤  0.05⇤  0.05⇤
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Spending Per Capita 0.00⇤ 0.00⇤ 0.00⇤
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Percent Female 5.63⇤ 5.79⇤ 5.70⇤
(0.53) (0.53) (0.53)
Percent White  0.23⇤  0.22⇤  0.23⇤
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Percent Urban 0.04⇤ 0.04 0.05⇤
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Percent Obama 0.44⇤ 0.45⇤ 0.44⇤
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Median Age 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Median Income 0.00⇤ 0.00⇤ 0.00⇤
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Continued on next page
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Table B.3 – continued from previous page
Modified
Product Average Product
Incivility Incivility Incivility
Same-Day Registration  0.06⇤  0.06⇤  0.05⇤
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Photo Identification Required 0.12⇤ 0.12⇤ 0.12⇤
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
South  0.13⇤  0.13⇤  0.13⇤
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
112th Congress 0.03⇤ 0.03⇤ 0.02
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
  39.06⇤ 39.14⇤ 39.02⇤
(0.68) (0.68) (0.68)
N 731 731 731
pseudo-R2 0.43 0.43 0.43
logL 7672.04 7679.30 7669.47
Note: The coe cient estimates are from a weighted beta regression where the percentage of the
two-party vote received is regressed on three definitions of incivility, the first of which is the product
of the average scaled vocal pitch and swear words. “Average Incivility” is the sum of the average
scaled vocal pitch and swear words divided by two. “Modified Product Incivility” is described
in Equation 5.1. Each of these variables is lagged one-year. The weights are proportional to the
number of speeches, and a ⇤ indicates the estimate is statistically significant at the 0.05-level,
with the standard errors being reported in the parentheses. Finally,   is the estimated precision
parameter and the pseudo-R2 is the ratio of the model’s log-likelihood to the log-likelihood of an
intercept-only model.
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